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Muslims in Great Britain: the impact of mosque attendance on political behaviour and civic engagement

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ABSTRACT

Is mosque attendance associated with withdrawal from civic and political life and the endorsement of politically motivated violence (PMV)? We draw from a large multi-ethnic survey in the U.K. to answer this research question. Our analysis is unique in that we compare Muslims to Christians to show that mosques, just like churches, can enhance the civic and political participation of their adherents. Drawing from scholarship on religious institutions, social capital, and social identity, we claim and empirically show that mosque attendance is associated with increased electoral and non-electoral political participation, higher levels of civic engagement, and the rejection of PMV. Our findings not only advance the current scholarly understanding of the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims in the West, but also have important policy implications in that they help dispel stereotypical and sensationalist accounts of Mosques and their adherents in the post-Brexit U.K.

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Setting the stage: why study mosques?

Despite what some academic discourse implies regarding the incompatibilities of Islam with Western democracies (Huntington 1993, 1997, 2004; Lewis 2002; Pipes 2003), and the popular depiction of Islam as an extremist and backward religion, research in the context of the U.S. has demonstrated that Muslims are rapidly acculturating and integrating, and that mosque attendance promotes, rather than inhibits, social and political incorporation (Ayers and Hofstetter 2008; Bagby 2009; Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011; Howell and Jamal 2009; Jamal 2005). Furthermore, research in the U.S. has not found any links between adherence to Islam and support for politically motivated violence (PMV) or radical views (Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015; Kurzman, Schanzer, and Moosa 2011). On the contrary, the most religiously devout Muslims are more likely than their counterparts to believe that Islamic teachings are compatible with participation in the American democracy, and to display much higher rates of civic and political engagement (Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011; Jamal 2005). Thus, when empirical evidence is brought to the forefront of alarmist accounts and monolithic depictions of Islam such as those advanced by Representative Peter King (R-NY) – who asserted that mosques

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are places 'where terrorists are being homegrown' or that '80% of mosques in this country [the U.S.] are controlled by radical Imams' – research finds no sign of radicalism, alienation or incompatibility between religiosity and democratic engagement in the U.S. context. However, given the persistent use of anti-Islamic discourse in other places outside the U.S., and the reliance on anecdotal evidence to describe what Muslims believe and how they behave, more research on the fastest growing religion in the world is needed. We seek to contribute to the growing (Ahmad and Evergeti 2010; Giugni, Michel, and Gianni 2014; Güveli and Platt 2011; Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 2010; Sobolewska and McAndrew 2015), but still limited, systematic analysis of Muslims in Western societies. Our central task is to determine whether the patterns of civic and political behaviour found among American mosque-goers holds in other Western societies, particularly the U.K. We focus on the U.K. not only because Muslims are the fastest growing population in Britain – projected to double in size by 2021 (U.K. Census, 2011) – but because analysis of media coverage, political rhetoric, and public opinion polls demonstrates that Islamophobia is an increasingly growing and widespread problem (Bayrakli and Hafez 2016; Bleich 2009; Bleich and Maxwell 2013; Field 2007; Moore, Mason, and Lewis 2008; Petley and Richardson 2013). Recent reports also suggest that the Brexit campaign may have further intensified anti-Muslim sentiments (Bayrakli and Hafez 2017), with a new study finding that faith-based hate crimes against British Muslims increased by 326% over a span of just one year (Sherwood 2016). Alarmed by the findings, the former Labour communities minister, Shahid Malik, expressed grave concern about the status of Muslims in the U.K.: 'We stand in uncharted territory … the statistics paint a profoundly bleak picture of the explosion of anti-Muslim hate both online and on our streets, with visibly Muslim women being disproportionately targeted by cowardly hatemongers' (Jeory 2016). It is in this climate of Islamophobia and often distorted, exaggerated, and oversimplified portrayals of Muslims in the U.K. that we deem more research on this population necessary.

While our research contributes to existing scholarship on the attitudes and behaviours of Muslims in the west, it is unique in that it goes a step further than any previous study. First, our study directly compares ethnic minority Muslim to ethnic minority Christian adherents within a large multi-ethnic sample. Second, our investigation departs from prior research on ethnic minorities in Britain (see, e.g. McAndrew and Voas 2014; Sanders et al. 2014; Sobolewska and McAndrew 2015) in that we seek to determine whether any notable differences emerge between individuals who attend the *mosque* as opposed to the *church* on a wide range of behavioural and attitudinal measures. In comparing Christians to Muslims we do not aim to generalise their unique experiences and beliefs, or to pit them against one another. Instead, our objective is to show yet another way that worship attendance has a similar, rather than divergent, impact on the civic and political engagement of different religious groups. More specifically, our argument is that mosques in places like the U.K., just like churches and synagogues, should also be viewed as important catalysts to social, civic, and political integration. Beyond advancing research on Muslims and mosque attendance outside of the American context, we believe that our findings have important policy implications in the post-Brexit U.K., and Europe in general. While Muslims in Europe have been depicted as a potential threat to democratic values (Modood, Triandafyllidou, and Zapata-Barrero 2006), we find that there is nothing strange or unique about the role that mosques play in the

overall puzzle of ethnic minority engagement. Our results reveal that British Muslims who frequently attend the mosque are more likely to engage in a range of civic and political activities than those who do not attend the mosque. When we compare Muslims to Christians, we actually find that on some measures, mosque-goers in the U.K. appear to be more engaged than church-goers. It is important to emphasise that our overall conclusion is not that mosques are somehow more capable than churches in socialising minorities into the British political process. Rather, we suggest that mosque-goers may have more at stake than church-goers to protect their rights and to enhance their status in Britain because they face challenges on multiple fronts. Not only do ethnic minority Muslims face scrutiny based on racial or ethnic grounds, but also due their faith, which has long been portrayed very negatively and often depicted to be at odds with Western ethos, beliefs, and democratic principles (Matar 2009; Said 1979, 1980).

Before we conclude our study, we take on one final and also important evaluation: whether Muslims in Britain are more likely than other religious individuals to endorse *violent* demonstrations or protests in the face of disagreement with government actions. Once again, the results counter orientalist notions of Islam as a religion prone to violence. Our analysis reveals no connection between religious identity and the endorsement of violent demonstrations or protests. In some cases, Muslims appear to be actually less likely than non-Muslims to endorse violence. We also do not find a link between regular mosque attendance and endorsement of violence. Overall, we deem these results important because they bring facts to the forefront of debates about Islam and religiosity is Western nations. Without empirical evidence, right-wing groups, media outlets, and some politicians in both Europe and the U.S. will continue to fuel fears about Muslims, especially those who regularly attend the mosque.

In what follows, we provide a much more expansive account of our empirical findings. Before that, however, we set the theoretical stage by explaining the link between worship attendance and political behaviour, and discuss more specifically why mosque attendance, just like church attendance, can promote civic and political engagement. After that, we provide a detailed description of the data, variable construction, and the analytical strategy. This section will be followed by a series of results, which are broken down into two sections. After a detailed discussion of the findings, we conclude with a short discussion.

Theoretical framework

Our research question is straightforward: do mosques promote civic and political participation in Western nations, particularly the U.K.? More specifically, should we expect mosque-goers to display higher rates of civic and political participation than their counterparts? Our answer is an unequivocal yes. Our proposition that mosques, just like churches and synagogues, are expected to promote civic and political participation among Muslims in the U.K. rests on two central reasons. First, we draw from the expansive literature on religious institutions, associational networks, and social capital to assert that mosques can also be viewed as civic associations that provide a common meeting place to discuss salient group issues, develop leadership skills, build trust, and encourage their members to take part in their respective communities. Second, we suggest that mosque-goers in places such as the U.K. may especially feel inclined to take part in various civic and political activities because of the challenges that mosques and their members have

encountered over the past decade and half (Bleich and Maxwell 2013). Facing marginalisation on multiple fronts (ethnic and religious identity), ethnic minority Muslims may have more at stake than non-Muslim minorities to tackle issues of stigmatisation, stereotyping, and bias. As such, when comparing Christian minorities to Muslim minorities in the recent social and political climate of the U.K., one might expect Muslims to be more active or participatory than Christian minorities, who, based on their religious identity at least, tend to fit into the 'mainstream'. We discuss each point in greater detail below, starting with the notion that mosques are akin to other religious and civic associations that serve as important catalysts to increased social and political incorporation.

The connection between worship attendance and political behaviour has been well documented. In addition to addressing spiritual needs, studies have found that religious institutions facilitate the political engagement of their adherents by developing basic civic skills, broadening social networks, providing information about salient issues and candidates, and even recruiting members into the political process (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Harris 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; McClerking and McDaniel 2005; Smidt 1999; Verba et al. 1995; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). Most of this scholarship, however, has specifically focused on the ability of Christian-based institutions to enhance civic and political engagement (Brown and Wolford 1994; Djupe and Gilbert 2006; Guth et al. 1998; Harris 1994; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Verba et al. 1995). It is contended that churches are akin to civic associations that develop civic education and skills especially because they provide a regular meeting place for individuals to interact and discuss salient public events and affairs (Brown and Brown 2003; Putnam and Campbell 2010; Tate 1994; Wald and Calhoun-Brown 2014). Furthermore, research has concluded that in addition to facilitating social networks, religious leaders, such as Catholic and Black Protestant clergy, also play an important role in engaging their congregants in the political process by supporting religious interpretations conducive to political participation (Guth et al. 1997; Harris 1994; McDaniel 2008; Smidt 2004).

While numerous studies have established a strong link between church attendance and increased participation in civic and political affairs, much less research has been conducted about the role that mosques, in Western nations, play in promoting the civic and political participation of their adherents. To date, our understanding of the relationship between mosque attendance and political behaviour is still fairly limited, necessitating more research into this topic. Nevertheless, there is strong reason to believe that mosques, similar to churches, serve as critical civic building and social capital enhancing institutions that socialise Muslims into the political process. Drawing from social capital theorists such as Bourdieu (2011), Coleman (1988), and Putnam (2000), we argue that mosques, like other associational networks, can be viewed as powerful vehicles of sociopolitical integration and cohesion that facilitate norms of reciprocity, enhance trust, build organisational skills, and increase collaboration towards specific community goals. Putnam (2000) contends that religious organisations play an especially vital role in civil society by directly supporting 'a wide range of social activities well beyond conventional worship' (35). More specifically, Putnam notes that faith-based organisations provide social support for their members, enhance communication skills, encourage altruism, and inform individuals about public affairs, all of which enhance social connectedness and political engagement. In the case of Mosques, the few studies that exist strongly echo these claims. Recent work, especially in the context of U.S., has shown that

mosque attendance is associated with increased political participation because mosques bring people from diverse social and ethnic backgrounds together, enhance civic skills and group consciousness, help members strengthen their common religious identity, and encourage active involvement in organisations that help the poor, sick, and elderly (Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011; Jamal 2005; Giugni, Michel, and Gianni 2014; Sobolewska and McAndrew 2015). Based on these empirical findings, we hypothesise that mosques in the U.K., as a function of developing civic skills and social capital, can also increase the civic and political participation of their members.

However, the development of civic skills and social capital may not be the only avenue through which mosque attendance can promote democratic engagement given the context of Islamophobia we previously discussed. Research on black churches suggests that religious institutions may also *directly* mobilise their adherents into the political process for the purposes of addressing issues of inequality and representation (Calhoun-Brown 1996; Jones-Correa and Leal 2001; Verba et al. 1995). According to Social Identity Theory (Tajfel and Turner 1979, 1986) and its offshoot, Social Identity Performance (Klein, Spears, and Reicher 2007), this is to be expected as stigmatised groups are likely to engage in behaviours that bolsters or strengthens their identity (identity consolidation) and behaviours that aim to advance group-specific goals or outcomes (identity mobilisation). With respect to Muslims, recent research has shown that perceived group-level threat has the capacity to increase participation in a wide variety of civic and political activities (Oskooii 2016), and that the saliency of Muslim identity is associated with expressing support for political action to defend Islam (Phalet, Baysu, and Verkuyten 2010). Thus, it is entirely possible that mosque leaders may also be directly encouraging their adherents to take part in various civic and political activities since the mosque – as a unique physical symbol of an Islamic presence in the community – and its members have come under tremendous scrutiny and widely discussed by local governments across the U.K. Biondo (2006) describes how Muslims in the U.K. have been pushed into the local political environment simply due to the architectural complications surrounding the mosque itself. This necessitates that Muslim leaders and members of the mosque to improve their political communication skills and encourage dialogue between themselves and non-Muslims. Certainly, the global war on terror and the depiction of Muslims as radical 'outsiders' have intensified the need to address issues of diversity and inclusion. Unlike church-attending ethnic minorities, who fit into the religious 'mainstream', ethnic minority mosque-goers not only encounter ethnic penalties, but also face pressures to improve 'social harmony' surrounding the mosque and its city, and to keep dialogue open with local authorities (Biondo 2006; Cesari 2005). While in the past Muslims in Europe were relatively isolated within invisible and private prayer rooms, the mosque now openly, publicly, and visibly marks an Islamic presence, requiring Muslims to confront stereotypical depictions of Islam and to push for policies that accommodate and encourage the establishment of sites of worship (Nagel 2005). Due to these challenges, another way in which mosque attendance can promote increased civic and political engagement is through more direct appeals by mosque leaders to encourage their members to build stronger community ties and to dispel myths about the mosque and Islam, in general. While more research into this specific mechanism or the messages and strategies that emanate from the mosque is needed, some scholars suggest that mosque-goers and mosque leaders in the post-9/11 era have become virtually unanimous

in their support of Muslim involvement in the political process (Bagby 2009; Khan 2015). As such, we also deem more direct efforts through the mosque as an important part of the overall puzzle of Muslim engagement in the U.K.

Data selection

The previous section highlighted the ways in which mosque attendance is expected to promote, rather than inhibit, civic and political participation. In this section, we rely on the 2010 Ethnic Minority British Election Study (EMBES) to investigate the relationship between worship attendance and a number of behavioural outcomes. We selected this survey for at least three key reasons. First, the EMBES study is the most comprehensive and up-to-date survey of ethnic and racial minorities in the U.K. From 7 May 2010 to 31 August 2010 a total of 2787 interviews were administered face-to-face by a computer-assisted personal interview (CAPI) software in England, Scotland, and Wales. The sample design differs considerably from the main British Election Study in that it focuses exclusively on the five biggest ethnic minority groups in Great Britain. Specifically, the survey population consists of a random sample of adults 18 years old or higher who self-classify into one of the five Census ethnic groups: Black Caribbean, Black African, Indian, Pakistani, and Bangladeshi.[1] Each ethnic minority group represents roughly 20% of the total sample with the exception of Bangladeshi participants, who only compose 10% of the sample.[2]

The second reason for selecting this survey is that it contains a large sample size of Muslim and Christian participants to assess whether any major or unique differences emerge between mosques and churches as it relates to civic and political engagement. About 41% of the total sample self-identified as Muslim and 30% as Christian, with 8% as Hindu, 6% as Sikh, and 2% as other. Roughly 1 out of 10 (13%) individuals did not identify with any religion. For the purposes of this study, we only analysed respondents who identified as Muslim or Christian. Out of the total number of Muslims, the vast majority (82%) of the respondents are Sunni, with only 3% of the sample identified as Shi'a. The majority of Muslim respondents are Pakistani (56%), with Bangladeshi and Black Africans composed of 23% and 13% of the Muslim subsample. As for Christians, 48% self-identified as Black Caribbean and 44% identified as Black African. In regards to the denominational breakdown of the Christian respondents, 31% identified as Pentecostal, 25% as Catholic, and 14% as Anglican. Roughly 85% of all the Muslim and Christian adherents indicated that religion is very or extremely important to them. Only less than 4% of both subsamples believed that religion is 'not very' or 'not at all important'.

Also important to note is the ethnic breakdown by religious affiliation. Nearly all of the Black-Caribbean participants (95%) and the vast majority of Black Africans (70%) are Christian. In contrast, almost all of the Pakistani and Bangladeshi participants are Muslim. Although the majority of Indians identified as Hindu or Sikh, 10% of them did identify as Christian and 14% as Muslim. While religious affiliation is, to some extent, contingent on the respondent's ethnic background, research shows that there are no significant differences in political interest as well as civic and political engagement across the five groups. As Sanders et al. (2014) reported, '… for the most part the experiences and attitudes of Britain's EM [Ethnic Minority] citizens are fairly uniform' (129). Furthermore, not only are there relatively minor attitudinal and behavioural differences

across the minority groups, there is very little evidence that the white majority is more interested in politics or more democratically engaged (Heath et al. 2013; Sanders et al. 2014). As such, we are confident that our comparison of Muslim and Christian adherents with this specific dataset is appropriate despite some of the ethnic differences we observed across the two subsamples.[3]

The last and final reason for selecting the EMBES dataset has to do with the availability of a number of detailed behavioural and attitudinal measures. For instance, respondents were not only asked whether they voted in the 2010 general election, but also asked if they have volunteered in politics or community affairs, participated in a protest, petitioned the government, and donated money towards a political cause or to an advocacy organisation. Furthermore, individuals were asked to report their activity levels in voluntary organisations such as a local community association, a charity, or a sports club. In addition to these political and civic participation measures, the EMBES includes three questions that assesses participants' levels of endorsement of violent demonstrations or protests. The violent protest questions will be used in the last part of our analysis to determine whether Muslim participants, on average, have a higher propensity than non-Muslims to endorse violence in the face of disagreement – more on this later. Having discussed the specific reasons that make the EMBES dataset suitable for the present study, we now turn to the construction of the key independent and dependent variables used in the first part of our analysis: the link between worship attendance and various civic and political outcomes.

Variable selection and construction

Our key independent variable is communal worship attendance. All the participants who identified with a religious denomination were asked how often they have participated in 'religious activities or attended religious services or meetings with other people, other than for events such as weddings and funerals' in the past 12 months. We chose this question over how often individuals engaged in religious activities on their own because we wanted to distinctly test the role of *religious institutions* on a set of behavioural outcomes. The latter question, often referred to as 'private religious practice', includes prayer or other forms of mediation or worship at places such as one's home, making the former question a much better measure for the purposes of this study.

Figure 1 compares rates of participation between Muslim and Christian participants. Overall, both subgroups participated in their respective religious institutions at similar rates. However, some differences do exist in that a higher proportion of Muslims than Christians (25% vs. 7%) indicated attending worship at least once a day. This is perhaps not surprising as religiously devout Muslims tend to pray five times a day, explaining some of the difference between the most involved subsections of the two groups. But, if we take a detailed look at how often Muslims and Christians participated in their respective religious institutions at least once a week, we find that any group differences are minimal. That is, about 56% of Muslims indicated attending the mosque once a week or more, and about 61% of Christians provided the same answer (i.e. attending church) – a difference of only 5 percentage points.

With respect to the outcome variables, we selected a total of six participation measures. The first five dependent variables were selected to assess both electoral and non-electoral



Figure 1. Worship attendance by religious affiliation.

political engagement. Respondents were asked (1) whether they have voted in the 2010 general election on May 6th; (2) signed a petition to show concern about a public issue or problem; (3) gave money to a political cause or advocacy organisation; (4) volunteered to get involved in politics or community affairs; and (5) participated in a protest, like a rally or a demonstration, to show concern about a public issue or problem.[4] All of the participation measures, by design, are dichotomous variables (0–1). Therefore, for each question, respondents who reported participating were assigned value 1, and those who did not participate were assigned value 0. Figure 2 reports rates of political participation for each unique measure by religious affiliation. Overall, a simple bivariate glance at the self-reported participation measures does not reveal any significant behavioural discrepancies between the two groups. As one would expect, voting is by far the most common mode of



Figure 2. Political participation by religious affiliation.

political participation, with at least 69% of both subgroups reporting that they casted a ballot in the 2010 general election. After voting, signing a petition and volunteering in politics or community affairs ranks as the second most popular mode of engagement. Attending a protest or donating money for a political cause, however, ranked last for both Muslims and Christians.

In addition to the political participation variables, we constructed a civic engagement variable from the following survey question: 'Over the past few years, how active have you been in a voluntary organisation, like a local community association, a charity, or a sports club?' Response options included: very active, somewhat active, a little active, and not active at all. Individuals who indicated that they were 'very active' were assigned the highest value (3), with those who reported that they were 'not active at all' receiving the lowest score (0). Unlike the political participation measures, we find some differences in the distribution of this categorical variable across the two religious cleavages. About 33% of Christians indicated being somewhat or very active as opposed to 21% of Muslims. This difference is even more noticeable when we compare those who were completely disengaged. Among Muslims, 63% reported no activity whatsoever while only 48% of Christians provided the same answer. Of course, these differences do not account for the impact of church and mosque attendance, which is something we pay specific attention to in the multivariate analysis section.

Having discussed the selection and construction of the key independent and dependent variables, we now shift our focus to the control variables. In order to assess the independent impact of worship attendance on each of the six dependent variables, we accounted for as many theoretically relevant confounding variables as possible while keeping the models reasonably parsimonious. With this objective in mind, we first included all the standard socioeconomic or demographic variables that previous scholars have identified as important controls or predictors of political engagement (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978; Verba et al. 1995; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980). For instance, we constructed dummy variables for each of the five ethnic groups as well as sex (female=1), generational status (second gen=1), and income (reference category=low income). We also accounted for variables such as age, education, and identity. Identity ranges from 0 to 2, with 0 indicating moderate to strong Black or Asian identification and 2 representing moderate to strong British identification. The middle category represents individuals who identify equally as British and Asian/Black. Because lack of fluency in English can pose considerable barriers to political engagement, especially among the most recent arrivals, we also included a measure of english proficiency. This variable was operationalised by asking respondents whether English is the main language spoken at home.

In addition to standard demographic controls, we also included a number of theoretically relevant psychological predictors of political engagement that previous scholars have considered when evaluating the political attitudes and behaviours of ethnic minorities in Britain (e.g. Heath et al. 2013; McAndrew and Voas 2014; Sanders et al. 2014). These variables range from questions gauging party attachment, political interest, and political knowledge to a sense of democratic satisfaction, political trust, and a sense of civic duty.[5] Party identification is a dummy variable where 0 means no party identification, and 1 signifies identifying with one of the parties in the U.K. such as the Labour party. Political interest is a four-category measure of interest in British politics. The lowest

response option means no interest at all, and the highest value stands for a great deal of interest. Political knowledge (0–5) is composed of the number of correct items reported from a five-item political quiz. Political efficacy is operationalised with the following question: 'On a scale from 0 to 10 where 10 means a great deal of influence and 0 means no influence, how much influence do you have on politics and public affairs?' Political trust is measured similarly to political efficacy, but this time respondents were asked how much they trust (0–10 ; 10=high trust) the Parliament at Westminster. Satisfaction with democracy is a categorical variable where 0 represents very dissatisfied with democracy in Britain, 1 stands for a little dissatisfied, and values 2 and 3 denote fairly or very satisfied. Lastly, we included a control for a sense of civic duty because the higher an individuals' sense of duty, the higher the propensity that he/she will care a great deal about the outcome of elections or other political processes (Blais and Achen 2010; Blais and Galais 2016; Galais and Blais 2014, 2016). And this certainly seems to be the case among ethnic minorities in Britain (Heath et al. 2013). To gauge a sense of civic duty, individuals were asked to report how strongly they agree or disagree with the following statement: 'It is every citizen's duty to vote in an election'. While questions such as these are susceptible to social desirability effects, the high sense of duty is, nevertheless, noteworthy and consistent with previous research that identifies this variable as a widely endorsed ethical norm (Blais and Galais 2016).

Findings: worship attendance and sociopolitical behaviour

We present the results of this section in two parts. For the first part, we discuss findings from ten logistic regression models assessing the impact of worship attendance among both Muslims and Christians on the five binary political participation measures that we selected. For the second part, we estimated two ordered logistic regression models to investigate the independent impact of mosque and church attendance on the ordinal civic engagement measure. All the models include the control variables we discussed in the previous section. For ease of interpretation and to assess the *substantive impact* of worship attendance on the dependent variables of interest, we calculated and graphed changes in the predicted probability of participation (min-max effects) given worship attendance. All the covariates were kept at their respective means so that we can assess the *independent* impact of our key independent variable.

In models 1 and 2 (see Table A1), we first examined participation in the 2010 general election. We found that worship attendance is positively associated with voting behaviour among both Muslims and Christians. In the Muslim-only model, individuals who indicated having participated in their mosque very frequently were about 13% more likely to have reported voting than those who did not attend the mosque. We found a similar, although much larger, effect among church-goers. Christians who regularly attended the church were about 27% more likely than their counterparts to report having voted in the 2010 general election. This difference in effect sizes could be a function of at least two potential factors.[6] First, because ethnicity is so closely tied to religious affiliation, the difference could be explained by different political incorporation trajectories, socioeconomic backgrounds, or the civic skills that the respective groups possess regardless of worship attendance. If Muslim and Christian immigrants are starting at different points as a function of their unique backgrounds, worship attendance could have a

bigger impact on some groups as opposed to others. For instance, research has shown that Caribbeans tend to be more socially, economically, and culturally incorporated in Britain than their South Asian counterparts (see Maxwell 2009 for a summary). Second, it is possible that in the context of U.K., and this particular sample of participants, churches have more actively attempted to recruit their members into the electoral process than mosques. A glance at one of the survey questions suggests that this may be the case. Participants were asked if their places of worship encouraged them to vote. Out of the Christian respondents who attended church at least occasionally, 44% reported that their church directly asked or encouraged them to vote. In comparison, 35% of Muslims reported the same answer. This difference, while not exceptionally large, could account for some of the sizable difference in the likelihood of voting among those who regularly attended the church as opposed to the mosque. Regardless of these difference, however, it is important to note that both mosques and churches appear to have a positive impact on voting. That is, we find no evidence that links mosque attendance to withdrawal from the electoral process as some may suggest.

Figure 3 displays the change in the predicated probability of voting among Muslims for each model covariate to also assess the substantive (relative) impact of mosque attendance on electoral behaviour. The purpose of this graph is to illustrate how mosque attendance



Figure 3. The change in the predicted probability of voting among Muslims.

Note: Min-Max effects based on logistic regression model 1 in Table A1. Symbols represent changes in the predicted probability of voting with 90% confidence bands.

fares in comparison to other correlates of voting. As the graph illustrates, mosque attendance has a similar impact on voting as variables such as political interest and age. Interestingly, mosque attendance is statistically associated with voting while other variables such as political efficacy, trust in Parliament, and english proficiency are not. While mosque attendance increases the likelihood of voting by about 13 percentage points, it does not have as much of an impact as a sense of civic duty, political knowledge, or party identification. These aforementioned variables have a much larger impact on voting, with a sense of civic duty increasing the likelihood of voting by 41 percentage points. Also interesting to note is the positive association between gender and voting. The results show that women are about 10% more likely than men to report having voted. This finding cuts against stereotypical notions of the role of Muslim women in politics, and is relatively consistent with other studies that have included gender in their models of Muslim political participation (Dana, Barreto, and Oskooii 2011; Jalalzai 2009; Jamal 2005; Oskooii 2016; Sobolewska and McAndrew 2015). As for the Christian-only model, we found nearly identical patterns in that variables such as a sense of civic duty, political interest and knowledge, and party attachment were all positively associated with voting. One particular difference we should note is that among Christians, women do not appear to be more engaged than men. In fact, in all of the Christian-only models, gender is not associated with political engagement.

Having discussed the impact of worship attendance on voting, we now turn to the other political participation measures. Models 3–10 (see Tables A2 and A3) assess the impact of worship attendance on four different behavioural outcomes. For ease of interpretation, we graphed the probability of engaging in each political act given worship attendance for both groups while keeping all the control variables constant. The results displayed in Figure 4 reveal some interesting patterns. Mosque attendance is positively associated with all of the outcome variables, except signing a petition. Regular mosque-goers are about 10% more likely than their counterparts to volunteer in political or community-related affairs. Mosque attendance also increased the probability of engaging in a protest by a little less than 10 percentage points (8%). With respect to donating money to a political cause, we found a very small, but statistically positive impact – an increase of about 4 percentage points. In contrast to mosque attendance, however, church attendance was not statistically associated with any of the participation measures besides the one we previously discussed. That is, with the exception of voting, church attendance is not associated with participation in non-electoral activities. However, one should still keep in mind that the overall picture is not one of withdrawal or alienation. Regular worship attendance, for both groups, did not have a negative effect on non-electoral political engagement. We also think that these differences could partially be explained by the challenges that mosque-goers have faced, and continue to face, in their local communities. While we cannot actually test this mechanism, our theoretical priors suggest that mosque-goers may simply have more at stake than church-goers to engage in a variety of non-traditional political acts. Unlike Christian minorities, Muslims in the U.K. not only face ethnic penalties but also challenges due to their religious identity. Since the global war on terror and the increasingly negative association between Islam and a number of stereotypes, Muslims have had to confront a variety of issues in the U.K. such as the increased surveillance and scrutiny of their group-members and places of worship. As such, it is possible that mosque leaders are making a more direct effort to encourage their adherents to take part in a



Figure 4. Worship attendance and political participation among Muslims and Christians.

Note: Min-Max effects based on logistic regression models in Tables A1–A3. Symbols represent changes in the predicted probability of each political act among Muslims and Christians with 90% confidence bands.

variety of political activities with the hope of addressing some of the major challenges that their community faces in a climate of Islamophobia.

While the effect of church attendance on non-electoral political behaviour was statistically indistinguishable from zero, its impact on involvement in local community associations is positive and fairly sizable. Table A4 reports the results of two ordered logistic regression models assessing the link between worship attendance and civic engagement. Since the dependent variable is a question about participation in non-political community-level activities such as participating in local charity or sports clubs, we only included standard socioeconomic and demographic variables in the models.[7] Once again, we calculated predicted probabilities for ease of interpretation. As Figure 5 shows, among regular church-goers, the estimated probability of being 'very involved' in local organisations is about 18%. In contrast, individuals who do not attend the church have a 7% probability of reporting high involvement – a difference of about 11 percentage points. A similar pattern is visible for the 'somewhat involved' category. The likelihood of somewhat getting involved in the activities of local civic or community organisations for frequent church-goers is about 23%, while for their counterparts it is only 12%. As for Muslims, mosque attendance has a statistically positive impact on civic engagement, but the effect sizes are not as large. Frequent mosque attendance increases the probability of civic engagement by a few percentage points, especially for the 'very involved' category option. Nevertheless, the results, once again, demonstrate a pattern of engagement rather than alienation.



Figure 5. Involvement in civic or community organisations.

Note: Predicted probabilities and 90% confidence bands based on ordered logistic regression models in Table A4. Lines represent the predicted probability of civic engagement among Muslims and Christians given varying degrees of Mosque/Church attendance.

Findings: endorsement of violent protests

Having discussed the relationship between worship attendance and a number of participation outcomes, we now turn to our last empirical analysis. In this section, we are interested in attitudes towards PMV to ascertain whether Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to endorse violence in the face of disagreement. Unlike anecdotal evidence and alarmists accounts that link Islam to radicalisation and violence, we do not expect British Muslims, even those who regularly attend the mosque, to favour PMV more than other groups. Our expectation is in line with previous investigations of this topic among Muslims outside of the U.K. Kurzman et al.'s (2011) influential work demonstrated that there is widespread opposition towards violent extremism among Muslims, and that those who have engaged in terrorism are part of a very small minority well outside of the mainstream. Likewise, through an empirical analysis of Muslims in the U.S., Acevedo and Chaudhary (2015) found that the vast majority of Muslim-Americans (86%) believe that suicide bombings are never justified. More importantly, results from their multivariate analysis revealed that religious salience, mosque attendance, and Qur'anic authoritativeness were not positively linked to the endorsement of PMV.[8] Contrary to claims that authoritative interpretations of Islamic scripture are conducive to more radical beliefs, the researchers found that Muslims who held more authoritative views towards the Qur'an were actually much more likely than their counterparts to believe that suicide bombings are never justified. This suggests that Muslims who have a deeper understanding of how Islam is interpreted and practised may reject extremist views and affirm integration into Western societies as long as they are able to practice their religion. Thus, in keeping with previous work, we argue that Muslims in the U.K. are unlikely to display higher odds of endorsing PMV than their non-Muslim counterparts. Furthermore, we do not expect devout Muslims – operationalised by regular mosque attendance – to have a higher likelihood of endorsing PMV than Muslims who do not attend the mosque. In fact, we would not be surprised if regular mosque attendance decreased the endorsement of radical views.

To assess the relationship between religion, worship attendance, and attitudes towards violent protests, we estimated six multivariate logistic regression models (see Table A5) that account for confounding factors such as socioeconomic status, ethnicity, identity, trust in parliament, democratic satisfaction, and other important controls especially due to the diversity that exists across the different religious groups.[9] The first set of models (13–15) evaluate whether Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to approve of violence. The second set of models (13.1–15.1) examine the interaction between religious identity and worship attendance on PMV. Here, we are interested in seeing whether Muslims who regularly attend the mosque are more likely to endorse violence than those who do not attend the mosque, and to what extent the attitudes of mosque-goers are similar or different to non-Muslims who also attend their religious institutions. Hence, the second set of models are identical to the first set of models with the exception of introducing an interaction term.

Our measures of PMV were operationalised using a three-part survey question that asked respondents whether they would ever support violent demonstrations or protests in the following circumstances: (1) If the British government was about to start a war that they did not agree with; (2) If the British government passed a tax increase which

they thought was unfair; and (3) To protest against job cuts. For all the three hypothetical scenarios, respondents indicated whether they would simply support or not support PMV. As such, our dependent variables are dichotomous (0–1), with value 1 representing endorsement of violence.

Before we turn to our results, it is noteworthy to mention that about nine out of ten participants rejected violence in each case. This suggests that ethnic minorities in Britain are largely opposed to violent protests or demonstrations even if they disagree with certain government actions. However, for the purposes of this study, we are interested in seeing whether Muslims are more likely than non-Muslims to support PMV. To answer this question, we first turn to the first set of models. For each of the dependent variables, we found that Muslims are not more likely than non-Muslims to support PMV (see models 13–15 in Table A5). With respect to protesting a war, the coefficient is negative and not statistically significant. Interestingly, in the Tax and Job models, Muslim participants are statistically less likely than non-Muslims to endorse violence. We calculated changes in predicted probabilities and found that Muslims are about 7% less likely than their counterparts to endorse PMV in the tax model, and about 5% less likely to support PMV in the job model. While the effect sizes are relatively small, they challenge monolithic depictions of Muslims in the West as prone to violence or extremism.

The second question before us requires that we examine the interaction between religion and worship attendance. To correctly evaluate the moderating impact of religion and worship attendance on PMV, we calculated and plotted predicted probabilities (see Figure 6). This is very important because interpreting interaction terms – especially for non-linear models – requires visually depicting the marginal effect of X (Religious Identity)



Figure 6. Endorsement of violent protests by worship attendance and religion.

Note: Predicted probabilities and 90% confidence bands based on logistic regression interaction models in Table A5. Lines represent the predicted probability of endorsing PMV among Muslims and non-Muslims given varying degrees of worship attendance.

on Y (Endorsement of Violence) at different values of Z (Worship Attendance), with a confidence interval around that marginal effect. As previously documented, the statistical significance or *z*-statistic of a multiplicative interaction term does not indicate whether X has an important or statistically distinguishable relationship with Y at a particular value of Z (Ai and Norton 2003; Berry, DeMeritt, and Esarey 2010; Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). Therefore, one should not look at 'significance levels' when evaluating interaction terms.

The visual depiction of the interaction effects reveals several patterns. First, the plots illustrate that Muslims are not more likely than non-Muslims to endorse violence in each of the three cases as illustrated by the overlapping 95% confidence bands and lower estimated probabilities. Second, mosque attendance does not statistically increase the probability of endorsing PMV among Muslims. The same pattern is also visible for non-Muslims, as regular worship attendance is not positively associated with the endorsement of PMV. There are some minor differences in the Tax plot, however. Non-Muslims who indicated that they never attend worship are about 7% more likely than non-Muslims who regularly attend their religious institutions to endorse PMV if the government passed a tax increase which they perceived to be unfair. The same pattern is not visible among Muslims as those who attend the mosque regularly and those who never attend the mosque have a similar expected probability of endorsing violence, which is only around 3–5 percentage points. Overall, the interaction results illustrate that worship attendance, for both Muslims and non-Muslims, does not increase the probability of approving violent demonstrations or protests in the face of disagreement.

Before we conclude this section, it is important to highlight several control variable effects. Across each of the models, we found that a sense of political efficacy is positively associated with PMV. Likewise, age is also associated with PMV in that younger individuals are more likely to endorse such tactics. As one might expect, higher trust in the British Parliament decreases the likelihood of protesting – although the effect of trust on job protests is not statistically significant. Other interesting findings include women generally displaying a lower likelihood of approving PMV and income and education either having a marginally negative impact or no impact on attitudes toward violent protests.

Conclusion and discussion

Our study proposed yet another way of evaluating the sociopolitical behaviours and attitudes of Muslims in the west. Our research questions were straightforward: does worship attendance have the same effect on the civic and political behaviours of Muslims as it does for Christians, and does worship attendance increase the likelihood of endorsing PMV among Muslims? Are Muslims really opposed to integrating into Western societies as some suggest? Do Western mosques radicalise Muslims and discourage them from participating in Western democracies? In-depth analysis of survey data revealed that mosque attendance does not promote alienation from the British political system, nor does it increase the likelihood of endorsing political violence. In direct contrast to stereotypical and often exaggerated accounts of Muslims, we found that mosques serve the same function as other religious institutions, notably churches, in promoting the civic and political engagement of their adherents. More specifically, our results illustrated that mosque attendance was positively associated with voting, volunteering in political affairs, participating in demonstrations, donating money for a political cause, and getting involved in

local community organisations. Perhaps surprisingly, we found that church attendance was not associated with some of the informal political activity measures that mosque attendance was associated with. This does not suggest that mosques are somehow better able than churches to engage their adherents into politics, especially when a plethora of research has highlighted the positive impact church attendance has on a wide range of civic and political activities. The comparison of Muslim and Christian worship-goers rather highlights more commonalities than differences, and illustrates that both mosques and churches do not alienate ethnic minorities from British politics and society. With that said, one thing should be very clear: our assessments and ensuing results do not suggest that Muslims are identical to Christians as it pertains to their beliefs or religious practices. Certainly, there are clear differences between different religious traditions, and we fully recognise this. Our main conclusion is that scholars and policymakers should also view mosques as social capital enhancing and civic-building institutions rather than places where 'terrorists are being homegrown'.

While our findings challenge stereotypical notions of Muslims and their places of worship, it is important to note that we cannot make any generalisation about U.K. Muslims of all backgrounds. The EMBES sample consisted of only Muslims from Pakistani, Bangladeshi, and Black-African backgrounds, with about 80% of the respondents identifying as Sunni. As such, we were unable to assess whether frequent mosque-goers of all backgrounds were more likely than their counterparts to participate more in civic and political activities or to reject violent protests. However, our theoretical priors lead us to believe that other British mosque-goers would also affirm participation in the British society and politics, and oppose radical political positions such as endorsing violence in the face of disagreement. We also acknowledge that our results may not be applicable to Muslims in other places where research is lacking. For instance, it may be the case that mosque attendance has a different function in Middle-Eastern, African, or Asian countries. What we do know, however, is that Muslims in other contexts display fairly high levels of support for democracy and are supportive of democratic forms of governance (Gu and Bomhoff 2012). Nevertheless, we do hope that future research considers similarities and differences in how mosque attendance impacts civic and political behaviour across Muslim majority and non-Muslim majority nations. Furthermore, we encourage scholars to also pay close attention to other ways in which mosques may promote civic and political engagement in contexts in which Muslims experience heightened scrutiny and marginalisation. While we relied on racialisation and social identity theories to suggest that other reasons beyond the development of social capital and civic skills can explain why stigmatised religious minorities may embrace increased participation, data limitations did not permit us to actually test alternative mechanisms. As more attention is paid to the status of Muslims in the west, we hope that future research sheds light on the specific messages and strategies mosque leaders may employ in an effort to mobilise their adherents.

To recap, our main goal was to make claims backed by empirical evidence on the role that mosques play in enhancing the civic and political participation of their adherents. Our analysis found no evidence to support the notion that mosques encourage their adherents to insulate themselves from the larger community, enhance radical views, or that participation in British society and politics is somehow incompatible with Islam. Instead, our results suggested that mosques, just like other associational networks, can be viewed as powerful vehicles of sociopolitical integration and cohesion that facilitate norms of

reciprocity, enhance trust, build organisational skills, and increase collaboration towards specific community goals.

Notes

1. The survey yielded a high response rate of 58%, and the estimated coverage levels for each ethnic group is also very high – between 85% and 90%.
2. Nearly all of the respondents completed the survey in English as interviewers were instructed to ask to speak to an English speaker within the household, where possible. In cases in which respondents faced language barriers, interviewers had translation cards at their disposal in multiple of languages.
3. For more detailed information about the unique characteristics of each group, and the similarities and differences that they have, refer to Heath et al.'s (2013) study, *The Political Integration of Ethnic Minorities in Britain*.
4. For all the non-electoral measures, participants were asked to report participation over the last 12 months.
5. The last three controls are important because those who have a positive orientation towards the British democracy and have a high sense of civic duty may not only feel inclined to participate in a range of political activities, but also community activities, including religious-based activities.
6. Overall, researchers must be very careful when comparing simulated effect sizes across two models with different populations and sample sizes.
7. Alternatively, we included all the other control variables (e.g. political interest) and found that the relationship between worship attendance and civic engagement does not change. Additional model specifications are available upon request.
8. Qur'anic authoritativeness is the belief that the Qur'an is divinely inspired word of God.
9. In the PMV models, we decided to group the non-Muslim respondents together and compare them to Muslims only because concerns over intolerance and radicalisation have often been levied against Islam rather than any other religion (see Acevedo and Chaudhary 2015 for a summary). We also deem this analytical strategy appropriate because prior research has demonstrated that despite tremendous diversity between EMBES participants, there are relatively minor attitudinal differences across the different groups (Heath et al. 2013; Sanders et al. 2014). Indeed, the forthcoming results reveal more commonalities than differences as it pertains to opinions towards PMV.

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Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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Appendix

Table A1. Electoral participation models.

	Model 1 *Vote (Muslims)*	Model 2 *Vote* (Christians)
Worship attendance	0.134*	0.272***
	(0.057)	(0.078)
Vote duty	0.485***	0.586***
	(0.103)	(0.119)
Political interest	0.174†	0.342***
	(0.092)	(0.102)
Political knowledge	0.302***	0.256**
	(0.077)	(0.092)
Political efficacy	0.039	0.014
	(0.032)	(0.037)
Democratic satisfaction	−0.019	−0.025
	(0.127)	(0.142)
Trust in parliament	0.012	0.048
	(0.039)	(0.045)
Identity (British=1)	0.127	0.097
	(0.135)	(0.164)
Second generation	−0.012	0.228
	(0.224)	(0.271)
Main language (English=1)	0.180	0.228
	(0.196)	(0.296)
Party ID (yes)	1.236***	0.562*
	(0.214)	(0.257)
Female	0.639***	−0.128
	(0.192)	(0.207)
Age	0.016*	0.045***
	(0.008)	(0.008)
Education	−0.128	−0.046
	(0.097)	(0.111)
High income	0.308	0.384
	(0.426)	(0.371)
Mid income	−0.079	0.635*
	(0.307)	(0.298)
Missing income	−0.040	0.116
	(0.192)	(0.233)
Sunni	−0.040	
	(0.232)	
Pakistani	0.785***	
	(0.218)	
Bangladeshi	1.186***	
	(0.271)	
Black Caribbean		0.193
		(0.259)
(Intercept)	−5.420***	−7.010***
	(0.723)	(0.808)
N	883	661
McFadden's R^2	0.16	0.21
log *L*	−362.989	−258.042

Note: Logistic regression (two-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<.10$.
*Significant at $p<.05$.
**Significant at $p<.01$.
***Significant at $p<.001$.

Table A2. Political volunteering and protest models.

	Model 3 *Volunteer (Muslims)*	Model 4 *Volunteer* (Christians)	Model 5 *Protest* (Muslims)	Model 6 *Protest* (Christians)
Worship attendance	0.211**	0.103	0.410***	−0.102
	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.103)	(0.143)
Political interest	0.338***	0.488***	0.419**	0.209
	(0.102)	(0.105)	(0.135)	(0.196)
Political knowledge	0.140	0.206*	0.055	0.112
	(0.093)	(0.095)	(0.122)	(0.180)
Political efficacy	0.136***	0.062†	0.035	0.080
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.048)	(0.066)
Democratic satisfaction	−0.288*	−0.406**	−0.141	−0.609*
	(0.137)	(0.142)	(0.171)	(0.266)
Trust in parliament	−0.049	−0.007	−0.140*	0.025
	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.060)	(0.090)
Identity (British=1)	0.144	0.032	−0.012	−0.340
	(0.148)	(0.153)	(0.193)	(0.306)
Second generation	0.478†	−0.325	0.483	0.925†
	(0.247)	(0.269)	(0.311)	(0.483)
Main language (English=1)	0.194	0.847*	0.707*	−0.948
	(0.220)	(0.340)	(0.295)	(0.614)
Party ID (Yes)	0.535†	−0.337	−0.035	0.202
	(0.310)	(0.285)	(0.349)	(0.546)
Female	−0.452*	0.231	0.046	0.005
	(0.222)	(0.210)	(0.279)	(0.410)
Age	0.003	0.000	−0.026†	0.002
	(0.009)	(0.008)	(0.014)	(0.016)
Education	0.181†	0.271*	0.062	0.535*
	(0.108)	(0.109)	(0.146)	(0.209)
High income	0.717†	0.250	−0.605	0.130
	(0.391)	(0.320)	(0.670)	(0.667)
Mid income	−0.543†	−0.638*	−0.689	0.623
	(0.328)	(0.283)	(0.450)	(0.525)
Missing income	−0.528*	−0.712**	−0.483†	0.529
	(0.228)	(0.255)	(0.293)	(0.483)
Sunni	−0.300		−0.115	
	(0.263)		(0.343)	
Pakistani	0.126		0.034	
	(0.264)		(0.352)	
Bangladeshi	0.232		0.645	
	(0.313)		(0.395)	
Black Caribbean		−0.495†		0.388
		(0.253)		(0.488)
(Intercept)	−3.860***	−3.370***	−3.710***	−3.899**
	(0.755)	(0.699)	(0.998)	(1.257)
N	908	676	911	678
McFadden's R^2	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.12
log *L*	−285.167	−264.541	−161.142	−59.475

Note: Logistic regression (two-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<.10$.
*Significant at $p<.05$.
**Significant at $p<.01$.
***Significant at $p<.001$.

Table A3. Donate and petition models.

	Model 7 *Donate* (Muslims)	Model 8 *Donate* (Christians)	Model 9 *Petition* (Muslims)	Model 10 *Petition* (Christians)
Worship attendance	0.178†	−0.028	0.080	−0.031
	(0.100)	(0.124)	(0.062)	(0.079)
Political interest	0.201	0.136	0.349***	0.330**
	(0.150)	(0.158)	(0.093)	(0.104)
Political knowledge	0.029	0.098	0.205*	0.096
	(0.131)	(0.143)	(0.086)	(0.093)
Political efficacy	0.119*	0.037	0.026	0.010
	(0.049)	(0.054)	(0.033)	(0.035)
Democratic satisfaction	0.080	−0.023	−0.260*	−0.147
	(0.207)	(0.215)	(0.125)	(0.138)
Trust in parliament	−0.048	−0.007	−0.083*	−0.027
	(0.067)	(0.071)	(0.041)	(0.045)
Identity (British=1)	0.036	0.862***	0.053	0.361*
	(0.221)	(0.234)	(0.137)	(0.152)
Second generation	0.584	−0.630	0.240	0.399
	(0.362)	(0.427)	(0.225)	(0.259)
Main language (English=1)	0.053	−0.403	0.294	−0.394
	(0.327)	(0.486)	(0.202)	(0.317)
Party ID (Yes)	−0.382	0.639	0.216	0.153
	(0.375)	(0.514)	(0.258)	(0.291)
Female	0.355	−0.499	−0.281	0.135
	(0.311)	(0.327)	(0.202)	(0.210)
Age	−0.008	−0.005	−0.008	−0.004
	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.009)	(0.008)
Education	−0.062	0.466**	0.111	0.366***
	(0.162)	(0.172)	(0.099)	(0.110)
High income	1.046†	0.899†	0.684†	0.035
	(0.567)	(0.481)	(0.376)	(0.342)
Mid income	0.577	−0.237	0.024	0.182
	(0.440)	(0.494)	(0.288)	(0.268)
Missing income	0.099	0.515	−0.395†	0.039
	(0.343)	(0.383)	(0.210)	(0.247)
Sunni	−0.364		0.234	
	(0.367)		(0.260)	
Pakistani	0.326		0.411	
	(0.404)		(0.257)	
Bangladeshi	−0.113		0.623*	
	(0.503)		(0.297)	
Black Caribbean		0.613		0.276
		(0.408)		(0.258)
(Intercept)	−4.039***	−4.552***	−2.993***	−2.739***
	(1.056)	(1.091)	(0.683)	(0.665)
N	911	677	911	677
McFadden's R^2	0.07	0.11	0.11	0.08
log *L*	−133.394	−101.544	−336.810	−266.875

Note: Logistic regression (two-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<.10$.
*Significant at $p<.05$.
**Significant at $p<.01$.
***Significant at $p<.001$.

Table A4. Civic engagement models.

	Model 11 *Civic Engagement* (Muslims)	Model 12 *Civic Engagement* (Christians)
Worship attendance	0.143***	0.244***
	(0.043)	(0.059)
Primary identity (British=1)	0.165*	0.115
	(0.097)	(0.107)
Second generation	0.531***	0.318*
	(0.158)	(0.187)
Main language (English=1)	0.361**	−0.105
	(0.141)	(0.204)
Female	−0.280**	−0.164
	(0.141)	(0.139)
Age	−0.011*	−0.005
	(0.006)	(0.005)
Education	0.179**	0.262***
	(0.071)	(0.074)
High income	−0.099	0.084
	(0.301)	(0.239)
Mid income	−0.075	−0.200
	(0.223)	(0.192)
Missing income	−0.441***	−0.394**
	(0.144)	(0.164)
Sunni	−0.240	
	(0.167)	
Pakistani	−0.448***	
	(0.167)	
Bangladeshi	−0.457**	
	(0.195)	
Black Caribbean		−0.042
		(0.174)
N	1067	775
Log likelihood	−1056.784	−961.219
Cut 1	0.571	0.611
	(0.367)	(0.365)
Cut 2	1.419	1.494
	(0.369)	(0.368)
Cut 3	2.698	2.613
	(0.379)	(0.378)

Note: Ordered logistic regression (two-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<.10$.
*Significant at $p<.05$.
**Significant at $p<.01$.
***Significant at $p<.001$.

Table A5. Endorsement of violent protest.

	Model 13 Protest war	Model 13.1 Protest war	Model 14 Protest tax	Model 14.1 Protest tax	Model 15 Protest job	Model 15.1 Protest job
Muslim	−0.315	−0.768†	−0.935**	−1.742***	−0.616*	−0.596
	(0.272)	(0.395)	(0.294)	(0.429)	(0.313)	(0.420)
Worship attendance	−0.034	−0.097	−0.049	−0.148*	−0.032	−0.029
	(0.047)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.060)	(0.049)	(0.064)
Political interest	−0.026	−0.025	−0.043	−0.043	−0.178*	−0.178*
	(0.077)	(0.077)	(0.078)	(0.079)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Political knowledge	0.000	−0.001	−0.026	−0.027	0.035	0.035
	(0.068)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.069)	(0.073)	(0.073)
Political efficacy	0.079**	0.079**	0.108***	0.108***	0.069*	0.069*
	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.028)
Democratic satisfaction	0.007	0.010	0.063	0.070	0.053	0.053
	(0.104)	(0.103)	(0.107)	(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.111)
Trust in parliament	−0.107**	−0.105**	−0.114***	−0.110**	−0.055	−0.055
	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.035)
British identity	0.055	0.056	0.141	0.138	−0.067	−0.067
	(0.115)	(0.115)	(0.117)	(0.118)	(0.123)	(0.123)
Second generation	0.434*	0.410*	−0.059	−0.092	0.089	0.091
	(0.188)	(0.188)	(0.192)	(0.193)	(0.202)	(0.203)
English language	−0.136	−0.107	−0.211	−0.176	−0.249	−0.250
	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.181)	(0.183)	(0.191)	(0.192)
Party ID (Yes)	0.239	0.234	0.042	0.032	0.630*	0.630*
	(0.216)	(0.216)	(0.211)	(0.211)	(0.256)	(0.256)
Female	−0.492**	−0.429**	−0.434**	−0.329*	−0.030	−0.032
	(0.154)	(0.159)	(0.156)	(0.160)	(0.160)	(0.165)
Age	−0.026***	−0.026***	−0.040***	−0.040***	−0.028***	−0.028***
	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Education	−0.081	−0.083	−0.223*	−0.224*	−0.142	−0.142
	(0.085)	(0.085)	(0.088)	(0.089)	(0.092)	(0.092)
High income	0.101	0.080	0.003	−0.040	−0.041	−0.040
	(0.277)	(0.278)	(0.308)	(0.309)	(0.314)	(0.315)
Mid income	−0.484*	−0.495*	−0.044	−0.071	−0.185	−0.184
	(0.240)	(0.241)	(0.226)	(0.227)	(0.242)	(0.242)
Missing income	−0.294†	−0.314†	−0.117	−0.155	−0.228	−0.227
	(0.176)	(0.176)	(0.180)	(0.181)	(0.186)	(0.186)
Pakistani	0.021	−0.005	0.308	0.265	0.158	0.159
	(0.279)	(0.277)	(0.301)	(0.298)	(0.325)	(0.325)
Bangladeshi	0.280	0.270	0.673†	0.644†	0.732*	0.733*
	(0.324)	(0.322)	(0.347)	(0.344)	(0.353)	(0.354)
Black Caribbean	−0.741**	−0.806**	−0.665**	−0.756**	−0.375	−0.373
	(0.242)	(0.246)	(0.243)	(0.247)	(0.248)	(0.250)
Muslim*Worship Att.		0.156		0.276**		−0.007
		(0.097)		(0.103)		(0.100)
(Intercept)	−0.317	−0.179	0.566	0.782	−0.785	−0.791
	(0.482)	(0.490)	(0.481)	(0.490)	(0.527)	(0.535)
N	1904	1904	1956	1956	1975	1975
log *L*	−561.926	−557.613	−543.766	−536.998	−516.655	−513.653

Note: Logistic regression (two-tailed test); standard errors in parentheses.
†Significant at $p<.10$.
*Significant at $p<.05$.
**Significant at $p<.01$.
***Significant at $p<.001$.