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THE ROLE OF IDENTITY PRIORITIZATION
WHY SOME LATINX SUPPORT RESTRICTIONIST IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND CANDIDATES

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Abstract Social Identity Theory suggests that individuals are motivated to support/oppose policies and politicians that benefit/harm members of their ingroup as a means of protecting their social status. Since the Republican Party's rhetoric against immigrants in recent decades has often been viewed as an assault upon those of Latinx descent, it is not surprising that strong majorities oppose restrictionist immigration policies and support the Democratic Party. However, the existing literature has overlooked why a sizeable minority of Latinx voters express support for restrictionist immigration policies and the politicians who espouse them. Our analysis of Latinx voters with the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) demonstrates that the degree to which individuals prioritize their US American identity over their Latinx identity has a significant influence over support for conservative immigration policies and GOP candidates. This relationship emerges above and beyond partisanship, ideology, and other key explanatory factors. Such attitudes likely represent an individual social

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mobility strategy in which members of a social group attempt to "pass" as a member of a higher-status group. Prioritizing a US American identity, supporting the Republican Party, and expressing hostility toward the interests of undocumented immigrants are a means of distinguishing themselves from a social group that has become increasingly associated with negative stereotypes. In contrast, those who are unwilling or unable to make this transition are likely pursuing a collective social mobility strategy (e.g., linked fate) whereby they attempt to enhance their individual status by elevating that of the entire social group.

Introduction

Over the last several decades, a number of states and local governments have pursued more restrictive immigration policies[1] as the national discourse regarding the undocumented has become increasingly hostile (Wallace 2014; Collingwood, El-Khatib, and Gonzalez O'Brien 2018). Since the majority of immigrants to the United States claim Latin American ancestry/heritage and the term "immigrant" has become increasingly associated with negative ethnic stereotypes of Latinx (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008), it should come as no surprise that these policy shifts have alienated many in the Latinx community. Social Identity Theory (SIT) suggests that individuals are motivated to support/oppose policies and politicians that benefit/harm members of their ingroup as a means of protecting their social status (Tajfel and Turner 1979). While scholars debate the relative influence of immigration policy on Latinx party preferences (Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006), it is unlikely that Latinx support for the Democratic Party is unrelated to these developments.

However, exit polls reveal that Republican Party presidential candidates have enjoyed the support of roughly one-third of the Latinx electorate over the last few decades. Furthermore, a 2018 survey by the Pew Research Center demonstrates that a significant minority of the Latinx community support restrictionist measures and express hostility toward immigrants: 25 percent of Latinx believe that there are too many immigrants living in America, 10 percent would oppose a law granting legal status to "Dreamers," and 19 percent support building a border wall with Mexico (Lopez, Gonzalez-Barrera, and Krogstad 2018). Given that nearly 60 million individuals are of Hispanic

1. For example, Alabama's 2011 "Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act" (HB 56); Arizona's 2010 "Support Our Law Enforcement and Safe Neighborhoods Act" (SB 1070); California's 1994 "Save our State Ballot Initiative" (Proposition 187).

origin, these percentages translate into millions of people, many of whom are registered voters in swing states. Clearly, Latinx political heterogeneity could prevent the group from operating as a unified political bloc—but it is not clear why so many Latinx support policies and candidates that ostensibly denigrate the status of Latinx in the United States.

Building upon SIT, we argue that a sizable minority of Latinx attempt to escape the lower social status associated with the Latinx social group by prioritizing a US American identity. Those with the capacity to do so further solidify/exemplify this shift by supporting restrictive immigration policies and candidates who promote such policies. However, individuals who find it impossible or undesirable to dissociate from the Latinx social group may oppose such policies as a means of protecting the collective status of the group from further denigration. Our analysis of the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) demonstrates that individuals who prioritize a US American identity above their Latinx identity express significantly less favorability toward the undocumented and more support for restrictive immigration policy proposals. Additionally, the degree to which individuals prioritize a Latinx identity over a US American identity strongly predicts opposition to Donald Trump, but not so much to Mitt Romney, a finding we attribute to Latinx identifiers likely regarding the former as a greater threat to their status than the latter.

A Social Identity Framework

In the contemporary US social hierarchy, Latinx are often regarded as a "lower-status" group compared to white/native-born Americans (Levin and Sidanius 1999). While earlier waves of European immigrants were ultimately embraced as "White" and "American," the same cannot be said for many with Latin American heritage (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Golash-Boza 2006; Golash-Boza and Darity 2008). In fact, the term "immigrant" has become increasingly associated with negative ethnic stereotypes of Latinx (Burns and Gimpel 2000; Brader, Valentino, and Suhay 2008). Elite and media frames associating Latinx immigration with domestic crime, national security concerns, and cultural change have further exacerbated the tendency for many Anglo-Americans to view Latinx as a threatening outgroup (Branton et al. 2011; Farris and Silber Mohamed 2018). Donald Trump's description of Mexican immigrants as criminals and rapists (Peters and Woolley 2015) along with his characterization of the Central American "Caravan" of asylum seekers as an enemy invasion (Fabian 2018) has further conflated the Latinx community with both legal and undocumented immigrants and diminished the status of this diverse population.

Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 40) defined social identity as "aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as belonging." The relative status of each group is determined through intergroup comparisons and, in an effort to attain this positive self-image, individuals are motivated to positively differentiate and protect the status of their social groups (Tajfel and Turner 1979). However, the impact of group status on individual self-esteem is a function of how important that identity is for each person (Phinney, Cantu, and Kurtz 1997). As such, to the extent that individuals identify (or are categorized by others) as Latinx, legal immigrant, or undocumented immigrant, their self-esteem should be negatively impacted by the perceived low status of these groups in US society. Building upon the fundamental human desire to enhance individual self-esteem, SIT scholars have identified a number of strategies[2] that may be pursued to accomplish that goal, depending on the nature of intergroup relationships.

Individual social mobility strategies are those in which there is an attempt to improve individual status without challenging the existing social hierarchy or improving the collective status of one's social group. More specifically, this involves an individual dissociating from a low-status group and attempting to "pass" as a member of a high-status group. While LeVine and Campbell (1972) argue that outgroup threat generally leads to stronger ingroup identification, Howard (2000) demonstrates that some members of stigmatized groups may attempt to dissociate themselves from these undervalued groups instead of working to increase the status of their group. Similarly, research on social dominance orientation (preference for the establishment and maintenance of group-based social hierarchy) demonstrates that Latinx exhibiting this personality characteristic are less likely to identify with their ingroup and express more positive outgroup affect out of a sense that the subordinate status of the ingroup is justified (Levin and Sidanius 1999). With respect to passing, Sherman and Cohen (2006) argue that when an individual's self-integrity is threatened, such as by their group's low status in society, one can distort reality and adopt alternative sources of identity as a protective mechanism.

Such behavior is only possible when group boundaries are permeable (Tajfel and Turner 1979), and some individuals will have more capacity to dissociate from the low-status group and/or pass as a member of a high-status group than others. The belief that one possess the attributes necessary for

2. One possibility is that individuals in lower-status groups will simply "accept" the reality they find themselves in and decide to take no action to alter their individual and social group status. Taylor et al. (1987) experimentally demonstrate that this occurs when the social group hierarchy is perceived as both stable and legitimate (i.e., the results of social group comparisons are not arbitrary or based on ascriptive characteristics). When these conditions are not met, members of lower-status groups take action in response to status inequalities.

passing into a high-status group and the perceived realistic opportunity for success are critical to the pursuit of this strategy (Taylor and McKirnan 1984; Boen and Vanbeselaere 2001). While cultural understandings of the requisites for a US American identity[3] are neither static nor uncontested (Hart 1978), successful passage minimally entails embracing values of liberty and equality, along with admiration of US institutions and customs (Schildkraut 2011; Citrin and Sears 2014). Existing research has also identified other factors, such as English language proficiency and elevated socio-economic status, to have a positive relationship to the strength of one's US American identity (Ono 2002; Bedolla 2003; Golash-Boza 2006; Schildkraut 2011; Citrin and Sears 2014).

Research has further indicated that descendants of Latinx immigrants (second generation and beyond) are more likely to adopt a US American identity and less likely to adopt a Latinx identity compared to recent arrivals, who may find it more difficult to acculturate (Ono 2002; Golash-Boza 2006; Citrin and Sears 2014). However, because acculturation is a complex, two-way process of brokered exchange between groups (Pedraza 2014), prejudice and discrimination can complicate this process for native-born immigrants (Lajevardi et al. 2020). Indeed, discriminatory experiences are theorized to elevate an individual's belief that they lack the capacity to "pass" or render individual social mobility strategies less desirable. Taylor and colleagues' (1987) experimental work demonstrates that when social mobility is denied on account of "unjust processes," evaluations of the higher-status group decline. Similarly, Ono (2002) and Oskooii (2016, 2018) find that perceived discrimination is associated with ethnic group identification, while Golash-Boza (2006) shows that it reduces the probability that Latinx will identify as Americans. Golash-Boza (2006, p. 47) further argue that "self-identification as Latino/a is a politicized choice made in response to conditions of oppression here in the United States."

When individual social mobility efforts are deemed to be impossible or undesirable,[4] individuals will pursue a variety of collective social mobility strategies where they embrace their social identity and collaborate with ingroup members to improve the collective status of their social group. "Social creativity" reflects attempts to improve their group status by either engaging in

3. Note that this discussion does not consider legal requirements for residency or citizenship in the United States; we are solely concerned with characteristics necessary for inclusion into the American "cultural family."

4. A variety of scholars theorize that collective social mobility strategies are only pursued when individual social mobility strategies are perceived to be impossible or undesirable (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Taylor and McKirnan 1984; Taylor et al. 1987; Padilla and Perez 2003). Tajfel and Turner (1979, p. 35) argue that collective social mobility strategies occur when the "nature and structure of the relationship between social groups is perceived as characterized by marked stratification, making it impossible or very difficult for individuals to invest themselves of an unsatisfactory, underprivileged, or stigmatized group membership."

intergroup comparisons based on different attributes or by comparing themselves to a lower-status group (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Jackson et al. 1996). "Social change" reflects efforts to challenge the existing social hierarchy and change the relative status of groups through competitive processes (Tajfel and Turner 1979; Jackson et al. 1996).

Theory and Expectation

Building on extant research, we contend that the decision to prioritize a US American identity above a Latinx identity likely represents an individual social mobility strategy in which some individuals have consciously chosen to devalue or disavow their membership in a lower-status group and pass as a member of a higher-status group. We suggest that such a strategy manifests itself through support for restrictive immigration policy proposals and candidates that advocate for such policies. There are at least two reasons for why this may be the case. First, expressing support for conservative immigration policies may be viewed as a means of defending the American group boundaries from low-status groups (e.g., undocumented Latinx), whose incorporation threatens to devalue their elevated status in society. Second, support for restrictive immigration policies and the candidates who espouse them is a means of solidifying (and signaling to others) the distinction between themselves and low-status Latinx. Basler (2014) found evidence of this phenomenon through interviews with Latinx who supported California's anti-immigrant Proposition 187. Latinx who sought a higher social status in the midst of this anti-Latinx political climate felt compelled to distance themselves from undocumented immigrants and assert the primacy of their US American identity through support for restrictive immigration policy (Basler 2014). Further, Huddy, Mason, and Horwitz (2016) argue that Latinx and Democratic Party identities have converged such that the former view the latter as representative of their interests. As such, the prototypical Latinx voter is assumed to share Democratic Party policy positions, including those related to immigration. Huddy (2001) argues that individuals are more likely to identify with a group when they share core values and have a greater affinity with prototypical members. Taking this into account with Basler's (2014) findings, we claim that supporting restrictive immigration policies is a means by which those who prioritize their US American identity can signal to others of their distinction from the prototypical Latinx.

When individual social mobility is impossible or undesirable, improving social status necessitates embracing ingroup identity and working collaboratively with other members to pursue a collective strategy. In this context, the decision to prioritize a Latinx identity above a US American identity represents the first step in this process. As previously discussed, a "social creativity" collective

strategy is an attempt to improve the status of the group by either (1) relying upon different attributes for intergroup comparisons or (2) comparing the ingroup to a lower-status outgroup. The former is exemplified by rhetorical arguments about the benefits that Latinx and immigrants provide to US society. The latter would be reflected in efforts by members of the Latinx community to distinguish themselves from immigrants (legal or undocumented).

Bedolla (2003) describes this as "selective dissociation," whereby members of a low-status group distance themselves from sectors of the group that they blame for the negative stigma associated with the group. Her interviews demonstrate that many Latinx view the decision by some group members not to learn English as a conscious choice, and that such immigrants are "asking" to be treated poorly by the native population because of their failure to acculturate more quickly. Similarly, Huddy and Virtanen (1995) demonstrate that Latinx categorize themselves into subgroups and regard their own subgroups as higher status than other subgroups. Consistent with these findings, Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) suggest that non-Mexican Latinx embraced their national origin group and somewhat distanced themselves from the Latinx group identity in the face of Trump's anti-Mexican rhetoric. However, while social creativity is one way that some Latinx may try to improve their status, it is unlikely to yield desired outcomes in the contemporary political context. While members of an ingroup are more inclined and capable of drawing distinctions between various subgroups, outgroup members are often incapable of recognizing these distinctions (Huddy and Virtanen 1995). As such, because non-Latinx are unlikely to acknowledge a distinction between Latinx and documented or undocumented immigrants in general, the status benefits of such actions will likely be minimal. Accordingly, we anticipate that a social-change collective strategy is more likely to occur among those who prioritize a Latinx identity above a US American identity.

More specifically, such individuals should be more likely to manifest characteristics associated with the theory of "linked fate" (Dawson 1995) as they engage in intergroup conflict over social and material rewards with the dominant outgroup. In exploring African American group identity, Dawson (1995) argues that because race is the decisive factor in determining opportunities and life chances (irrespective of individual socio-economic status), it is cognitively efficient to determine and pursue racial group interests over individual interests. While African American linked fate is the product of a shared history of political, social, and economic oppression, the great diversity of the Latinx community (e.g., national origin, immigration status, etc.) has produced more diverse experiences, which may hinder the development of similar levels of political unity (Masuoka 2006). However, Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) demonstrate that the majority of Latinx do express linked fate and such sentiments are based on difficulties with social integration and the degree of marginalization they experience based on their socio-economic and immigration status.

Similarly, Valdez (2011) argues that experience with discrimination motivates Latinx identifiers to participate in electoral politics at higher levels than American identifiers, while Sanchez (2006) demonstrates that such experiences elevate support for allowing more immigrants to enter the United States. It therefore appears that those who lack the capacity to pursue an individual social mobility strategy are more likely to recognize the necessity of acting upon Latinx group interests. Because the status of the Latinx community has become inextricably tied to that of documented and undocumented immigrants, the pursuit of Latinx social change strategy necessitates challenging discriminatory practices and prejudicial beliefs against each of these groups.

The aforementioned points lead to the following hypothesis regarding the interplay between identity prioritization and policy and candidate evaluations: *Prioritization of a US American identity above a Latinx identity will have a positive relationship to support for restrictive immigration policies and political actors who endorse or advocate for such policies.*

Data and Measures

Our study relies on the 2012 and 2016 American National Election Studies (ANES) administered in both pre- and postelection waves through a combination of nationally representative face- to-face (FTF) and web samples (gFK/Knowledge Networks). The total sample size is $n = 5{,}914$ (2012) and $n = 4{,}271$ (2016), with the target sample frame being all US citizen adults aged 18 or older.[5]

To examine whether prioritizing a U.S. American identity over a Latinx identity (or vice versa) will have divergent effects on candidate evaluations and immigration policy attitudes, survey participants who did not identify as Latinx were excluded from the study.[6] For each year, we subset the data to respondents who self-reported their race or ethnicity as Hispanic. This decreased the respective sample sizes to $n = 1{,}009$ (2012) and $n = 450$ (2016).[7]

5. A total of 85 percent (2012) and 84 percent (2016) of all ANES respondents indicated that they were registered to vote, whereas 15 percent (2012) and 16 percent (2016) of respondents indicated that they were not registered or did not know. Among Latinx, 79 percent (2012) and 77 percent (2016) of respondents reported being registered. Our results are robust to statistical models conducted among just Latinx respondents who reported being registered to vote. These additional results are presented in table B1 in the Supplementary Material. More detailed information about the data is also provided in the Supplementary Material.

6. It could certainly be the case that some individuals with Latinx heritage may not self-identify as Latinx on surveys (Emeka and Vallejo 2011). Unfortunately, the ANES survey does not offer an alternative means of identifying such respondents.

7. The 2012 survey oversampled Black and Hispanic respondents. Table A3 in the Supplementary Material presents weighted demographics from several surveys targeting the same universe. ANES Latinx demographics are similar to other nationally representative Latinx US citizen adult surveys across a range of demographics. However, there are some relatively minor

For the key explanatory variable, we constructed a ratio measure of identity prioritization by subtracting the strength of Latinx identity from the strength of US American identity from responses to the two identity questions available in both surveys: "How important is being American/Hispanic to your identity?" Responses to each question were measured on a five-point scale (0 = Not at all important; 1 = A little important; 2 = Somewhat important; 3 = Very important; 4 = Extremely important). This variable ranges from –4 to +4, where positive values indicate the degree that one prioritizes a US American identity over a Latinx identity and negative values indicate the degree to which one prioritizes a Latinx identity over their US American identity.[8] This variable does not make a distinction between the relative strength of the two identities for equal identifiers (value 0). In other words, the score is the same for those who regard both identities as "Extremely important" or "Not at all important"—or some measure in between.[9] Figure 1 presents the variable's distribution for both 2012 and 2016. As illustrated, the modal value is 0, indicating that a sizable share of the sample gave the same response to both identity questions—33.5 percent in 2012 and 48.6 percent in 2016. However, 48.5 percent of 2012 respondents and 31.5 percent of 2016 respondents prioritized a US American identity over a Latinx identity, while 18.1 percent (2012) and 19.9 percent (2016) prioritized a Latinx identity over a US American one.[10]

differences across education, party identification, and foreign-born status, which we control for in the analyses.

8. Tables B25–B31 in the Supplementary Material replace the key identity prioritization measure with discrete measures for US American identity and Latinx identity. The results are consistent with our theoretical priors, and do not alter the core findings.

9. Tables B32 and B33 in the Supplementary Material assess whether those who respond to the two identity questions as extremely important or not at all important display different preferences on each of the outcome measures. Respondents who selected "extremely important" relative to those who selected "not at all important" hold more favorable attitudes toward "illegal" immigrants, less favorable opinions of Donald Trump, and are less supportive of building a wall along the US-Mexican border. These findings suggest that when individuals hold both identities in high regard, they respond to some outcome measures more based on their Latinx identity (e.g., since Latinx identity is correlated with greater support for illegal immigrants and opposition to building a wall). However, since sample size is limited, future research should investigate this question in greater detail.

10. To get a better sense of who, descriptively, prioritizes a US American identity over a Latinx identity, we regressed the identity ratio variable onto a host of available demographic measures. The 2012 analysis suggests that older respondents are more likely to prioritize an American identity over a Latinx identity than their younger counterparts. Statistically significant relationships were also detected for the following measures: men relative to women, middle-income respondents relative to lower-income respondents, descendants of immigrants relative to first-generation respondents, more conservative individuals, and those who express higher levels of racial resentment. Respondents more likely to prioritize a Latinx identity over a US American identity were those with Mexican and Puerto Rican heritage, and those with higher frequency of worship attendance. For 2016, individuals who prioritize a US American identity over a Latinx identity include higher-income respondents relative to lower-income respondents, descendants of immigrants relative to first generation, Republican identifiers, and racially conservative respondents. However,



Figure 1. Distribution of Latinx to American ID, 2012 and 2016 ANES.

To examine the relationship between identity prioritization and political attitudes, we rely on three feeling thermometer questions that gauge affect toward "illegal immigrants," and presidential candidates Mitt Romney and Donald Trump.[11] Each thermometer is scaled from 0 to 100, with higher values indicating warmth or favorability. In addition to the affect measures, two constructed variables capture respondents' views toward restrictive immigration policy proposals. The first evaluates views about what government policy should be toward unauthorized immigrants now living in the United States. This question was postelection posed in both 2012 and 2016 ANES and includes the following response options: (0) "Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country," (1) "Have a guest worker program in order to work," (2) "Allow them to remain and eventually qualify for US citizenship if they meet certain requirements and pay penalties," or (3) "Allow them to remain and eventually qualify for US citizenship without penalties." The second policy measure captures respondents' views on Donald Trump's proposal to build a wall along the Mexico-US border. This question was only available in the 2016 survey and is coded to range from –3 (Oppose a great deal) to +3 (Favor a great deal).

Additionally, we constructed standard demographic controls and a number of theoretically important confounders such as party identification, political ideology, and racial resentment. A detailed accounting of these variables appears in the Supplementary Material.[12]

somewhat different relationships emerge with respect to country of origin in that only Puerto Ricans are statistically more likely to prioritize a Latinx identity over a US American identity. Both sets of findings are reported in tables B2 and B3 of the Supplementary Material.

11. We examine feeling thermometer ratings for Mitt Romney (2012) and Donald Trump (2016) in both the pre- and postelection waves of the survey.

12. Tables A1 and A2 in the Supplementary Material report summary statistics for all of the variables.

Results

We test our hypothesis by estimating a series of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression models, where the outcome variables include: (1) opposition/support for immigration policy from the 2012 and 2016 ANES; (2) support for Trump's border wall (2016); (3) warmth toward "illegal immigrants" in the 2012 and 2016 ANES; and (4) favorability toward Mitt Romney (2012) and Donald Trump (2016). The initial discussion of the findings will center on the key explanatory variable's relationship to each outcome measure, respectively. We then conclude this section by offering a brief discussion of other notable findings.

Table 1 presents three models, with unstandardized coefficients and standardized errors in parentheses. The first column (Model 1) is a bivariate regression between American identity prioritization and policy attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants, which ranges from a restrictionist (classify immigrants as felons and deport them) to a progressive position (grant citizenship with no penalties). The findings show that for each unit change in identity prioritization (from Latinx to US American), support for more liberal policy options drops by 0.09 points on the 0–3 scale. This relationship is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. Column 2 (Model 2) presents a baseline demographic model and column 3 (Model 3) includes additional political, policy, and racial attitude variables. With the inclusion of these additional variables, the relationship between identity prioritization and policy attitudes toward unauthorized immigrants remains statistically significant at $p < 0.01$.

Similar trends are observed with the 2016 ANES. Individuals who prioritize a US American identity over a Latinx identity are less supportive (at $p < 0.01$) of progressive policy proposals toward unauthorized immigrants. In Model 1 of table 2, the coefficient for American identity prioritization is –0.13, which is a similar magnitude as that observed in 2012. Controlling for demographic variables (Model 2) and other confounders (Model 3) does not substantively alter the main results.

For ease of interpretation, predicted values of policy support for both 2012 and 2016 are presented in figure 2. Each post-estimation plot holds all the model covariates at their respective means. Both panels reveal a similar trend—as respondents move from high Latinx identity (left on *x*-axis) to high US American identity (right on *x*-axis), predicted support for progressive immigration policy drops considerably. For instance, respondents who highly prioritize a Latinx identity in 2016 have an expected score of about 2.4 on the 0–3 immigration policy scale, whereas those who highly prioritize a US American identity have an expected score of about 1.6 on the same scale.

Next, we examine an increasingly salient policy proposal in American politics—whether to build a wall along the US-Mexico border. Consistent with the previous findings, the results reported in table 3 show that the coefficient for

Table 1. Predictors of attitudes toward immigration policy, 2012

	Immigration policy support, ANES 12		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	–0.089**	–0.076**	–0.066**
	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.021)
Age		–0.005**	–0.004*
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		–0.072	–0.096#
		(0.052)	(0.058)
Education		0.010	–0.004
		(0.025)	(0.028)
Income 40 < 80		0.041	0.060
		(0.063)	(0.069)
Income >80		–0.038	–0.026
		(0.083)	(0.088)
Missing income		0.086	0.059
		(0.090)	(0.117)
Mexican		–0.053	–0.077
		(0.070)	(0.076)
Cuban		0.101	0.040
		(0.112)	(0.119)
Puerto Rican		–0.089	–0.088
		(0.101)	(0.110)
Catholic		–0.0002	–0.036
		(0.053)	(0.059)
Generation		–0.079*	–0.089*
		(0.035)	(0.039)
Worship attendance			0.004
			(0.019)
Political knowledge			–0.035
			(0.026)
Dem-Rep PID			–0.033#
			(0.017)
Liberal-conservative ideo			–0.001
			(0.024)
Racial resentment			–0.090**
			(0.033)
US economy worse			–0.049#
			(0.029)
Constant	1.915**	2.273**	2.383**
	(0.027)	(0.125)	(0.150)

(continued)

Table 1. *(continued)*

	Immigration policy support, ANES 12		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
N	911	874	706
R-squared	0.029	0.056	0.099
Adj. R-squared	0.028	0.043	0.075

SOURCE.—2012 ANES, Latino sample.

NOTE.—"On immigration policy, do you prefer to: (0) Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country, (1) Have a guest worker program in order to work, (2) Allow them to remain and eventually qualify for US citizenship if they meet certain requirements and pay penalties, or (3) Allow them to remain and eventually qualify for US citizenship without penalties?"

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{\#}p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$

the American identity prioritization variable is statistically significant (at $p < 0.01$). Substantively, a single unit change in identity prioritization yields between a 0.43 and 0.56 increase in support for a border wall.

To visualize the results, predicted values of support with confidence bands are presented in figure 3. As illustrated, Latinx are generally opposed to a border wall, but this level of opposition varies greatly based on individuals' identity prioritization. The predicted value of support for high Latinx identifiers is –3, which corresponds to "a great deal" of opposition. In contrast, the predicted value for high American identifiers falls just above value 0, which corresponds to the "neither favor nor oppose" response option. This is consistent with the immigration policy findings, and provides the largest cleavage by identity prioritization on any of the outcome measures.

The "illegal immigrants" feeling thermometer analyses also support our hypothesis. Table 4 reports the results for 2012, and shows that across all of the models, American identity prioritization is statistically significant at $p < 0.01$. More specifically, for each unit change on the identity prioritization measure, we observe a reduction of 5 to 6.5 points in favorability toward unauthorized immigrants. Table 5 illustrates the presence of nearly identical patterns in 2016.

To aid in interpretation, figure 4 graphically depicts this relationship. Across both datasets, respondents who highly prioritize their Latinx identity rate "illegal immigrants" around 80 points on the 0–100 scale, whereas high American identifiers rate "illegal immigrants" around 40 points. This stark

Table 2. Predictors of attitudes toward immigration policy, 2016

	Immigration policy support, ANES 16		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	–0.131**	–0.131**	–0.101**
	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.029)
Age		–0.004	–0.002
		(0.002)	(0.002)
Female		0.138#	0.145#
		(0.078)	(0.077)
Education		0.016	–0.022
		(0.037)	(0.038)
Income 40 < 80		–0.054	–0.036
		(0.093)	(0.092)
Income > 80		–0.086	–0.049
		(0.106)	(0.107)
Missing income		–0.231	–0.258
		(0.326)	(0.317)
Mexican		0.034	0.068
		(0.087)	(0.087)
Cuban		0.066	0.053
		(0.183)	(0.179)
Puerto Rican		–0.168	–0.183
		(0.132)	(0.131)
Catholic		0.150#	0.139#
		(0.080)	(0.080)
Generation		–0.036	–0.007
		(0.052)	(0.052)
Worship attendance			0.040
			(0.027)
Political knowledge			0.008
			(0.036)
Dem-Rep PID			–0.001
			(0.025)
Liberal-conservative ideo			–0.115**
			(0.035)
Racial resentment			–0.039
			(0.044)
US economy worse			–0.098**
			(0.037)
Constant	1.963**	2.034**	1.909**
	(0.038)	(0.178)	(0.183)

(continued)

Table 2. *(continued)*

	Immigration policy support, ANES 16		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
N	348	333	320
R-squared	0.067	0.117	0.205
Adj. R-squared	0.065	0.084	0.157

SOURCE.—2016 ANES, Latino sample.

NOTE.—"On immigration policy, do you prefer to: (0) Make all unauthorized immigrants felons and send them back to their home country, (1) Have a guest worker program in order to work, (2) Allow them to remain and eventually qualify for US citizenship if they meet certain requirements and pay penalties, or (3) Allow them to remain and eventually qualify for US citizenship without penalties?"

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{\#}p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$

difference of about 40 points in thermometer rating by identity prioritization provides strong support for our hypothesis.

The final set of main analyses examine support for Republican presidential candidates. If our theoretical priors are correct, the identity-prioritization variable should be positive and statistically significant. Both candidates championed anti-immigrant policy positions, with Romney advocating for undocumented self-deportation and Trump proposing a border wall and cracking down on immigration.

Table 6 reports the results of the 2012 pre- and postelection analyses. In general, American identity prioritization is statistically associated with Romney favorability in every model save for Model 3 of the pre-election wave. Even in this model, the coefficient is in the expected direction. In the postelection models, the identity measure is consistently positively associated (at $p < 0.05$) with Romney favorability. As the bottom panel of figure 5 helps illustrate, those who prioritize a US American identity compared to a Latinx identity rate Mitt Romney more favorably. However, the effect size is not as large when compared to evaluations of "illegal immigrants," partly due to the partisan and ideological nature of candidate evaluations. While the party identification variable was statistically significant in some of the policy/group models, its effects appear to be much stronger in the candidate feeling thermometer models.

Table 7 presents the 2016 results, which illustrates a similar relationship. However, most likely due to Trump's strong anti-immigrant candidacy and over-the-top nationalism, the American identity prioritization coefficients are nearly double that of the 2012 Romney model coefficients. Ranging across the



Figure 2. Predicted values of support for progressive immigration policy option with 90 percent confidence bands by identity prioritization, ANES 2012 and 2016. Predicted values are based on coefficients in tables 1 and 2, Model 3.

models, for each unit change in identity prioritization we observe between 2.9 and 6.4 points change in support for Trump (on the 0–100 thermometer scale). Figure 6 illustrates both pre-election and postelection effects—revealing consistent patterns across survey waves. High Latinx identifiers give Trump a score between about 10 and 15 points on the 0–100 scale, whereas high American identifiers rate Trump around 40 on the same scale. Thus, even after accounting for partisanship, ideology, economic views, and racial attitudes, American identity prioritization provides additional insight into Latinx support for Donald Trump.

Having focused on identity prioritization, we now turn to the other variables. Overall, we do not find any unanticipated relationships that would challenge theoretical expectations. For example, party identification, ideology,

Table 3. Predictors of attitudes toward border wall, 2016

	Border wall support, ANES 16		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	0.513**	0.546**	0.425**
	(0.073)	(0.077)	(0.076)
Age		–0.0004	–0.002
		(0.007)	(0.007)
Female		–0.144	–0.085
		(0.213)	(0.205)
Education		–0.161	–0.046
		(0.103)	(0.101)
Income 40 < 80		0.396	0.188
		(0.253)	(0.243)
Income > 80		–0.234	–0.373
		(0.293)	(0.285)
Missing income		–0.275	−–0.336
		(0.899)	(0.844)
Mexican		–0.076	–0.195
		(0.239)	(0.233)
Cuban		0.926#	0.742
		(0.504)	(0.476)
Puerto Rican		0.684#	0.786*
		(0.360)	(0.347)
Catholic		–0.247	–0.182
		(0.219)	(0.212)
Generation		0.085	–0.017
		(0.143)	(0.137)
Worship attendance			0.058
			(0.072)
Political knowledge			–0.166#
			(0.095)
Dem-Rep PID			0.187**
			(0.067)
Liberal-conservative ideo			0.168#
			(0.093)
Racial resentment			0.260*
			(0.118)
US economy worse			0.194*
			(0.098)
Constant	–1.592**	–1.215*	–0.789
	(0.106)	(0.485)	(0.481)

(continued)

Table 3. *(continued)*

	Border wall support, ANES 16		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
N	352	336	323
R-squared	0.124	0.181	0.319
Adj. R-squared	0.122	0.151	0.279

NOTE.—Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose building a wall on the US border with Mexico?

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{\#}p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$



Figure 3. Predicted values of support for the Mexico border wall with 90 percent confidence bands by identity prioritization, ANES 2016. Predicted values are based on coefficients in table 3, Model 3.

Table 4. Predictors of attitudes toward "illegal immigrants," 2012

	Illegal immigrant favorability, ANES 12		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	–6.357**	–5.207**	–4.635**
	(0.560)	(0.593)	(0.655)
Age		–0.048	–0.005
		(0.052)	(0.060)
Female		0.957	0.761
		(1.649)	(1.815)
Education		–0.587	–0.870
		(0.800)	(0.880)
Income 40 < 80		–0.268	–0.252
		(2.000)	(2.167)
Income > 80		–1.351	–1.877
		(2.644)	(2.770)
Missing income		0.560	–0.772
		(2.904)	(3.706)
Mexican		2.775	4.493#
		(2.239)	(2.390)
Cuban		–4.082	–0.811
		(3.626)	(3.814)
Puerto Rican		2.749	5.534
		(3.242)	(3.490)
Catholic		3.236#	1.527
		(1.685)	(1.859)
Generation		–8.965**	–8.568**
		(1.131)	(1.227)
Worship attendance			1.022#
			(0.587)
Political knowledge			–0.633
			(0.827)
Dem-Rep PID			–1.249*
			(0.544)
Liberal-conservative ideo			–1.394#
			(0.743)
Racial resentment			–2.733**
			(1.030)
US economy worse			–2.659**
			(0.919)
Constant	63.278**	72.000**	69.731**
	(0.896)	(3.995)	(4.716)

(continued)

Table 4. *(continued)*

	Illegal immigrant favorability, ANES 12		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
N	908	871	703
R-squared	0.125	0.204	0.269
Adj. R-squared	0.124	0.192	0.250

SOURCE.—2012 ANES, Latino sample.

NOTE.—How would you rate illegal immigrants? Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{\#}p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$

racial resentment, and economic evaluations help explain policy attitudes and favorability ratings in theoretically sensible directions. In terms of demographic controls, there are no consistent patterns across all of the models. However, it is worth highlighting that Puerto Ricans, relative to other Latinx, are disproportionately supportive of building a border wall. Consistent with arguments made by Garcia-Rios, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta (2018), this may reflect a reduced tendency to view xenophobic rhetoric about the border wall as a direct attack against those of Puerto Rican descent given their unique status as American citizens.

Finally, we conducted a number of additional analyses (see tables B4–B22 in the Supplementary Material) that show that the main results are not sensitive to modeling choices, missing observations, or sample design and nonresponse. To rule out the possibility that the identity prioritization measure simply correlates with a variety of policy positions rather than distinctly related to restrictive immigration attitudes, we considered opinions toward other policies not directly linked to the Latinx community. These additional results (see table B23 in the Supplementary Material) reveal no statistically or substantively significant relationships between the American identity prioritization variable and attitudes toward global warming or federal spending on science/technology and crime. We also replicated the analyses (to the extent possible) with the 2006 Latino National Study (LNS). The LNS models (see table B24 in the Supplementary Material) show that individuals who prioritize a US American identity have a more favorable view of President George W. Bush and are less likely than their counterparts to support progressive policy options (e.g.," immediate legalization") toward undocumented immigrants. Finally,

Table 5. Predictors of attitudes toward "illegal immigrants," 2016

	Illegal immigrant favorability, ANES 16		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	–6.477**	–5.860**	–4.231**
	(0.925)	(0.964)	(0.930)
Age		–0.115	–0.077
		(0.083)	(0.079)
Female		4.155	3.737
		(2.659)	(2.491)
Education		0.066	–1.650
		(1.283)	(1.222)
Income 40 < 80		–3.742	–1.804
		(3.173)	(2.959)
Income > 80		–1.867	–0.974
		(3.671)	(3.464)
Missing income		–9.796	–9.401
		(11.237)	(10.235)
Mexican		3.012	3.422
		(2.994)	(2.824)
Cuban		–7.089	–5.732
		(6.292)	(5.772)
Puerto Rican		–3.500	–5.085
		(4.528)	(4.206)
Catholic		8.698**	8.552**
		(2.739)	(2.576)
Generation		–5.750**	–3.783*
		(1.793)	(1.676)
Worship attendance			0.224
			(0.873)
Political knowledge			2.124#
			(1.160)
Dem-Rep PID			–2.312**
			(0.811)
Liberal-conservative ideo			–1.699
			(1.134)
Racial resentment			–2.737#
			(1.432)
US economy worse			–4.092**
			(1.190)
Constant	62.119**	67.922**	61.066**
	(1.350)	(6.066)	(5.847)

(continued)

Table 5. *(continued)*

	Illegal immigrant favorability, ANES 16		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
N	350	334	322
R-squared	0.124	0.216	0.362
Adj. R-squared	0.121	0.187	0.325

NOTE.—How would you rate illegal immigrants? Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the group. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the group and that you don't care too much for that group. You would rate the group at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the group.

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{\#}p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$



Figure 4. Predicted favorability score toward "illegal immigrants" with 90 percent confidence bands by identity prioritization, ANES 2012 and 2016. Predicted values are based on coefficients in tables 4 and 5, Model 3.

Table 6. Predictors of attitudes toward "Mitt Romney," 2012

	Romney favorability (pre)			Romney favorability (post)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	2.744**	2.113**	0.206	3.614**	3.137**	1.563*
	(0.639)	(0.700)	(0.622)	(0.621)	(0.681)	(0.638)
Age		0.207**	0.173**		0.192**	0.135*
		(0.062)	(0.057)		(0.060)	(0.058)
Female		–4.374*	–3.409*		–1.527	–1.629
		(1.951)	(1.726)		(1.896)	(1.766)
Education		–0.473	–0.300		–0.355	–0.919
		(0.948)	(0.836)		(0.917)	(0.855)
Income 40 < 80		0.447	–0.959		3.103	2.031
		(2.357)	(2.058)		(2.298)	(2.110)
Income > 80		2.791	–0.986		3.378	0.018
		(3.111)	(2.632)		(3.024)	(2.692)
Missing income		0.838	–2.625		1.109	0.270
		(3.472)	(3.518)		(3.285)	(3.565)
Mexican		0.800	–0.734		1.511	–0.121
		(2.647)	(2.265)		(2.568)	(2.322)
Cuban		5.907	–4.053		–1.396	–8.619*
		(4.241)	(3.579)		(4.096)	(3.641)
Puerto Rican		–1.501	–4.466		–4.354	–7.092*
		(3.784)	(3.291)		(3.678)	(3.370)
Catholic		–1.168	1.551		–0.767	1.957
		(1.991)	(1.764)		(1.934)	(1.807)
Generation		0.354	0.626		–0.356	0.177
		(1.332)	(1.164)		(1.298)	(1.193)
Worship attendance			1.435*			2.493**
			(0.558)			(0.572)
Political knowledge			0.753			0.694
			(0.783)			(0.803)
Dem-Rep PID			6.696**			5.507**
			(0.518)			(0.530)
Liberal-conservative ideo			2.409**			2.707**
			(0.705)			(0.723)
Racial resentment			2.670**			2.815**
			(0.980)			(1.001)
US economy worse			5.142**			3.454**
			(0.873)			(0.896)
Constant	38.109**	31.702**	35.295**	39.115**	31.393**	34.906**
	(1.024)	(4.738)	(4.469)	(0.995)	(4.588)	(4.583)

(continued)

Table 6. *(continued)*

	Romney favorability (pre)			Romney favorability (post)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
N	906	870	705	907	871	702
R-squared	0.020	0.046	0.454	0.036	0.057	0.399
Adj. R-squared	0.019	0.032	0.439	0.035	0.044	0.383

NOTE.—How would you rate Mitt Romney? Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

*$p < 0.05$; **$p < 0.01$



Figure 5. Predicted favorability score toward presidential candidate Mitt Romney with 90 percent confidence bands by identity prioritization, ANES 2012. Predicted values are based on coefficients in table 6, Models 3 and 6.

Table 7. Predictors of attitudes toward "Donald Trump," 2016

	Trump favorability (pre)			Trump favorability (post)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Prioritize American > Latinx ID	6.545** (1.109)	6.072** (1.165)	3.506** (0.986)	6.386** (1.117)	5.944** (1.171)	3.013** (0.963)
Age		0.118 (0.101)	0.061 (0.085)		0.140 (0.100)	0.070 (0.083)
Female		–5.937# (3.231)	–3.952 (2.660)		–3.227 (3.239)	–0.424 (2.594)
Education		–1.529 (1.566)	0.414 (1.305)		–3.841* (1.565)	–1.498 (1.272)
Income 40 < 80		3.397 (3.844)	–0.508 (3.157)		6.771# (3.852)	3.092 (3.074)
Income > 80		–0.357 (4.442)	–4.568 (3.697)		1.462 (4.464)	–2.378 (3.614)
Missing income		–10.152 (13.610)	–11.711 (10.918)		–15.464 (13.690)	–16.944 (10.657)
Mexican		3.045 (3.647)	1.182 (3.021)		–1.780 (3.654)	–2.321 (2.948)
Cuban		13.320# (7.630)	9.265 (6.160)		15.963* (7.669)	12.498* (6.014)
Puerto Rican		–4.834 (5.498)	–3.503 (4.527)		–3.975 (5.474)	–1.169 (4.381)
Catholic		–6.527# (3.321)	–5.105# (2.748)		–6.788* (3.330)	–6.027* (2.674)
Generation		5.363* (2.166)	2.791 (1.782)		4.469* (2.178)	2.087 (1.739)
Worship attendance			2.293* (0.933)			1.961* (0.910)
Political knowledge			–3.079* (1.230)			–2.583* (1.208)
Dem-Rep PID			6.269** (0.863)			6.676** (0.841)
Liberal-conservative ideo			2.012# (1.212)			1.873 (1.181)
Racial resentment			3.565* (1.527)			5.014** (1.494)
US economy worse			3.506** (1.265)			3.625** (1.236)
Constant	22.872** (1.626)	19.314** (7.350)	29.462** (6.242)	28.494** (1.632)	31.132** (7.386)	38.999** (6.081)

(continued)

Table 7. *(continued)*

	Trump favorability (pre)			Trump favorability (post)		
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
N	348	333	321	351	335	322
R-squared	0.091	0.154	0.482	0.086	0.159	0.520
Adj. R-squared	0.089	0.122	0.452	0.083	0.128	0.492

NOTE.—How would you rate Donald Trump? Ratings between 50 degrees and 100 degrees mean that you feel favorable and warm toward the person. Ratings between 0 degrees and 50 degrees mean that you don't feel favorable toward the person and that you don't care too much for that person. You would rate the person at the 50-degree mark if you don't feel particularly warm or cold toward the person.

OLS regression; two-tailed test. Standard errors in parentheses.

$^{\#}p < 0.10$; $^{*}p < 0.05$; $^{**}p < 0.01$



Figure 6. Predicted favorability score toward presidential candidate Donald Trump with 90 percent confidence bands by identity prioritization, ANES 2016. Predicted values are based on coefficients in table 7, Models 3 and 6.

tables B34–B42 (in the Supplementary Material) explore the potential interactive effect of identity prioritization and socio-economic status (income and education) on each outcome variable. With the exception of attitudes toward Mitt Romney in the pre-election wave and the construction of a border wall in 2016, there were no statistically significant interactive effects in any of the fully specified models. While income is associated with American identity prioritization (see tables B2 and B3 in the Supplementary Material), the interaction between socio-economic status and identity prioritization does not shed any additional insights into Latinx support for restrictive immigration policies and candidates.

Conclusion

The present study draws from social identity theory to explain Latinx support for restrictive immigration policies and the politicians who support them. We have argued that identity prioritization is a component of and indicator for the type of social mobility strategy utilized by many Latinx in the United States as they struggle to navigate the comparatively lower status associated with their social group. Those with the capacity to do so may prioritize their US American identity over their Latinx identity in an effort to pass as a member of the former and disassociate from the latter. As hypothesized, such individuals were significantly more likely to support restrictive immigration policies and Republican presidential candidates even after controlling for a range of political variables and alternative explanations. Conversely, prioritizing a Latinx identity signifies efforts to collaborate with ingroup members to improve the collective status of the social group, which in the contemporary context necessitates challenging discriminatory practices and prejudicial beliefs against (un)documented immigrants.

Our study not only fills an important gap in scholarly research on Latinx attitudes toward immigration, but also sheds light on the potential challenges to Latinx political unity and "linked fate." Sanchez and Masuoka (2010) demonstrate that Latinx linked fate is both prevalent and predicated upon shared difficulties with social integration and marginalization derived from the immigrant experience. However, existing scholarship has also noted that "Latinx" is a socially imposed, pan-ethnic identity that ignores the tremendous diversity within this community (Masuoka 2006), and may therefore lack the emotional resonance necessary to inspire political unity and collective action. What is often missing is an appreciation that those who lack a sense of linked fate with the Latinx community may actually be working against the interests of the group rather than merely sitting on the sidelines. As such, the integration of SIT and analytical focus on identity prioritization is a more precise means of understanding when and why individuals choose to abandon the group.

Furthermore, there are no clear theoretical reasons to assume that these processes are restricted to the Latinx community. There are a number of other social groups in the United States, such as Muslim Americans and Asian Americans, whose group interests are often regarded as "undesirable" or "un-American" by large segments of the population (Lajevardi and Oskooii 2018; Oskooii, Dana, and Barreto 2019). We look forward to future research that can apply the present framework to explore whether these group members similarly prioritize a US American identity and dissociate themselves from their social group and its shared interests, and what specific factors may render "passing" impossible or undesirable for different social groups.

In a similar vein, given the Latinx population's diversity in country of origin, temporal proximity to the immigration experience, and other attributes, future research should consider how US American identity prioritization operates for different subgroups. In other words, are the effects observed for identity prioritization heterogeneous?

Although much can be gained from an analysis of the effects of identity prioritization, it is important to acknowledge that individuals in complex societies usually belong to several overlapping social groups. While some groups are voluntarily joined, others are imposed by broader social forces based on ascriptive characteristics. Membership in a group does not necessarily contribute to an individual's social identity (Tajfel and Turner 1979), and social group membership may mean different things in different contexts. Therefore, an individual may choose to prioritize a particular identity in some contexts but not others or emphasize their membership in both groups equally (Roccas and Brewer 2002).[13] Latinx can display both strong ethnic and national identities (Schildkraut 2011; Citrin and Sears 2014), which may be regarded as a sign of acculturation (as one feels equally well connected to their ancestral heritage as their country of residence), or it could reflect a sense of alienation from both (Golash-Boza 2006). Similar distinctions could likely be made with respect to other marginal social groups whose members may be strongly or weakly connected to both their national and subnational identities. Although there is a rich literature on multiple social identities (Roccas and Brewer 2002), it is not clear whether equal identification represents two identities experienced as separate aspects of the self that switch with context, as a compound identity where they are inextricably connected to one another, or as nested identities (e.g., superordinate and subgroup identities) that complement each other to serve different needs (Brewer 1999). In the case of the latter, research on the

13. Citrin and Sears (2014) describe "Hyphenated Americans" as a "halfway house" between immigration and assimilation. Such individuals are more likely to regard their ethnic identity as very important to them, compared to those who solely identify as American and are just as patriotic. While many of these hyphenated Americans will prioritize one identity over the other, some will regard them as equally important.

common ingroup identity model suggests that outgroup bias can be reduced when individuals view themselves as being members of a shared superordinate group (Gaertner et al. 1993). As such, we encourage future scholars to further explore the conditions under which identity prioritization may change along with developing more precise measures and hypotheses for those who choose not to prioritize one identity over the other.

Similarly, we encourage researchers to explore how different conceptions of what a US American identity means may affect these processes. The literature points out that US American identity can mean different things to different people in various contexts, and that this can have particularly important implications for immigration attitudes (Schildkraut 2011; Citrin and Sears 2014). Unfortunately, due to data limitations, we assumed that those who prioritize a US American identity have adopted a monolithic conception of that identity, which lends itself toward support for more restrictive immigration policies. While this interpretation may be appropriate in this particular context, it is our hope that future work will be able to incorporate more nuanced measures that could explore the differential effects of various notions of US American identity.

Finally, it is important to acknowledge the limitations of this study. The comparatively harsher rhetoric employed by President Trump against the Latinx community arguably further devalued Latinx group status in US society. Although it would be consistent with our expectation that more Latinx individuals may choose to pursue an individual social mobility strategy (or, if that fails, to pursue a collective social mobility strategy) compared to previous years, we simply lack adequate panel data to properly evaluate this hypothesis. Future research relying on time series/panel data to capture such changes and/or framing experiments to evaluate how rhetoric against one's social group can impact identity prioritization would be beneficial in this regard. Another limitation of our research concerns accounting for perceptions of Latinx group status. Since the datasets lack adequate measures of group status, we can only encourage future research to develop and incorporate such measures to further explore the potential link between self-perceptions of group status and identity prioritization among Latinx.

We also acknowledge that there are numerous reasons why Latinx (and minority groups in general) face discrimination. We do not seek to conflate being a member of a group that has experienced discrimination in the past with personally experiencing discrimination based on perceived membership in a group. Once again, the ANES lacks fine-grained measures to satisfactorily account for this distinction, and the role it may play in influencing identity prioritization among Latinx. Moving forward, future work would benefit from exploring this possible relationship, as well as investigating the ways in which state and local immigration policies (e.g., California's Proposition 187) may influence identity prioritization.

Data Availability Statement

REPLICATION DATA AND DOCUMENTATION are available at https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataset.xhtml?persistentId=doi:10.7910/DVN/DPFNTQ.

Supplementary Material

SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL may be found in the online version of this article: https://doi.org/10.1093/poq/nfaa048.

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