

Partisan Attitudes toward Sanctuary Cities: The Asymmetrical Effects of Political Knowledge

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Sanctuary city policies seek to protect undocumented community members from federal detention or deportation. Debates over sanctuary cities have become increasingly prominent and partisan in American politics. Republicans accuse sanctuary cities of enabling crime, while Democrats laud them for protecting communities from rights violations. Despite partisan salience, we have little information about peoples' substantive knowledge of sanctuary policies or how crucial that knowledge is in shaping partisan attitudes toward those policies. Drawing on a unique survey dataset of sanctuary attitudes, we demonstrate that an absence of political knowledge has asymmetrical effects on sanctuary attitudes along ideological and partisan lines. Knowledge about sanctuary policies increases support for sanctuary cities among liberals/Democrats, whereas conservatives/Republicans do not require substantive knowledge to align their attitudes on sanctuary cities with their ideological predispositions. This finding advances scholarship on the interplay between political knowledge and ideology, and has important immigration-related policy and advocacy implications.

Keywords: Sanctuary Cities, Partisan Attitudes, Immigration Policy, State and Local Politics, Municipal Government, Undocumented Migrants, Immigrant Protection, Public Policy, Public Opinion, Public Support of Sanctuary Policies, Urban Politics, Political Knowledge, Asymmetry, Race Relations, Intergroup Relations.

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Related Articles:

Pearson-Merkowitz, Shanna. 2012. "Aquí No Hay Oportunidades: Latino Segregation and the Keys to Political Participation." *Politics & Policy* 40 (2): 258-295. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00349.x>

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Turner, Robert C., and William Sharry. 2012. "From Progressive Pioneer to Nativist Crackdown: The Transformation of Immigrant Policy in Oklahoma." *Politics & Policy* 40 (6): 983-1018. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-1346.2012.00392.x>

Las políticas de las ciudades santuario buscan proteger a la comunidad indocumentada de la detención federal o la deportación. Los debates sobre las ciudades santuario se han vuelto más y más comunes en la política partisana y estadounidense. Los Republicanos acusan a las ciudades santuario de fomentar el crimen, mientras que los Demócratas las alaban por proteger a las comunidades de violaciones de derechos. A pesar de la prominencia partidista, tenemos poca información sobre el conocimiento sustantivo de las personas sobre las políticas del santuario o de qué tan crucial es ese conocimiento para dar forma a las actitudes partidistas hacia esas políticas. Basándonos en un conjunto único de datos de encuestas sobre las actitudes hacia los santuarios, demostramos que la ausencia de conocimiento político tiene efectos asimétricos sobre las actitudes del santuario a lo largo de ideológicas y partidos. El conocimiento sobre las políticas de santuario aumenta el apoyo a las ciudades santuario entre los liberales/demócratas, mientras que los conservadores/republicanos no requieren conocimiento sustantivo para alinear sus actitudes sobre las ciudades santuario con sus predisposiciones ideológicas. Este hallazgo hace avanzar la investigación sobre la interacción entre el conocimiento político y la ideología, y tiene importantes implicaciones políticas y de defensa relacionadas con la inmigración.

Palabras Clave: ciudad santuario, política pública, opinión pública, políticas urbanas, conocimiento político.

摘要: 庇护城市政策试图保护无证社区成员，防止其被联邦拘留或驱逐出境。有关庇护城市的辩论在美国政治中变得越来越突出和党派化。共和党指责庇护城市促使犯罪发生，而民主党却对庇护城市保护社区权力不受侵犯表示赞许。除去党派显著性，研究者并不了解人们对庇护政策的实际看法，以及庇护方面的知识在影响党派对庇护政策态度一事上有多么重要。通过使用一项关于庇护态度的独特调查数据集，本文证明，从思想和党派两方面看，（人们）在政治知识上的缺乏会对庇护态度产生非对称效应。对庇护政策的了解能增加自由党/民主党人士对庇护城市的支持，而保守党/共和党人士则不需要对该政策有实质性

了解便能因其思想倾向而对庇护城市一事保持一致态度。这一结论促进了有关政治知识和思想之间相互作用的学术研究,并对与移民相关的政策及倡导具有重要意义。

关键词: 庇护城市, 公共政策, 舆论, 城市政治, 政治知识.

Policies governing race relations and immigration often activate strong emotional reactions and backlashes among Americans from across political and racial spectrums (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Kinder and Sears 1981; Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Schildkraut *et al.* 2018; Sears and Kinder 1985). Municipal “Sanctuary City” policies, which provide quasi-legal protections to undocumented immigrants, are no exception. Sanctuary cities forbid local officials and police from ascertaining or acting upon residents’ immigration statuses. They also block city agencies from coordinating with the federal U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agency, which detains and deports undocumented residents (Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017; Griffith and Vaughan 2017; Ridgley 2008).¹

Debates over sanctuary policies position racialized “rule-of-law” and law-enforcement standards against commitments to protecting human rights. Because these opposing sentiments are increasingly “baked into” partisanship (Mason 2015, 2018b; Tesler 2016), sanctuary policies should activate public support or opposition along partisan lines. Indeed, they tend to attract support among Democratic elites and voters, along with opposition from their Republican counterparts (Casellas and Wallace 2018). Yet, given sanctuary policies’ recent entrance as a high-profile political topic, voters have only recently begun to crystallize their opinions about them (Collingwood, Gonzalez O’Brien, and Tafoya 2018). Our research examines the relationship between political knowledge and attitudes toward sanctuary policies and suggests asymmetrical processes by which Democrats and Republicans align their personal attitudes with their political parties’ platforms.

During the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, sanctuary cities became emblematic of the broader immigration debate, which pits those who prioritize incorporation against those who emphasize law enforcement.² Then-presidential candidate Donald Trump politicized and railed against sanctuary policies, which he suggested enable crime.³ He vowed: “We will end the sanctuary cities that have resulted in so many needless deaths” (Luhby 2016).⁴ He had also threatened

¹ ICE commissions local officials to detain those suspected of residing in the United States unlawfully. Detainees—many of whom are noncriminals—are often held indefinitely, without trial, and under harsh conditions (Misra 2015).

² Political conservatives and Republicans have increasingly criticized sanctuary cities for cultivating crime and harboring criminals (Littlefield 2015).

³ Social science research challenges this claim (Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017).

⁴ Trump elevated the shooting death of Kathryn Steinle by an undocumented immigrant (who was later acquitted for accidentally firing a firearm) as evidence of the danger sanctuary cities present.

to deny standard federal funding to cities that refused to comply with ICE agents.

Since then, sanctuary policies have introduced highly publicized, increasingly politicized, and hotly contested debates and policy actions at all levels of governance. Sanctuary municipalities across the country herald their commitments to protecting productive community members from unmerited deportation or indefinite detention without trial. Meanwhile, the Trump Administration's Department of Justice remains focused on ridding the nation of sanctuary cities (Ballesteros 2017). States with high Latino populations have taken conflicting sanctuary stances. In 2017, Republican Texas Governor Greg Abbott signed SB-4 into law, banning sanctuary policies in Texas statewide (Gamboa 2017).⁵ The same year, California's Democratic Governor Jerry Brown signed SB-54, which designated all of California a sanctuary for undocumented residents.

Public opinion is divided on the issue of sanctuary policies. A March 2018 CBS News Poll reported that 48 percent of respondents and 70 percent of Democrats took the pro-sanctuary position that, "sanctuary cities should be able to deal with immigrants as they see fit" (De Pinto *et al.* 2018). Another 47 percent of respondents, and 74 percent of Republicans, opposed sanctuary cities—stating they should be, "forced to comply with federal immigration efforts" (De Pinto *et al.* 2018). While partisanship clearly drives sanctuary policy attitudes, a nontrivial portion of partisans nonetheless cross party lines to side with the majority of voters from the opposing party.

Given sanctuary policies' renewed public salience,⁶ it is possible that some partisans have not learned enough about the policy to align their attitudes with their partisan predispositions. This article therefore examines how political knowledge interacts with partisanship to shape the public's support for, or opposition of, sanctuary policies. We focus on Seattle, Washington, where a representative sample of 1,108 residents was surveyed on their sanctuary-policy attitudes six months after Donald Trump was elected as U.S. president. By the time this survey was fielded, Seattle had prominently defended its sanctuary ordinances against Trump's immigration and law-enforcement policies. We use this survey to examine whether knowledge of sanctuary cities differentially influences self-identified Republicans' and Democrats' attitudes toward such policies.

Our analysis suggests that an absence of political knowledge has asymmetrical effects on sanctuary attitudes along partisan and ideological lines. On one hand, preexisting knowledge of sanctuary policies enable both Democrats and

⁵ Senate Bill 4 (SB-4) became Texas law on May 7, 2017. The law attaches Class A misdemeanor charges and imposes civil financial penalties to anyone who fails to comply with federal immigration policies and ICE detainer requests. The bill lets law enforcement gauge individuals' immigration status for anyone detained. Texas' move fits within a broader framework of immigration federalism, where states have increasingly sought to pass immigration legislation due to the federal government's failure to pass comprehensive immigration reform, and the constitutional uncertainties surrounding federalism, state rights, and devolution (Varsanyi *et al.* 2012).

⁶ The policy itself has gained attention since the 2016 presidential campaign.

political liberals to align their attitudes about sanctuary cities with their partisan and ideological predispositions. Democrats or liberals lacking knowledge of sanctuary policies, on the other hand, are less equipped to make those connections and therefore less likely to support sanctuary policies. This comports with existing research on political knowledge, which predicts that those lacking political knowledge can misalign their preferences and policy-specific support (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992). An absence of political knowledge has a different effect on Republicans and political conservatives, however. Given the strong anti-immigrant rhetoric that conservative elites have employed for years, Republicans and conservatives interpret subtle, racialized cues (e.g., “immigration enforcement”) as signals that they should oppose sanctuary policies, even in the absence of any policy knowledge on the subject.

These findings suggest that advocates for sanctuary policies face a greater challenge, relative to their opposition, in garnering public support for their agenda. Policy makers who use polling data to gauge mass opinion may erroneously conclude that the public generally opposes sanctuary policies or is divided. In doing so, they may overlook the fact that a substantial portion of their constituency would support such policies if they were better informed about the issue. Thus, the current lack of public knowledge about sanctuary policies may benefit those who oppose these policies and undermine efforts to support them.


In what follows, we first introduce sanctuary policies in Seattle and demonstrate the increasing public salience of sanctuary policies nationwide. Next, we review existing research on political knowledge to ground our theory of the asymmetrical effects of political knowledge. We then outline our survey data, describe our measures, and present our results. We conclude by discussing research limitations and the implications of our findings for immigration policies, urban politics, American partisanship, and scholarship on the relationship between political knowledge and policy attitudes.

Seattle’s Sanctuary Policies

Sanctuary policies first emerged in the 1980s, when select cities implemented local protective ordinances for undocumented immigrants from Central America (Gonzalez, Collingwood, and El-Khatib 2017). Other cities—namely Seattle, Washington—adopted sanctuary policies to protect immigrants from heightened federal scrutiny following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. In 2003, the Seattle City Council passed Ordinance 121063, prohibiting city officers or employees from inquiring into, or seeking to ascertain, any person’s immigration status (City of Seattle 2003).⁷ The ordinance allowed police to inquire into someone’s immigration status only if they reasonably suspected that person had been previously deported from the United

⁷ The 2003 ordinance followed the Seattle Police Department’s 2002 Directive D02-40, which prohibited officers from coordinating with federal immigration enforcement.

Figure 1.
The Aggregated Number of Articles that Mention “Sanctuary” in a Given Year across



Sources: New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Christian Science Monitor.

Notes: This figure demonstrates that newspaper coverage of sanctuary policies dramatically increased beginning in 2015. Virtually all sanctuary articles in 2016 and 2017 mention Donald Trump. Articles mention Democrats and Republicans with comparable frequency.

States and had subsequently committed a U.S. criminal felony. It sought to counteract undocumented immigrants’ fears of federal detention or deportation in the wake of post-9/11 national security policies, which often prevented immigrants from accessing government benefits or reporting crimes. The 2003 ordinance affirmed Seattle’s diversity, identified it as a city “comprised of immigrants from throughout the world who contribute to Seattle’s social vivacity and cultural richness,” and reiterated Seattle’s commitment to providing its residents equal access to legal rights and protections “regardless of race, ethnicity, or immigration status” (City of Seattle 2003).

Like many other U.S. cities, Seattle’s sanctuary policies gained heightened local attention after Donald Trump won the 2016 U.S. presidential election. The day after Trump’s electoral victory, Seattle’s then-Mayor Ed Murray vowed to uphold Seattle’s sanctuary policies. He said protecting undocumented immigrants was “the most American thing we could possibly do” and announced that sanctuary protections were part of Seattle’s platform to resist President Trump’s

“demonstrated outright misogyny, demonstrated xenophobia and homophobia, nationalism, racism and authoritarian tendencies” (Beekman 2016).⁸

During his first days in office, Mr. Trump signed a presidential executive order that authorized the federal government to deny funds to sanctuary jurisdictions, except those funds mandated by law (Trump 2017).⁹ Five days later, the Seattle City Council unanimously passed Resolution 31730, which affirmed Seattle’s sanctuary policies, stating: “We recommit to standing shoulder-to-shoulder with those who may be targeted by the Trump Administration and reject his attempts to bully us into abandoning our values of inclusion and opportunity” (City of Seattle 2017). That March, Seattle filed a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of Trump’s executive order (Beekman 2017).¹⁰

Although sanctuary policies have been around for decades, their public salience in Seattle and throughout the country is relatively new. When municipalities began protecting their undocumented immigrants from federal immigration enforcement, they did not attract considerable media attention. Prior to 2015, Americans had limited exposure to sanctuary policies (see Figure 1). The *Seattle Times* did not discuss immigrant sanctuaries until 2006, and then only in one article. By 2017, however, national print media coverage of sanctuary policies had increased nearly four-fold, with most sanctuary-related articles mentioning the Trump Administration.

Sanctuary policies have also become more politicized. Respondents across parties generally opposed sanctuary policies in 2015, which was the first recent year when pollsters surveyed respondents on sanctuary attitudes (Collingwood, Gonzalez O’Brien, and Tafoya 2018). Partisans had begun to realign by 2017, however. Democrats became increasingly supportive of sanctuary policies while Republicans remained stridently opposed. To what extent are these partisan attitudes shaped by substantive political knowledge about sanctuary city policies?

Political Knowledge and Sanctuary Policies

People exposed to meaningful political information and debates are likely to exhibit increased knowledge of contemporary political concepts and events (Eveland 2001; Eveland, Shah, and Kwak 2003).¹¹ A person’s political knowledge, in turn, plays a crucial role in shaping her reported opinions about policy issues (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1991, 1996). Traditionally, respondents who have

⁸ Similar connections between American identity and immigrant justice garnered opposition to Trump’s Muslim-targeted travel ban several weeks later (Collingwood, Lajevardi, and Oskooii 2018).

⁹ Trump’s executive order accused sanctuary jurisdictions of “willfully violating federal law in an attempt to shield aliens from removal from the United States,” and of causing “immeasurable harm to the American people and to the very fabric of our Republic” (Trump 2017).

¹⁰ The lawsuit was filed in the U.S. District Court of Seattle on March 29 of 2017.

¹¹ People develop political knowledge through a variety of venues. These include formal education channels (Galston 2001), political candidates’ advertising campaigns (Brians and Wattenberg 1996; Geer 2008), and news and other media outlets (Baum 2003; Entman 1989; Prior 2003).

accurate, comprehensive knowledge about a policy issue are better equipped to support policies that are consistent with their political ideologies and priorities (Converse 1964; Zaller 1992), more likely to voice opinions about particular policies (Chaffee, Zhao, and Leshner 1994; Galston 2001), and more likely to participate in democratic processes (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1993; Kenski and Stroud 2006; McLeod, Scheufele, and Moy 1999). They are therefore better equipped—relative to their less-knowledgeable peers—to insulate themselves from being persuaded by political communication messages that peddle policies at odds with their political predispositions (Zaller 1992).¹² By contrast, people ignorant of specific policy issues can be far more easily persuaded by political messages (e.g., from media outlets or messaging campaigns) to adopt opinions that would otherwise not align with their preferences or predispositions (Gilens 2001). This foundational research suggests that those who encounter political messages but lack prior issue-specific knowledge are vulnerable to misinformation or to voting “incorrectly”—for example, counter to their material interests or their normative commitments (Lau and Redlawsk 1997; Zaller 1992).

However, contemporary partisan sorting may help a person avoid misaligning her attitude on a given issue from her broad partisan perspective, even if she lacks knowledge about that issue. Contemporary politics are riddled with mass party preferences (Ura and Ellis 2012), biased media presentations of politically charged issues (Menjívar and Kil 2002, 160), and a notably uninformed electorate (Bullock 2011; Lupia 2016).¹³ In this context, citizens’ attitudes are often shaped by their political ideological identities rather than by their political knowledge (Mason 2018a). People rely on partisan cues, code words, party messengers, ideological news sources, and political affiliations in the process of generating their policy attitudes (Fryberg *et al.* 2011; Grossmann 2014) and voting preferences (Reid and Moog 2011).¹⁴ In fact, most people turn to simple, partisan heuristics, in place of systematically analyzing the political messages and issues they encounter: “Party source cues activate latent partisan biases in the minds of citizens, which in turn affect the degree to which individuals express support for these values” (Goren, Federico, and Kittilson 2009, 805). Even voters who are politically informed and engaged choose their political preferences primarily on the basis of their partisan loyalties (Achen and Bartels 2017; Lenz 2013).¹⁵

¹² For example, people possessing low or moderate knowledge on specific immigration-related issues are influenced by biased—negative or positive—immigration news coverage, whereas well-informed people are more resistant to these effects (Schemer 2012).

¹³ This lack of information is partially due to an oversaturated media environment. People have a limited capacity to absorb information, so they allocate their attention according to their values and identities (Druckman and Lupia 2016).

¹⁴ Indeed, as partisanship becomes an increasingly powerful identity, people have geographically sorted themselves along partisan lines (Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz 2015).

¹⁵ Achen and Bartels (2017) demonstrate that informed voters even adjust their perceptions about policy-related matters to conform with their partisan loyalties. But, Bullock (2011) demonstrates that partisan cues do not always inhibit critical, independent thinking among informed partisans.

Conservatives may be particularly persuaded by partisan messages when those partisan messages contain racial signals—references to images commonly tied to particular racial or ethnic groups (Domke 2001). Racial signals are often used to implicitly invoke racial animosities. They tend to lock partisans into adopting attitudes that align with their political ideological platforms (Valentino, Traugott, and Hutchings 2002). Conservatives who encounter political messages imbued with racial cues are less likely (than political liberals) to support policies that may disproportionately benefit Hispanics or African Americans and more likely to support law-enforcement policies that disproportionately target or surveil nonwhite communities (Domke 2001, 787).¹⁶ Immigration is one such policy that activates racialized, restrictionist (Filindra and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013), or antiwelfare (Hussey and Pearson-Merkowitz 2013) attitudes. Indeed, immigration debates often invoke partisan, racialized, and “nativist sentiments toward members of new immigrant groups” (Johnson 1996, 265). Together, this research suggests that substantive issue-specific knowledge, partisan cues, and racialized sentiments coalesce to shape partisans’ political attitudes, particularly on racialized policy debates like providing sanctuary to undocumented immigrants.

Asymmetrical Effects of Sanctuary Knowledge

Based on these partisan and racialized contours of immigration-related attitude formation, we expect Democrats and political liberals to support sanctuary policies and Republicans and political conservatives to oppose sanctuary policies. However, these baseline predictions do not account for the process of acquiring political knowledge. If there is symmetry across parties in the effect of knowledge acquisition on support for sanctuary policies, one of two dynamics would occur. Regardless of knowledge, self-identified Democrats and political liberals would support sanctuary policies and self-identified Republicans and political conservatives would oppose sanctuary policies. Alternatively, knowledgeable Democrats and political liberals would support sanctuary policies at higher rates—relative to their less-informed partisans—and knowledgeable Republicans and political conservatives would oppose sanctuary policies at higher rates—relative to their less-informed partisans. In other words, uninformed Democrats and Republicans would be equally likely to misalign their sanctuary policy attitudes with their preferred parties’ platforms.

However, recent research suggests that knowledge might have distinct, *asymmetrical* effects on respondents’ attitudes, based on their party identification

¹⁶ The Republican party in particular elicits white racial loyalties by using coded language that appeals to racist sentiments: “The new racism rips through society, inaudible and also easily defended insofar as it fails to whoop in the tones of the old racism, yet booming in its racial meaning and provoking predictable responses among those who immediately hear the racial undertones of references to the underserving poor, illegal aliens, and sharia law” (López 2015, 4).

and political ideology. Conservatives who lack substantial prior knowledge on a given issue are more persuaded by partisan information cues, relative to conservatives with higher levels of specific information or to liberals with any level of political knowledge (Reckhow, Grossmann, and Evans 2015). For example, partisan cues and co-partisan messages override the moderating effect that contact with undocumented immigrants may have on conservatives' support for pathways to citizenship (Pearson-Merkowitz, Filindra, and Dyck 2016).¹⁷

Applying this research, we expect that Republicans and political conservatives have likely encountered racialized cues that elite messengers attach to immigration-related policies. Even limited discussions about sanctuary policies can contain simple, recognizable cues or “coded language” (e.g., “law enforcement”) that enable Republicans and conservatives to “correctly” align their predispositions to any particular immigration policy. Even seemingly unbiased descriptions of sanctuary policies can signal a racialized law-and-order sentiment.¹⁸ Consequently, even conservatives who lack specific knowledge about sanctuary policies will easily match their attitudes toward sanctuary policies with their ideological predispositions and therefore oppose them.

Since pro-immigrant Democratic platforms have typically not been as cohesive, salient, or racialized, Democrats or liberals may not similarly absorb partisan-cued messages. Indeed, conservatives and liberals often experience differential immigration media environments (Dunaway *et al.* 2011; Gadarian and Albertson 2014; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2012), with conservative newspapers more commonly proposing punitive immigration policies (Fryberg *et al.* 2011). We therefore propose that *an absence of political knowledge has asymmetrical effects on sanctuary attitudes along partisan and ideological lines:*

Hypothesis 1: Republicans and political conservatives will register opposition to sanctuary policies at higher rates, relative to Democrats and political liberals, regardless of their levels of political knowledge. Republicans and political conservatives with high levels of political knowledge will support sanctuary policies at rates comparable to those with low levels of political knowledge.

Since uninformed liberals tend to be less persuaded by partisan and racialized cues than do uninformed conservatives (see e.g., Domke 2001; Reckhow, Grossmann, and Evans 2015), we expect commonly used sanctuary policy descriptions to provide a weak signal to liberal respondents. The same heuristics—such as “limiting the enforcement of existing immigration laws”—that enable conservatives to easily express a position that is consistent with their

¹⁷ Similar trends are evident among conservatives' contact with, and attitudes toward, LGBTQ Americans (Dyck and Pearson-Merkowitz 2014).

¹⁸ For example, the survey we analyze described a sanctuary city as one “which limit[s] its cooperation with the federal government when the federal government tries to *enforce* existing *immigration laws*” (emphases added).

ideological predispositions are unlikely to generate ideologically consistent policy positions among liberals. We therefore expect political knowledge to play a critical role in engendering support for sanctuary policies among liberal respondents:

Hypothesis 2: Democrats and political liberals familiar with sanctuary policies will be more likely to register support for sanctuary policies, relative to less-knowledgeable Democrats or liberals.

In short, we hypothesize that an absence of political knowledge has asymmetrical effects on sanctuary attitudes along partisan and ideological lines. Table 1 presents the sanctuary attitudes we expect to observe, based on this partisan- and ideology-based theory of the *asymmetrical effects of political knowledge*.¹⁹

Data and Measures

Case Selection

To test our hypotheses, we analyze a 2017 public opinion survey of Seattle residents. We locate our examination of political knowledge and partisan sanctuary attitudes in Seattle for two key reasons. First, Seattle's strong recent commitment to limiting federal immigration enforcement gained public salience after Donald Trump's presidential election. Seattle's lawsuit against Trump's denial of federal funds to sanctuary cities—alongside Washington state's successful lawsuit against Trump's original so-called “Muslim ban”—received extensive national and local coverage.²⁰ This heightened political and information environment likely increased knowledge among enough Seattle residents to yield sufficient variation in political knowledge across the survey sample.

Second, the Seattle-based poll we analyze here provides a rare opportunity to examine the contours of sanctuary attitudes as they were being formulated and crystallized. In June 2017, KING-TV (Seattle) commissioned a preelection poll of 1,108 adult Seattle residents²¹ to examine candidate preferences for Seattle's open mayoral race. Since sanctuary policies had become a prominent local

¹⁹ Our hypotheses do not intend to conflate party identification (Republican, independent, Democrat) and political ideology (conservative/liberal priorities). Indeed, these are two distinct concepts. However, because partisanship and ideology have become increasingly aligned in American politics (see e.g., Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Layman, Carsey, and Horowitz, 2006; Levendusky 2009; Mason and Wronski, 2018), we expect respondents self-identifying as Republican and those self-identifying as conservative to exhibit similar attitudes, as will those self-identifying as Democrat and those self-identifying as liberal.

²⁰ Local media sources that provided heightened media coverage include the *Seattle Times*, *Stranger*, *Seattle Weekly*, *Seattle Business Magazine*, and KING 5 News.

²¹ SurveyUSA interviewed this sample via either land-line telephone—using a recorded voice of a professional announcer—or electronically on a cell phone, tablet or other electronic devices.

Table 1. Partisan-Based Asymmetrical Effects of Political Knowledge

	No Sanctuary Knowledge	Sanctuary Knowledge
Liberal / Democratic	low(er) support	high support
Conservative / Republican	high opposition	high opposition

political issue,²² the survey included a set of sanctuary-related questions. This enabled us to estimate the emerging relationships between political knowledge and sanctuary attitudes before those attitudes had become too entrenched along partisan or ideological divides.

Model Variables

Our key explanatory variables gauge respondents' knowledge of Seattle's sanctuary policies. Respondents were first asked whether they knew what a sanctuary city was (0 = no knowledge, 1 = knowledge). Next, they were asked if Seattle was a sanctuary city (0 = no, 1 = yes). In both cases, "1" indicates some self-reported level of knowledge and "0" indicates a lack of knowledge.²³ Roughly 79 percent of respondents reported possessing some knowledge of sanctuary policies and 74 percent correctly identified Seattle as a sanctuary city.²⁴ We expected these higher-than-average percentages of self-reported knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996), given the extensively politicized attention Seattle's sanctuary policies had received in the first half of 2017. Since the survey was not conducted with live interviewers, we are not seriously concerned that respondents overreported their knowledge. Nevertheless, we discuss possible social desirability effects and other potential limitations in the "Discussion and Limitations" section, below.

Since we are interested in the interaction between political knowledge and partisanship, we also include measures of political ideology and party identification. Survey respondents were asked to place themselves on a standard political-ideology spectrum (1 = very conservative, 2 = somewhat conservative,

²² The poll fielded shortly after the U.S. District Court of Seattle filed a lawsuit against the Trump Administration.

²³ The measure of knowledge we analyze is limited to self-reported knowledge of Seattle's sanctuary policies. This deviates from the broader measures of knowledge (of political institutions and contemporary political events), which have served as the basis for academic research on political knowledge. However, we believe similar dynamics apply to both broad and very context-specific knowledge. We therefore draw on and advance political knowledge literature in our analysis of this targeted case.

²⁴ Bivariate statistics reveal that Democrats report possessing knowledge about sanctuary cities at somewhat higher rates than Republicans. Independents report less sanctuary knowledge than their partisan counterparts. A similar trend is observed by political ideology. However, a clear majority of respondents across both partisan and ideological subgroups report knowing what a sanctuary city is and indicate knowing that Seattle, in specific, is a sanctuary city. Importantly, accounting for levels of education erases any partisan or ideological difference in sanctuary knowledge.

3 = moderate, 4 = somewhat liberal, and 5 = very liberal). Roughly 16 percent of the sample identified as conservative, 26 percent as moderate, and 58 percent as liberal. Respondents also reported their party identification (1 = strong Republican, 7 = strong Democrat). Approximately 16 percent of the sample self-identified as Republican, 19 percent as independent or “other,” and 65 percent as Democrat.

Our main outcome variable assesses respondents’ attitudes toward sanctuary policies. The survey provided a standard policy description: “Seattle is one of 160 sanctuary cities in America which limit its cooperation with the federal government when the federal government tries to enforce existing immigration laws. Do sanctuary cities do more good than harm? Or more harm than good?” Responses were recoded as: 0 = “more harm than good,” 1 = “neutral,” 2 = “more good than harm.” Crucially, this question was asked after respondents reported their sanctuary-city knowledge. Given Seattle’s predominantly Democratic electorate (Keeley 2016), a considerable majority (67 percent) of survey respondents reported support for sanctuary cities. Sixteen percent registered a neutral opinion and 17 percent opposed sanctuary policies. Our models include a number of control variables that likely contribute to variations in attitudes toward sanctuary policies. Since white Americans tend to hold more restrictive immigration-related views than nonwhites (Abrajano and Hajnal 2015; Newman 2013), we include a dichotomous measure for white racial identity (1 = white).²⁵ Some Americans believe that immigration introduces competition that threatens their economic well-being. For instance, individuals with little economic resources may view immigrants as depressing American wages and capturing American jobs (Citrin *et al.* 1997) or think that low-skilled immigrants introduce additional costs to local communities (e.g., when they access public services; Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010)).²⁶ Relatedly, individuals with lower levels of education may disproportionately harbor racial intolerance, opposition to immigration, and reticence toward cultural diversity (Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007, 2010; Huang and Liu 2018). To account for these dynamics, we include measures for income, education, and home-ownership status.²⁷ Finally, our models control for survey mode effects (0 = landline telephone, 1 = cell phone/tablet), gender (1 = female), age, and residence location (1 = urban center).²⁸

²⁵ Since only 30 percent of the entire sample identified as Asian, black, Latino, or “other,” we combine these individuals and compare their attitudes to majority white respondents.

²⁶ However, recent work suggests that fears about labor market competition do not have an impact on attitudes toward immigration policy (Hainmueller, Hiscox, and Margalit 2015). Furthermore, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2010) find that rich and poor natives are equally likely to oppose low-skilled immigration.

²⁷ Beyond these general measures, the survey did not entail any questions directly related to a sense of economic anxiety or competition.

²⁸ Individuals residing in more diverse urban centers of Seattle may hold more cosmopolitan outlooks than those who live in more residential areas.

Table A1 (in the Appendix) presents descriptive and coding details for all model variables.

Analysis and Results

We begin the analysis by estimating an ordered logistic regression model. We regressed respondents' sanctuary attitudes on self-reported knowledge of general sanctuary policies, political ideology, party identification, and control covariates (see Table 2, Model 1). Consistent with our expectations, Democrats, political liberals, and those possessing some level of prior sanctuary-policy knowledge are more likely than Republicans, political conservatives, and those with no knowledge of sanctuary policies to report that sanctuary policies do more good than harm. Age is negatively associated with sanctuary support; older participants display more opposition to sanctuary policies than their younger counterparts. No other statistically significant relationships are present. In accordance with other recent research on sanctuary cities (Casellas and Wallace 2018), indicators of wealth (e.g., income or home-ownership status) are not associated with sanctuary attitudes. Controlling for partisanship and political ideology, whites in Seattle do not appear to be any more or less likely than nonwhites to oppose sanctuary cities. After controlling for sanctuary knowledge, education is also not statistically associated with sanctuary attitudes.²⁹ We do not find any evidence that the respondent's survey-mode or residence location shapes sanctuary attitudes.

Our main analyses introduce interaction terms to evaluate the moderating effects of self-reported knowledge on sanctuary attitudes by political ideology and partisanship. Table 2, Model 2 presents the ordered logistic regression results for the model that includes a political ideology interaction term. To aid in the interpretation of the results, we calculated and plotted predicted probabilities with 95 percent confidence bands.³⁰ As Figure 2 demonstrates, varying levels of knowledge do not yield significant differences in attitudes among politically conservative respondents. The same is not the case among politically liberal respondents, however. There is a statistically and substantively significant gap in attitudes between liberals who indicated possessing prior knowledge of sanctuary policies and those who did not. The model predicts that "very liberal" respondents with prior knowledge of sanctuary policies have an 88 percent likelihood of supporting sanctuary policies. In contrast, strong liberals lacking prior sanctuary knowledge have only a 56 percent likelihood of supporting sanctuary policies. In other words, strong liberals with prior knowledge of sanctuary policies are 32 percentage points more likely to support sanctuary policies than those lacking prior knowledge. These patterns maintain among somewhat

²⁹ At the bivariate level, education is positively associated with support for sanctuary cities.

³⁰ All model covariates were held at their respective means to calculate predicted probabilities.


Table 2. Ordered Logistic Model

	Model 1 No Interaction	Model 2 Sanctuary Knowledge × Ideology	Model 3 Sanctuary Knowledge × Party ID
Sanctuary knowledge	.913*** (.162)	-.995** (.495)	-.846 (.533)
Ideology (Con-Lib)	.568*** (.074)	.172 (.120)	.546*** (.074)
Party ID (Rep-Dem)	.332*** (.053)	.304*** (.054)	.055 (.095)
Female	-.231 (.150)	-.214 (.151)	-.230 (.151)
Age	-.013** (.005)	-.014** (.005)	-.013** (.005)
White	.062 (.155)	.067 (.155)	.047 (.155)
Education	-.047 (.112)	-.030 (.112)	-.040 (.112)
Income	.016 (.103)	.013 (.103)	.011 (.103)
Own home	-.072 (.176)	-.048 (.178)	-.028 (.178)
Urban center	.191 (.172)	.226 (.172)	.208 (.172)
Survey mode: Cell phone	.066 (.198)	.091 (.201)	.065 (.200)
Sanctuary knowledge × Ideology		.568*** (.139)	
Sanctuary knowledge × Party ID			.369*** (.107)
Harm Neither	1.943*** (.466)	.561 (.573)	.554 (.610)
Neither Good	2.985*** (.472)	1.610*** (.576)	1.602*** (.613)
N	1,086	1,086	1,086
Log-likelihood	-790.510	-782.375	-784.667

Notes: Two-tailed test; standard errors in parentheses.

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.

Figure 2.
The Relationship between Sanctuary Knowledge, Ideology, and Sanctuary Attitudes.




Note: Postestimation Monte Carlo simulation effects based off Model 2 coefficients in Table 2.

liberal respondents (who exhibit a 28-point gap in support by knowledge) and ideologically moderate respondents (who exhibit a 17-point gap).

Given the low number of respondents in this survey who identify as conservative, the model’s wide confidence bands may mask true differences in attitudes among conservatives by knowledge. However, even the point-estimate differences in attitudes by knowledge among conservatives is relatively small (5-10 points), compared to liberals (28-32 points). Knowledge appears to have a much stronger effect on the sanctuary attitudes of political liberals and, to some degree, political moderates, but little-to-no effect on the sanctuary attitudes of political conservatives. These results support our theory of an asymmetrical effect of political knowledge.

Next, we evaluate the asymmetrical effect of knowledge by party identification (Table 2, Model 3). The predicted probabilities of sanctuary support by knowledge and party identification (Figure 3) illustrate a remarkably similar result to that of ideology and knowledge. Among strong Democrats, there is a 32-point gap in support for sanctuary policies by knowledge. This relationship persists among those who lean Democrat and identify as independent but decreases in magnitude. We find no statistically significant differences in sanctuary support by knowledge among Republicans. The estimated probabilities

Figure 3.
The Relationship between Sanctuary Knowledge, Party Identification, and Sanctuary Attitudes



Note: Postestimation Monte Carlo simulation effects based off Model 3 coefficients in Table 2.

for all partisan groups *without knowledge* demonstrate that the attitudes of Republicans and Democrats are statistically indistinguishable. However, there is a sizeable difference in sanctuary support between Democrats and Republicans who possess knowledge.

We replicated these models by regressing respondents’ sanctuary attitudes on their self-reported knowledge of Seattle’s sanctuary status. Table 3 presents three ordered logistic regression models: Model 1 (no interaction), Model 2 (interaction between knowledge and political ideology), and Model 3 (interaction between knowledge and party identification). These models suggest that the effects of respondents’ knowledge of Seattle’s sanctuary status—by political ideology and party identification—mirror those of their self-reported general knowledge on sanctuary policies.

Simulated predicted probabilities demonstrate that knowledge increases the probability that very liberal respondents (Figure 4) and strong Democrats (Figure 5) will support sanctuary policies by roughly 30 percentage points. These effects are similar, albeit weaker, among political moderates and independents but absent among conservatives and Republicans. For instance, the predicted probability that strong Republicans who knew Seattle was a sanctuary city would support those policies is 39 percent. For their counterparts with no

Table 3. Ordered Logistic Model

	Model 1 No Interaction	Model 2 Seattle Sanc. Knowledge × Ideology	Model 3 Seattle Sanc. Knowledge × Party ID
Sanc. knowledge Seattle	.912*** (.155)	-.850* (.461)	-.386 (.467)
Ideology (Con-Lib)	.575*** (.074)	.247** (.107)	.545*** (.074)
Party ID (Rep-Dem)	.302*** (.053)	.271*** (.053)	.123 (.079)
Female	-.201 (.150)	-.195 (.151)	-.202 (.150)
Age	-.014*** (.005)	-.015*** (.005)	-.014*** (.005)
White	.093 (.154)	.097 (.154)	.099 (.154)
Education	-.041 (.112)	-.024 (.112)	-.038 (.112)
Income	.0004 (.103)	-.009 (.103)	-.014 (.103)
Own home	-.047 (.177)	-.045 (.178)	-.009 (.178)
Urban center	.197 (.171)	.204 (.171)	.174 (.172)
Survey mode: Cell phone	.125 (.198)	.124 (.200)	.121 (.199)
Sanc. knowledge Seattle × Ideology		.532*** (.131)	
Sanc. knowledge Seattle × Party ID			.284*** (.096)
Harm Neither	1.814*** (.464)	.578 (.553)	.846 (.567)
Neither Good	2.859*** (.470)	1.627*** (.556)	1.893*** (.570)
N	1,086	1,086	1,086
Log-likelihood	-788.923	-780.818	-784.642


Notes: Two-tailed test; standard errors in parentheses.

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.

knowledge, the simulated probability of support is a comparable 41 percent. This two percentage-point difference is very small, and not statistically significant at $p < .1$. Overall, these results provide additional support for our hypotheses.


Finally, we regressed respondents' sanctuary attitudes on an additive index of knowledge (see Table 4) whereby high knowledge indicates respondents who know what a sanctuary city is and knew that Seattle was a sanctuary. We then interacted this aggregate measure of knowledge with political ideology and party identification. Once again, the predicted probability plots in Figures 6 and 7 illustrate that varying levels of knowledge yielded substantively significant differences in attitudes among political liberals and Democrats, but not among political conservatives and Republicans. There is a roughly 40-point gap between strong liberals with high knowledge and no knowledge (see Figure 6). High-knowledge liberals are also 15 percent more likely than their lower knowledge (one item) counterparts to think that sanctuary cities do more good than harm. These meaningful, statistically different effects are not present among conservatives. The predicted probability that strong conservatives with high levels of knowledge will support sanctuary policies is about 30 percent. Their counterparts with no demonstrable knowledge hover around 38 percent. This eight percentage-point difference is not statistically significant (at $p < .10$). Findings by party identification are fairly similar (see Figure 7). The predicted difference

Figure 4.
The Relationship between Seattle Sanctuary Knowledge, Ideology, and Sanctuary Attitudes



Note: Postestimation Monte Carlo simulation effects based off Model 2 coefficients in Table 3.

Figure 5.
The Relationship between Seattle Sanctuary Knowledge, Party Identification, and Sanctuary Attitudes



Note: Postestimation Monte Carlo simulation effects based off Model 3 coefficients in Table 3.

in sanctuary support among strong Democrats (no knowledge versus high knowledge) is about 34 percentage points. Among Republicans, this relationship is small and not statistically significant. Once again, the findings suggest an asymmetrical effect of political knowledge on sanctuary support across partisan and ideological cleavages.

Discussion and Limitations

Our article demonstrates that an absence of political knowledge has asymmetrical effects on sanctuary attitudes along partisan and ideological lines. We demonstrate that, among Democrats and political liberals, possessing knowledge about sanctuary policies helps people align their attitudes on sanctuary policies with their general progressive political predispositions. This dynamic largely comports with existing research on political knowledge (Converse 1964; Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Zaller 1992). Deviating from these existing theoretical expectations, we demonstrate that Republicans and political conservatives possessing little or no substantive knowledge of sanctuary policies nevertheless behave as if they had full knowledge. We


Table 4. Ordered Logistic Model

	Model 1 No Interaction	Model 2 Sanctuary Knowledge Index × Ideology	Model 3 Sanctuary Knowledge Index × Party ID
Sanc. knowledge index	.548*** (.087)	-.537** (.259)	-.319 (.277)
Ideology (Con-Lib)	.566*** (.074)	.135 (.119)	.535*** (.075)
Party ID (Rep-Dem)	.320*** (.053)	.286*** (.054)	.066 (.093)
Female	-.211 (.150)	-.194 (.151)	-.212 (.151)
Age	-.014*** (.005)	-.015*** (.005)	-.015*** (.005)
White	.069 (.155)	.073 (.155)	.065 (.155)
Education	-.060 (.113)	-.041 (.113)	-.053 (.113)
Income	-.001 (.104)	-.008 (.104)	-.011 (.104)
Own home	-.071 (.177)	-.058 (.179)	-.026 (.179)
Urban center	.187 (.172)	.215 (.172)	.181 (.172)
Survey mode: Cell phone	.101 (.199)	.119 (.201)	.098 (.200)
Sanc. knowledge index × Ideology		.326*** (.073)	
Sanc. knowledge index × Party ID			.184*** (.056)
Harm Neither	1.895*** (.465)	.354 (.577)	.576 (.611)
Neither Good	2.943*** (.471)	1.410** (.579)	1.629*** (.613)
N	1,086	1,086	1,086
Log-likelihood	-786.457	-776.733	-781.153

Notes: Two-tailed test; standard errors in parentheses.

***p < .01; **p < .05; *p < .1.

Figure 6.
The Relationship between Seattle Sanctuary Knowledge, Ideology, and Sanctuary Attitudes




Note: Postestimation Monte Carlo simulation effects based off Model 2 coefficients in Table 4.

suggest that this asymmetrical effect of political knowledge emerges because Republicans and political conservatives have encountered partisan heuristics between conservative agendas and sanctuary opposition and can extrapolate subtle cues in simple descriptions of sanctuary policies. These cues signal the “correct” conservative position, even in the absence of substantive policy knowledge. Similar heuristics provide little guidance to Democrats or political liberals, however, because such heuristics have not been traditionally linked to progressive immigration-related policy positions. As a result, less-knowledgeable progressives are less equipped than their partisans with higher knowledge to intuit whether supporting sanctuary policies align with their progressive priorities.

These asymmetrical effects have significant implications for national politics and policies. To whatever extent the progressive public lack knowledge about sanctuary policies, this will disproportionately benefit opponents of sanctuary policies. Low-knowledge Republicans can more easily align their partisan predispositions with the typical Republican policy stance. Low-knowledge Democrats are less likely to easily do so. As a result, public opinion about sanctuary policies may appear more antisantuary than they should be—or could become—among a fully informed population. This eases Republican elites’ efforts to generate support for, and to enact, antisantuary policies. Emboldened by a

Figure 7.
The Relationship between Seattle Sanctuary Knowledge, Party Identification, and Sanctuary Attitudes



Note: Postestimation Monte Carlo simulation effects based off Model 3 coefficients in Table 4.

more unified base, these Republican elites can claim greater public support for their policies than would be appropriate among a more sufficiently informed electorate.

The implications of this asymmetrical effect of knowledge acquisition suggest opposing strategies for Republicans and Democrats. Republican elites ideologically committed to opposing sanctuary policies should expedite efforts to codify them before Americans acquire substantial political knowledge. Given the increase in antisantuary state bills introduced in 2017 (Collingwood, El-Khatib, and Gonzalez O’Brien 2018), Republican legislators appear to be doing this. Meanwhile, Democratic elites who support sanctuary policies should work to expand the public’s knowledge about sanctuary cities, rather than moderate their public sanctuary positions. Some Democratic elites appear weary to take aggressive stances against racialized policies, as they did in previous eras (Frymer 2010). However, our findings suggest that Democratic elites should assertively define and promote sanctuary policies to help garner knowledge and support among a promising voter base.

We identify three notable limitations to these conclusions. First, our measures of sanctuary knowledge are limited. The first question gauges respondents’ self-reported knowledge of sanctuary policies, not their actual knowledge. This

allows respondents to overreport their knowledge—perhaps due to social-desirability concerns. However, this survey’s electronic survey methods, rather than live interviews, assuage these concerns. The second question demonstrates respondents’ knowledge of Seattle’s sanctuary status but does not ascertain knowledge about the content or meaning of sanctuary policies. These imprecise measures of policy knowledge are limiting and potentially misleading, particularly if knowledge overreporting and/or variation in knowledge depth are not randomly distributed among respondents. In the future, surveys should incorporate batteries of specific factual survey questions about sanctuary policies. This would provide more precise assessments about respondents’ knowledge of sanctuary policies (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996) and allow researchers to examine with greater granularity our theory of asymmetrical partisan effects. In the meantime, the robustness and consistency of our findings across models—despite imperfect measures—provide compelling preliminary support for the theory of asymmetric effects.

Second, the cross-sectional, nonexperimental nature of the data we analyze here limits our ability to causally identify the effects that knowledge “treatments” have on policy attitudes. Lacking the ability to isolate these causal effects, we are unable to rule out a variety of alternative causal relationships. For example, a political liberal or Democrat may be knowledgeable about sanctuary policies precisely because she is invested in progressive approaches to immigrants’ rights. In this case, her preferences would have caused her knowledge, not the reverse. Similarly, a Seattle resident’s knowledge of, and commitment to, sanctuary policies may be the feature that defined her partisan alignment as a political liberal or Democrat.

Last, these results are limited to a city for which sanctuary policies are particularly salient. Seattle is a Democrat-leaning sanctuary jurisdiction that emblemized the politicized nature of sanctuary policies under the Trump Administration. It therefore provides a valuable context for understanding the relationships between political knowledge, partisanship, and policy attitudes. However, the results in Seattle may not apply elsewhere. To test the generalizable rigor of our theory, future surveys should be fielded in larger, more diverse sanctuary jurisdictions (e.g., Los Angeles, San Francisco, Chicago, New York), more conservative cities, jurisdictions lacking or opposing sanctuary policies, and locations that have not staged prominent anti-Trump movements.

These limitations notwithstanding, our research identifies clear, partisan asymmetries in the relationship between knowledge and policy preferences. This builds upon, and advances, existing scholarly understandings of the effects of political knowledge on policy attitudes. It also suggests important implications for immigration policy in urban political settings and provides insights into contemporary partisan politics. Conservative elites need not necessarily seek to advance their constituency’s base of knowledge. Progressive candidates and advocates, on the other hand, should invest in substantive policy education

campaigns to solidify and activate a liberal base of support. Otherwise, a wealth of potential supporters will remain underestimated in surveys and untapped as political allies.

Appendix

Cases

Arizona v. United States, 641 F. 3d 339 (2012)

Table A1. Descriptive Statistics of Model Variables

	Mean	Median	S.D.	Min	Max
Sanctuary attitudes	1.50	2.00	.77	.00	2.00
Sanctuary knowledge	.79	1.00	.41	.00	1.00
Sanctuary knowledge Seattle	.74	1.00	.44	.00	1.00
Sanctuary knowledge index	1.53	2.00	.78	.00	2.00
Ideology (Con-Lib)	3.67	4.00	1.18	1.00	5.00
Party ID (Rep-Dem)	4.96	5.00	1.62	1.00	7.00
Female	.61	1.00	.49	.00	1.00
Age	43.26	37.00	18.03	18.00	95.00
White	.69	1.00	.46	.00	1.00
Education	2.48	3.00	.70	1.00	3.00
Income	2.08	2.00	.83	1.00	3.00
Own home	.43	.00	.49	.00	1.00
Urban	.80	1.00	.40	.00	1.00
Survey mode: Cell phone	.68	1.00	.47	.00	1.00

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