

Undermining Sanctuary? When Local and National Partisan Cues Diverge

Urban Affairs Review

1–37

© The Author(s) 2021

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/10780874211043867

journals.sagepub.com/home/uar

Loren Collingwood¹,
Gabriel Martinez¹, and Kassra
A. R. Oskooii² 

Abstract

To what extent do national partisan cues exert influence over local voting behavior? Despite being an “immigrant welcoming city,” in November, 2019, Tucson, Arizona, voters rejected Prop. 205—the Tucson Families Free and Together Initiative. We leverage theories of elite partisan cues to explain why voters in a progressive city voted against such an initiative. In contrast to Democratic support for sanctuary cities at the national level, we argue that mixed cues from local Democratic elites contributed significantly to a surprising rejection of the initiative. Using aggregate-level data and a framing experiment, we find that the local political environment split Democratic votes (50% favored, 50% opposed) while keeping Republican voters—who received consistent elite cues of opposition—uniformly against the proposition. This study illustrates how local partisan elite cues can shape ballot initiative voting outcomes, even to the point of overriding negative partisanship and national co-partisan consensus on the same issue.

¹University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, New Mexico, USA

²University of Delaware, Newark, Delaware, USA

The authors, listed in alphabetical order, would like to thank the four anonymous reviewers and the editorial team at UAR. They would also like to thank Sarah Dreier, Stephen Nicholson, Bradford Jones, Gabriel Sanchez, Hannah Walker, and participants at the 2020 ASU PRIEC for their invaluable feedback on previous versions of this article.

Corresponding Author:

Kassra A. R. Oskooii, University of Delaware, USA.

Email: oskooiik@udel.edu

Keywords

sanctuary cities, immigration policy, elite cues, direct democracy, ecological inference, local politics

Introduction

In 1982, Tucson, Arizona, birthed the sanctuary movement, with John Fife, minister of Southside Presbyterian, declaring his church a sanctuary for immigrant refugees fleeing civil conflict in El Salvador and Guatemala (Collingwood and O'Brien, 2019; Lasch et al., 2018; Delgado, 2018). The movement spread to hundreds of houses of worship around the country and, by 1985, Madison, Wisconsin, became the first sanctuary city. While no single definition exists, sanctuary cities nearly universally have two common elements: the city has an ordinance that (1) forbids local law enforcement from inquiring into residents' immigration status and (2) limits local law enforcement's cooperation with ICE/federal immigration authorities (Gonzalez O'Brien, Collingwood, and El-Khatib, 2019a). Since Madison, the sanctuary movement has morphed into a national movement, with the largest cities in the country declaring themselves sanctuaries for the undocumented.

However, despite being a broadly progressive city with a 2 to 1 advantage in registered Democrats, Tucson, the home of the sanctuary movement, is not a sanctuary city because its residents voted down (69.8% v. 30.2%) a local ballot initiative (Proposition 205) in 2019.¹ In contrast to Democratic politicians on the national stage, a significant portion of local Democratic officials advocated against efforts to turn the city into a sanctuary for immigrants. They asserted that by making Tucson a sanctuary, the city may lose millions of dollars in state and federal funding. For instance, outgoing Democratic mayor, Jonathan Rothschild, penned a "vote no" op-ed in the Arizona Daily Star newspaper just three weeks before the 2019 vote, where he asserted: "If passed, Prop. 205 would harm our community in ways that have nothing to do with immigration. And, while intended to protect immigrants, it may actually make their situation worse."²

Given Tucson's rejection of the sanctuary proposition, we consider whether local elite cues can override potentially powerful and conflicting national partisan cues and sentiments. Stated differently, can local elites still inform citizens' voting behavior on highly salient policy issues? This question is important to answer because recent evidence suggests that local politics and voters' understanding of issues has become increasingly nationalized (Hopkins, 2018), particularly with the rise of negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). Nowhere does this nationalizing

phenomenon seem to be more germane than in the case of sanctuary cities. Previously a local issue, President Trump thrust sanctuary cities into the national immigration debate in the early stages of his 2016 presidential run. Subsequently, public's sanctuary attitudes polarized along partisan lines (Collingwood, O'Brien, and Tafoya, 2018; Casellas and Wallace, 2020), fitting with the trend of partisan sorting across the electorate (Mason, 2015; Lang and Pearson-Merkowitz, 2015; Abramowitz and Webster, 2016; Nicholson, 2012). However, in a progressive city where a clear majority of its citizens identify as Democrats, voters rejected a sanctuary ballot proposition.

Our study addresses this puzzle by examining voting patterns in Tucson to shed light on the interplay between local and national political dynamics in explaining citizen's vote choice on salient policy issues. We find that even in a broadly polarized national elite environment surrounding the topic of sanctuary cities—with Republicans resoundingly opposing them and Democrats supporting them—Democratic voters split their support on the proposition, which resulted in its downfall. Building upon scholarship on elite partisan cues, and an emerging scholarship on sanctuary cities and public opinion, we argue that Tucson's sanctuary initiative failed because partisans were operating in a localized asymmetrical elite cues environment, where Republican voters received consistent one-sided elite messaging on sanctuary cities (ban them) and Democratic voters received conflicting co-partisan messages.³

Using precinct-level voting data from the 2019 general election, our ecological inference (EI) analysis shows that Republican voters uniformly opposed Prop. 205, whereas Democrats neatly split on the initiative vote. Importantly, we find that the Prop. 205 outcome cannot be explained by disproportionate Republican turnout, which would undermine a mixed-cues explanation. Additionally, we show that in two other local contexts where elite Democratic party cues were nearly uniform, Democratic voters showed overwhelming support for sanctuary city ballot initiatives. Finally, we test the influence of mixed partisan cues on vote choice with a framing experiment among Democrats, which shows that respondents exposed to a Democratic elites are divided condition were statistically and substantially less supportive of sanctuary cities than were Democratic respondents exposed to a control condition.

Our study contributes to the broad literature on partisan elite cues, voting behavior, local elections, and sanctuary politics. The findings help illustrate that even in the case of a salient policy issue with tremendous partisan sorting at the national level, the local political context can still exert significant influence on citizens' voting behavior. Furthermore, this observation poses a challenge to the contention that policy positions taken by out-group

party leaders—in this case, Trump’s well-known and publicized opposition toward sanctuary cities—can meaningfully induce in-group identifiers (i.e., Democratic voters) to take the contrary policy position (Nicholson, 2012). Instead, a significant portion of Tucson Democrats seem to have been more influenced by local in-party leaders’ mixed messages rather than clear out-party opposition from local and national Republican elites. Overall, Tucson’s sanctuary policy failure highlights the important ways in which local political contexts can still shape political behavior and provides a cautionary tale for political advocates who assume that national political narratives automatically supersede or translate into local political outcomes.

In what follows we outline literature on partisan elite cues and how such cues apply to the study of sanctuary city politics and direct democracy measures in general. We then review the specific political context of Prop. 205 before outlining formal hypotheses. Next, we present our data, methods, and findings. We then discuss our experimental design and findings before concluding with final thoughts and suggestions for future research.

Theoretical Framework

Mainstay theories of political attitude formation and attitude change suggest that citizens are strongly influenced by elite cues and political communication (Converse, 1964; Zaller et al., 1992), particularly as they navigate the demanding context of direct democracy (Bowler and Donovan, 2000). More specifically, partisans take cues from same-party candidates and elected officials and tend to exhibit elites’ policy preferences (Gilens and Murakawa, 2002; Levendusky, 2010). For instance, Lenz (2013) shows that voters often support candidates, and then adopt said candidates’ policy positions. In the context of ballot initiatives, Karp (1998) notes that Zaller’s model is particularly influential in that elite endorsements play a key role in structuring mass opinions and decision-making, especially when local elites have partisan affiliations (Lupia, 1994; Magleby, 1984). Research has shown that the initiative campaigns themselves (Rogers and Middleton, 2015) and local media coverage of initiatives (Delaney and Eckstein, 2008), which often rely on partisan cues, can also play a consequential role in structuring attitudes. Particularly relevant for undecided voters or those who possess limited knowledge of a policy proposal (Oskooii et al., 2018) are arguments in favor or opposition of an initiative presented in voter pamphlets or guides. These information sources, which often highlight local partisan positions, offer easy-to-use cues for most voters (Bowler and Donovan, 2000).

Under this model of elite partisan communication, the scholarship suggests that when elite partisan cues about direct democracy measures are one-sided,

particularly at the local level, partisans will exhibit similar trends as their respective elites. For instance, if Republican messages communicate to voters that sanctuary policies are “flawed” or “dangerous,” one should anticipate Republican voters to uniformly oppose such policies. However, if Democratic elites, particularly at the local level, send mixed cues—some support sanctuary policy, others not so much—Democratic voters will likewise respond in such a manner and exhibit mixed support. This is particularly the case if such mixed cues are presented in local media coverage of the proposition and the arguments voters are presented with in the voter guide.

These trends of reliance upon partisan elite cues may also be increasing in an era of mass partisan polarization (Mason, 2015), although Klar, Krupnikov, and Ryan (2018) suggest that many people simply disdain partisanship. Still, Mason (2018) argues that partisan identity has become a core social identity, whereas Abramowitz (2010) argues the political center is disappearing. Indeed, recent research shows that individuals express increasing dislike of out-group partisans, a term Abramowitz and Webster (2016, 2018) coin negative partisanship. It stands to reason, then, that elite partisan communication should strongly influence voters’ decisions on topics, such as, sanctuary cities.

Indeed, recent research on sanctuary cities finds support for intense partisan polarization on the issue. For instance, Collingwood, O’Brien, and Tafoya (2018) show that Trump’s campaign against sanctuary cities and the then Democratic mayors’ response helped to further polarize public opinion on the topic. Specifically, they demonstrate that Democratic voters in the states of California and Texas moved strongly into the pro-sanctuary camp between 2015 and 2017. Casellas and Wallace (2020) provide additional evidence that partisanship is a primary cleaver of sanctuary city public opinion formation. Gonzalez O’Brien et al. (2019b) further find that media coverage of sanctuary cities has become increasingly partisan over the past four decades. As such, they suggest that Democrats and Republicans will increasingly hold polarized attitudes on the topic of sanctuary policy.

The work on polarization and sanctuary politics mirrors findings showing a growing partisan schism on immigration more generally. Johnston, Newman, and Velez (2015) find that local ethnic change polarizes people over the issue of immigration and that people high in authoritarianism and “need for change” are more likely to voice anti-immigrant attitudes. Additionally, Hout and Maggio (2021) find that the public’s attitudes on race and immigration are more correlated now than they were twenty years ago and that both are more correlated with party preferences.

While partisans may generally be motivated to hold a similar position as their party leaders and may have a hard time making up their minds in the absence of clear source cues, the social identity account of partisanship

predicts an alternative outcome, where partisan bias is so powerful that out-party cues alone may override any unified or mixed in-party cues. In “Polarizing Cues,” Nicholson (2012) argues that in-party leaders have a limited influence to persuade in-partisans. Rather, partisans are more likely to adopt a contrary policy position advocated by out-party leaders. Research in line with Nicholson’s polarizing cues is partially supportive of this thesis. For instance, Bolsen, Druckman, and Cook (2014) find that both in-party and out-party cues drive support/opposition on energy policy. In related, but slightly earlier work, Goren, Federico, and Kittilson (2009) find that out-party cues motivate value expression (i.e., equal opportunity, self-reliance, traditionalism, and tolerance) more strongly than do in-party cues. Finally, Bullock (2011) finds that both in- and out-party cues drive in-party members to more strongly support/oppose a policy.

The polarizing cues thesis, therefore, suggests that Democratic leaders’ support for sanctuary cities does not exert much influence on Democratic voters. Rather, Republican leaders’ opposition plays a much bigger role in whether Democrats will support sanctuary initiatives. Under this negative partisanship model, mixed Democratic elite cues should not factor into the voting behavior of Tucson Democrats since they will be highly motivated to hold a policy position contrary to Republican leaders, who have firmly opposed sanctuary cities. If this model is correct and differential turnout levels cannot explain the vote outcome, Prop. 205 should have never failed in the progressive city of Tucson as Democrats would have voted overwhelmingly in favor of it. Of course, this is not what happened, and as we will demonstrate, Democrats split their vote, mirroring the mixed position taken by local Democratic elites. Before further evaluating vote outcomes, we first need to establish that Democratic elites were divided in Tucson—a key point that we turn to next.

Prop. 205 and Tucson’s Political Environment

Since Donald Trump’s presidential campaign, the topic of sanctuary cities has gained increasing attention and scrutiny, not only leading to an apparent nationalization of the issue but also a polarized public response. Indeed, Trump began his presidency with a memo aiming to ban sanctuaries outright, although a federal judge later overturned the executive order. In response, states, such as, California and Washington enacted statewide sanctuary policies, while Texas, Florida, Iowa, and Tennessee banned sanctuary cities outright. Thus, even though the sanctuary issue is commonly determined at the local level, with such national attention, it seems reasonable that voters casting ballots in local elections may be influenced by a mixture of national and local elite cues. And in fact, recent research by Hopkins (2018) suggests

that the nationalizing of local politics could override local political messaging. But, in Tucson, this was not the case.

In response to President Donald Trump's immigration policies a coalition of Tucson immigrant activists and local religious leaders gathered enough signatures in 2019 to place Prop. 205—the "Tucson Families Free and Together Initiative"—on the city's general election ballot. If enacted, the proposition would make Tucson a sanctuary, by blocking law enforcement from detaining residents to ask about citizenship status in many scenarios, and by limiting a police officer's ability to cooperate with federal immigration enforcement officials.⁴ While Prop. 205 did not go as far as Atlanta's sanctuary policy in terms of expressly limiting ICE holds (detainers) and restricting notifications to ICE about release dates, several clauses in the initiative (listed below) indicate the policy meets the definition of a sanctuary proposed by Gonzalez O'Brien, Collingwood, and El-Khatib (2019a)—and almost certainly would go against the "No Sanctuary for Criminals Act" proposed by Republican Bob Goodlatte in the U.S. House.

- "During a consensual contact, an officer shall not inquire about immigration status."
- "In seeking to determine whether a detainee or arrestee is an alien who is unlawfully present in the United States, an officer shall not initiate contact with a federal law enforcement agency by phone."
- "No city employee, officer, or agent shall participate in, offer, teach, prepare, or otherwise provide training to federal officers."

While Democratic elites nationally have been moving strongly in support of sanctuary cities (Democratic House representatives nearly unanimously voted against "No Sanctuaries for Criminals Act"), Arizona state and local Democratic officials took divergent positions on Prop. 205. Democratic state legislators, such as, Andres Cano and Victoria Steele expressed support for the proposition, as did the Arizona Democratic Party Progressive Caucus, Progressive Democrats of Southern Arizona, No More Deaths, and a handful of left-wing and left-leaning interest groups.⁵ However, then-U.S. Senate candidate and now Democratic U.S. Senator Mark Kelly, who is from Tucson, gave an interview during the election and expressed his opposition to Prop. 205.⁶ Furthermore, Pima County Democrats endorsed the proposition, and so too did the Pima County Supervisor, Democrat Richard Elias. However, many local Tucson Democrats opposed the initiative, including Democratic mayoral candidate, Regina Romero, and Tucson's entire all-Democratic city council.⁷ In her opposition, Romero, elected in 2019 as the city's first Latina mayor, stated: "I've led on those issues [immigrant welcoming] and they are very important

to this community, but I vehemently oppose the sanctuary city initiative because of that language.”

Tucson Democratic city councilmen Paul Durham, Richard Fimbres, and Steve Kozachik also wrote an argument against Prop. 205 in Tucson’s official voter guide, arguing that it places millions of dollars in federal grants at risk, jeopardizes state shared revenues, and does not make Tucson safer.⁸ City manager Micheal Ortega, Police Chief Chris Magnus—who is known for criticizing many of the Trump administration’s anti-immigration policies—and City Attorney Mike Rankin echoed these concerns, stating that the initiative would damage the city by withholding of state funds. In addition, local groups against Prop. 205 were Chicanos Por La Causa, which is an organization that self-proclaims advocacy for Chicanos, Mexican Americans, Central Americans, and indigenous peoples in Tucson.⁹ Overall, Democratic voters faced a mixed partisan information environment where many in-party local elites opposed the proposition due to concerns surrounding unintended consequences and the potential of losing state and federal funding.¹⁰

In contrast to Democratic elites, Republicans displayed a unified front. At the national level, Bob Goodlatte’s (Republican, VA-6) congressional bill, “No Sanctuary for Criminals Act,” co-sponsored by fifteen fellow Republicans, passed the House on June 29, 2017, with a vote of 225 Republicans for, and seven Republicans against.¹¹ During the 2016 GOP primary presidential campaign, leading candidates voiced opposition to sanctuary cities, including Donald Trump, Marco Rubio, Ted Cruz, Rand Paul, and Jeb Bush.¹² Indeed, Trump built a large portion of his immigration policy agenda around opposition to sanctuary cities. At the state level, Republican governor, Doug Ducey, voiced opposition to the proposition,¹³ which was a similar position taken by Republican politicians, such as, Jay Lawrence, John Kavanagh, and Bret Lawrence, who were threatening to ban local governments from declaring themselves sanctuary cities and withholding state funds to cities that made such declarations by citing a state law (SB-1487) enacted in 2016.¹⁴ At the local level, the Pima County Republican Party voiced strong opposition to Prop. 205¹⁵ and even attempted to block the proposition from getting on the ballot by challenging it in the courts.¹⁶ Overall, Republican voters in Tucson received fairly clear and one-sided messages from national, state, and local Republican officials in opposition of sanctuary cities in general, and Prop. 205 in specific.

To capture these partisan dynamics more systematically, we conducted a media text analysis by searching Google News using the phrase “Tucson sanctuary city” from January 1 - November 5, 2019. After a close examination of the article headlines to discard unrelated news stories, the search generated twenty-six news articles, disproportionately from the *Arizona Daily Star* (Tucson), *Arizona Republic* (Phoenix), and various Arizona television

stations.¹⁷ We then conducted a key word in context (KWIC) search for Democrat/Democrats/Democratic and Republican/Republicans/GOP, respectively (Leech and Onwuegbuzie, 2008; Benoit et al., 2018). This produced two data sets of twelve Democrat textual references and thirty-five Republican textual references. For example, we classified the following August 7, 2019 statement on *Arizona Republic* as Democrats opposed to the initiative: “others opposing the initiative include the three Democrats running to be Tucson’s next mayor.”¹⁸ We then read the sentences around each partisan reference to assess whether the reference (i.e., Democratic) indicated the partisan’s stance on the sanctuary initiative. Among the twelve Democrat references, six indicated that the Democratic actor opposed the initiative, five indicated that the actor was supportive of the initiative, and one suggested a neutral position. However, of the thirty-five Republican references, thirty-two indicated opposition, whereas only three suggested a neutral position.

To broaden our analysis of the information environment, we also conducted a Spanish media search using Nexus Uni, which resulted in twelve articles about the Tucson sanctuary campaign. Following our KWIC analysis above, we extracted all references to Democrats and Republicans, then classified whether the reference indicated pro- or anti-Prop. 205. Of the seven Democratic and six Republican references, all indicated elite opposition to the ballot initiative. However, based on our reading, we conducted an additional analysis for “Zaira Livier”—the main advocate behind the proposition. The search resulted in twelve references, all of which were pro-Prop. 205. Thus, it appears that the Spanish media framed the election as mainstream Democratic opposition (due to concerns over legality and funding), complete Republican opposition, and Latino activist support. Thus, a mixed elite information environment (mainstream Democrats v. Latino activists) was also present in these other outlets.

Hypotheses

The theoretical framework on elite cues and the local and national political dynamics surrounding Prop. 205 leads to two rival hypotheses regarding partisan voting behavior in Tucson. If the standard, top-down model of elite political communication holds ground, and local politics still exerts significant influence over citizen’s vote choice on salient policy issues, we should expect Republican voters to overwhelmingly oppose Prop. 205 and Democratic voters to split fairly evenly in support and opposition. This expectation is grounded in the observation that the local (and national) elite source cue environment for Republican voters was highly one-sided in opposition

toward the proposition, while the Democratic elite political communication was highly divided and conflicted in Tucson.

- H_1 : Republican voters will uniformly oppose Prop. 205, while Democratic voters will split their vote fairly evenly between yes and no on Prop. 205.

In contrast to the classic model, the social identity model of partisan source cues suggests that out-party, rather than in-party, leaders play a much more influential role in persuading voters (Nicholson, 2012). Additionally, research on the interplay between local and national politics suggests that American political behavior has become substantially more nationalized so much so that all politics is no longer local (Hopkins, 2018), particularly due to the rise of negative partisanship (Abramowitz and Webster, 2016). Taken together, these accounts suggest that Republicans and Democrats will display uniformly opposite voting behaviors on Prop. 205. Over the past several years, Republican voters have received clear cues in opposition to sanctuary city policies from national party leaders (e.g., President Donald Trump), while prominent national out-party leaders (e.g., House Speaker Nancy Pelosi) have expressed support for such pro-immigration policies. This suggests that due to diametrically opposing and clear in- and out-party cues on the national stage, and the desire to maintain a difference from the out-party, Tucson Republicans will uniformly oppose Prop. 205. Given that the national political communication environment for Democratic voters was also similar, with in-party leaders supporting the policy and out-party leaders opposing it, Tucson Democrats should be expected to uniformly support the proposition despite some conflicting local co-partisan cues.

- H_2 : Republican voters will uniformly oppose Prop. 205, while Democratic voters will uniformly support Prop. 205.

Data and Methods

Since we lack individual-level data of Tucson voters, we constructed aggregate-level data using a variety of sources to test our hypotheses. The data collection is extensive and consists of multiple parts to enable reliable inferences about partisan support/opposition toward Prop. 205. First, from the Tucson City Clerk's office, we gathered precinct-level election results, which includes the number of registered voters and the number of Prop. 205 yes and no votes, respectively.¹⁹ There are 135 total precincts in the data, which collectively contain 260,959 registered voters; 96,916 of whom voted on the initiative (37.14% turnout).²⁰ Second, we gathered

percent Sinema (Democratic candidate for U.S. Senate) and percent Garcia (Democratic candidate for Arizona governor) from the 2018 general election returns to construct partisan precinct estimates. More specifically, we averaged the percent vote share for these two top of the ticket Democrats to form a latent partisanship variable.

Figure 1 maps the citywide Prop. 205 precinct vote outcomes. The dark red color equates to strong opposition toward the proposition whereas the deep blue color signifies strong support. A cursory look at the map indicates that the south and southeast portion of the city voted overwhelmingly in opposition to Prop. 205, whereas the proposition received more favorable support towards the center of the city in the area around the University of Arizona. Overall, very few precincts displayed strong Prop. 205 support as indicated by the lack of deep blue precincts.

To assess whether Republicans voted almost uniformly in opposition to Prop. 205 and Democrats split their votes, we estimated voting behavior using Ecological Inference (EI) (King, 2013) from the eiCompare package (Barreto et al., 2019; Collingwood et al., 2016) in R.²¹ Our measure of partisanship is proxied from the average of the 2018 vote for U.S. Senator Kyrsten Sinema and Democrat David Garcia.²² The ecological regression takes percent yes on the left side of the equation and percent Democrat on the




Figure 1. Tucson 2019 General election percent yes vote for Prop. 205.

right side. Finally, the model incorporates total votes cast. The baseline model is presented below, where Y_i is the outcome variable (percent yes), β_i^D the estimated coefficient for percent Democrat, and β_i^{ND} the coefficient estimate for percent non-Democrat, by precinct. Similar to work by Collingwood, Jochim, and Oskooii (2018), We also evaluated the same data with a spatial regression, arriving at similar conclusions (see Supplemental Appendix section B.2).

$$Y_i = \beta_i^D \times X_i + \beta_i^{ND} \times (1 - X_i) \quad (1)$$

Results

Before discussing the main results, we begin with a simple scatterplot of the key variables of interest: percent Democrat (Republican) and percent Yes (No) on Prop. 205. Figure 2 plots percent Democrat on the x -axis against percent support for Prop. 205 on the y -axis. Each point represents a precinct and the bubble size is weighted by precinct population. As the plot illustrates, the two variables are strongly related, receiving a correlation of 0.91. However, a distinct pattern emerges: the majority of the precincts fall above the 50% Democrat line on the x -axis (vertical dotted gray line) but




Figure 2. Association between percent democrat (2018) and percent yes vote on Prop. 205.

below the 50% Yes vote line on the *y*-axis (horizontal dotted gray line). This suggests that while party identification is related to vote choice, a large share of heavily Democratic precincts did not cast ballots in support of Prop. 205. In fact, only seven heavily Democratic precincts voted 50% or more in favor of Prop. 205. In contrast, all of the Republican-leaning precincts strongly opposed the proposition. These aggregate findings provide initial support for hypothesis 1.

To examine the data in more detail, we turn to the EI analysis. Hypothesis 1 states that Republicans will uniformly oppose Prop. 205, whereas Democrats will exhibit mixed voting behavior. Table 1 suggests this to be the case.²³ The EI model estimates that 49% of Democrats supported Prop. 205 and 51% opposed it. In contrast, the model estimates that 99% of Republicans opposed the proposition. The findings lend strong support for hypothesis 1, while rejecting the social identity model of partisan source cues (hypothesis 2) since Democrats nearly perfectly split their support for the proposition despite diametrically opposed national in- and out-party cues.²⁴

To ensure that the findings are not simply due to the estimation techniques employed, we also analyzed the mayoral vote, which occurred contemporaneously as Prop. 205. Tucson mayoral candidates campaign with clear party labels, enabling us to see if Democrats and Republicans clearly polarized along partisan lines unlike the sanctuary city vote. In 2019, Regina Romero ran as the Democratic candidate, Ed Ackerley as an independent, and Mike Cease as a Green Party candidate. Overall, Romero won the election by receiving 55.9% of the votes cast with Ackerley receiving 39.4% of the votes. Both Romero and Ackerley opposed Prop. 205, with Cease supporting it. Given the partisan nature of mayoral elections, one would anticipate Democrats to strongly support Romero, while the Republicans would rally behind Ackerley, who is the only viable alternative given his independent party label and business background. The EI results reported in Table 2 confirm this expectation. An estimated 88% of Democrats backed Romero,

Table 1. Estimated Ecological Inference (EI) Prop. 205 Support by Partisanship.

	Democrats	Republicans
Percent Yes	49.34	0.78
se	0.06	0.17
Percent No	50.79	99.35
se	0.18	0.09

Source: Tucson Board of elections, 2018, 2019 election returns.

Table 2. Estimated Ecological Inference (EI) Mayoral Vote by Partisanship.

	Democrats	Republicans
Percent Romero (Dem)	87.97	5.95
se	0.45	0.74
Percent Cease (Green)	5.49	1.49
se	0.11	0.22
Percent Ackerley (Ind)	5.61	92.06
se	0.39	0.62
Percent Write-In	0.66	0.95
se	0.12	0.06

Source: Tucson Board of elections, 2018, 2019 returns.

while an estimated 92% of Republicans voted for Ackerley. This additional analysis helps illustrate the main results are capturing the unique campaign dynamics around Prop. 205 (mixed Democratic elite cues) rather than being driven by our estimation procedure or some other data limitation.²⁵

Finally, we take a look at party variation in voter turnout to rule out a rival explanation that Prop. 205 failed due to exceptionally high Republican voter turnout and low Democratic voter turnout rather than split voting behavior among Democrats. Using EI regression, we estimate that 57% of registered Republican voters and 25% of Democratic voters cast a ballot in 2019. However, and most importantly, we note that Democrats maintain a 2 to 1 registered voter advantage over Republicans.²⁶ Therefore, the composition of Prop. 205 voters remained roughly equal between Republicans and Democrats. Given the asymmetry in vote preference (Republicans nearly unanimous; Democrats mixed), the explanation for Prop. 205's failure cannot be explained by lower Democratic turnout. Had Democratic voters uniformly supported Prop. 205, Tucson could have become a sanctuary city similar to how fairly uniform support among Democrats helped elect Democratic party mayoral candidate Regina Romero.²⁷

Alternative Elite Environments

So far, the findings suggest that mixed in-party elite cues at the local level resulted in Tucson Democratic voters splitting their sanctuary city vote. This is despite mostly unified Democratic support and Republican opposition toward sanctuary policy at the national level. As it happens, Tucson is not the only entity to hold a public vote on sanctuary status. We located two other recent ballot initiatives: Humboldt County, California, in 2018, and

Greenfield, MA, in 2019. Interestingly, Humboldt displays similar partisan trends as Tucson: both jurisdictions backed Clinton by 64% in 2016.

However, the difference is that Democratic and left-leaning elites in Humboldt and Greenfield consistently and fairly uniformly endorsed the pro-sanctuary ballot propositions. In Humboldt, for instance, a collection of left-leaning groups led by the immigrant advocacy group, Centro del Pueblo, endorsed Measure K, including Humboldt County Democrats, the Green Party, the ACLU of Northern California, the Arcata City Council, the Humboldt State University Lumberjack newspaper, and Los Bagels.²⁸ Likewise, the “Greenfield Safe City—Yes on 2” campaign was endorsed by a familiar coterie of left-leaning interest groups, including the ACLU of Massachusetts’ Immigrant Protection Project, Racial Justice Rising, Greenfield Town Democratic Committee, and Franklin County Pride. Given that local elites on both sides of the aisle did not provide mixed cues, we should then expect uniform partisan polarization in both jurisdictions—Democrats in support and Republicans in opposition.

To examine this, we gathered precinct-level voting data in Humboldt and Greenfield and added statewide partisan election results from the most recent elections: the 2016 presidential vote in California, and 2018 gubernatorial vote in Massachusetts. The Humboldt County EI regression results, presented in Table 3, reveal clear partisan polarization as predicted by a partisan elite cues model: 82.5% of Democrats backed Measure K, with just 17.5% in opposition. As with Tucson, Humboldt Republicans nearly uniformly opposed the measure (95% oppose, 5% support).

Finally, the Greenfield EI regression results, presented in Table 4, show similar patterns: 96% of Democrats backed the safe city initiative, with just 1% in opposition. However, 77.5% of Republicans opposed the initiative, while 22% supported it. Overall, all three analyses (Tucson, Humboldt, and Greenfield) support the claim that local political contexts can still exert

Table 3. Estimated Measure K, Humboldt County, CA, support by Democrats and Republicans.

	Democrats	Republicans
Percent Yes	82.53	5.16
se	0.36	0.80
Percent No	17.48	94.77
se	0.38	0.70

Source: Humboldt County Board of elections, 2018 returns

Table 4. Estimated Yes Safe City Initiative, Greenfield, MA, support by Democrats and Republicans.

	Democrats	Republicans
Percent Yes	96.21	21.80
se	3.36	2.08
Percent No	1.17	77.51
se	1.22	3.14

Source: Massachusetts Election Statistics, 2019 returns

significant influence on citizens' voting behavior and that in-party cues appear to matter more than previously assumed.

Mixed-Cues Experimental Design and Analysis

To take a deeper look at whether in-party cues could exert influence on how Democrats may respond to sanctuary city initiatives, we embedded a framing experiment in a Qualtrics survey administered between May 5 and 8, 2020 to a subset of self-identified Democrats ($n=128$). The total survey sample size was $n=274$, with respondents drawn from the Qualtrics' non-probability online sample. The experiment is designed to test the mechanism that in-party mixed elite cues can move Democratic respondents away from supporting sanctuary policies. To this end, we randomly exposed self-identified Democrats to one of three conditions.²⁹ Condition one is a control group that simply reads an informational statement about sanctuary cities. Condition two includes the same information as condition one but adds on some language that Democratic mayors and city council members are "divided" about whether to support sanctuary city policies. Condition three includes the same language as the control but informs respondents that Democratic mayors and city council members are "united" (as opposed to divided) in support of sanctuary city policies. After each statement, respondents were then exposed to the following outcome measure: "How likely would you be to vote in favor/opposition of a ballot initiative to make your city, town, or county a sanctuary?" Response options ranged from 0 (opposed) to 100 (favor).³⁰

If the in-party cues argument holds ground with respect to sanctuary city policies, we expect that Democratic voters exposed to the "divided" treatment will report lower levels of support for the sanctuary city ballot initiative than will respondents in the control group. We also anticipate that respondents in the "unified" treatment group will provide statistically indistinguishable responses from those exposed to the control condition. The logic behind

this latter expectation is that Democrats, in general, tend to show high levels of support for sanctuary cities (Collingwood and O'Brien, 2019) and so may assume that Democratic politicians broadly support the policy.

In addition to the outcome measure, we asked a subjective manipulation check question to ensure that our treatments had the intended effects. The question reads: "In your opinion, how much do Democratic mayors and city council members support or oppose sanctuary city policies?" We incorporate answers to this question into our second statistical analysis to evaluate potential causal effects among compliers. Instead of simply dropping respondents who may not be complying with our treatments (see Aronow, Baron, and Pinson (2019) for a discussion on dropping respondents), we chose to instrument treatment by treatment assignment. Specifically, respondents in the "divided" treatment group who stated that Democratic elites are divided 50-50 are treated as compliers, as are respondents in the "united" group who stated that most or almost all mayors and council members support sanctuary city policies.

Our analysis, therefore, consists of two parts. First, we estimated the intent to treat (ITT) effect where we assume that all respondents in the treatment groups were treated. Second, we estimated the complier average causal effect (CACE), which takes into account variation in attention to the treatment. In the first, to reduce the influence of outliers, we estimate the mean sanctuary vote across the three groups with robust linear regression.³¹ In the second, we estimate an instrumental variable regression, instrumenting treatment by treatment assignment. This latter method takes into account the potential issue that some respondents may only weakly pay attention to the treatment and may therefore not be treated (Gerber and Green, 2012).

In Column one of Table 5, we estimate that on average 70% of Democratic respondents (in the control) support sanctuary cities. However, respondents exposed to the "divided" treatment are about twelve points (on a 0–100 scale) less likely to vote in favor of a sanctuary policy initiative. Meanwhile, respondents in the "united" condition are statistically no different in their attitudes towards a sanctuary initiative from respondents in the control condition. These general findings hold in Column two, which includes demographic covariate adjustments.

Finally, Table 6 presents results from our instrumental regressions estimating the CACE. Columns 1 (base) and 2 (covariate) estimate the effects among compliers receiving the treatment in the "elites divided" treatment group. The treatment effects are similar across models. Respondents in this group are about 20–25 points less supportive of a sanctuary ballot initiative than are respondents in the control condition. These findings are consistent with our ITT analysis presented in Table 5. Columns three and four present our

Table 5. Intent To Treat (ITT) Effects of Treatment on Attitudes Towards sanctuary city Ballot Initiatives. Outcome Variable: “How likely would you be to vote in favor/opposition of a ballot initiative to make your city, town, or county a sanctuary?”

	Outcome variable	
	Favor Sanctuary initiative	
	(1)	(2)
Treatment: Divided	-12.177* (6.575)	-13.587** (6.454)
Treatment: Unified	-0.633 (5.989)	0.748 (5.892)
Female		-5.028 (5.352)
Ideology, cons to libs		2.646* (1.439)
Education, low to high		3.916** (1.683)
Religious Importance		0.181 (2.373)
Hispanic		14.445** (6.497)
Foreign-Born		-6.601 (12.811)
Constant	70.276*** (3.458)	43.089*** (13.563)
Observations	128	128
Residual Std. Error	30.059 (df = 125)	22.866 (df = 119)

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

unified treatment findings, once again revealing no statistically significant differences between respondents in the elites unified treatment condition and those in the control group. Taken together, these results provide additional support for the contention that in-party cues may exert significant influence on whether Democrats display support toward sanctuary city policies.

Discussion and Conclusion

Despite its reputation as a progressive city and its historic status in the sanctuary movement, Tucson voters rejected a ballot proposition that would have

Table 6. Complier Average Causal Effect (CACE) Effects of Treatment on Attitudes Towards Sanctuary City Ballot Initiatives. Outcome Variable: “How likely would you be to vote in favor/opposition of a ballot initiative to make your city, town, or county a sanctuary?”

	Outcome variable: Favor Sanctuary initiative			
	Divided base (1)	Divided covariate (2)	Unified base (3)	Unified covariate (4)
Treatment	-21.925* (11.975)	-24.369** (11.117)	-1.119 (9.710)	-0.518 (10.208)
Female		-6.524 (5.483)		-2.260 (5.898)
Ideology, cons to libs		1.360 (1.527)		2.532 (1.720)
Education, low to high		4.214* (2.406)		3.954* (2.203)
Religious importance		2.692 (2.512)		1.635 (2.602)
Hispanic		12.113* (6.866)		8.373 (8.372)
Foreign born		-16.294 (13.846)		4.505 (12.416)
Constant	68.309*** (3.456)	40.406*** (14.805)	68.309*** (3.456)	36.533** (15.077)

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$.

made the city a sanctuary. At first glance, this rejection certainly seems surprising given that national Democratic elites and voters have broadly shifted into a pro-sanctuary city stance. However, upon closer inspection, the outcome can be explained by the classic top-down model of elite political communication. By now it is well-known that Republican elites at the national, state, and local level have almost uniformly expressed opposition to sanctuary cities. However, the same type of elite cohesion does not exist among Democrats, at least not in localities, such as, the city of Tucson. While many have moved strongly into a pro-sanctuary direction over the past several years, a significant number of Democratic elites in Tucson expressed considerable concern over Prop. 205. Our study suggests that partisans' Prop. 205 vote choice was very much a reflection of how local political elites framed the issue. Republicans voted nearly unanimously against Prop. 205, whereas Democrats split their vote 50-50. In two other environments where Democratic elites conveyed a unified front in support of sanctuary policy, Democratic voters were much more strongly supportive of sanctuary initiatives. Our framing experiment corroborates the observational results, showing that the divided treatment condition reduced Democrats' support for sanctuary policies relative to an informational or unified message.

These findings lead us to two important conclusions about partisan voting behavior in local election environments. First, it suggests that local elites can still exert significant influence over their constituents even in the face of conflicting national elite cues. This means that scholars and political advocates should consider paying more attention to the ways in which political dynamics may unfold in local contexts. While voting behavior may have become more nationalized over time (Hopkins, 2018), it is premature to relegate local politics to the margins if the aim is to fully grasp variations in voting behavior across time and space.

Second, the findings lead us to the conclusion that the social identity model of partisan source cues, while persuasive, may not necessarily be applicable across different electoral environments and policy issues. In the case of Tucson, out-party Republican opposition toward sanctuary cities at both local and national levels was clear, but they did not appear to have unified Democratic voters to support the policy. To be clear, we are not dismissing the relevance of negative partisanship. Given that we did not observe any notable variations in opinions towards sanctuary cities between local and national Republican elites, we cannot determine whether unified Republican support against Prop. 205 can be best explained by the top-down model of elite political communication or negative partisanship. However, what we can conclude is that had negative partisanship played a powerful role in Tucson, the ballot proposition would have likely passed as

Democratic voters would have supported it simply because out-party elites (i.e., Republicans) have stood in opposition toward Sanctuary policies at both the local and national level.

Another implication of our study is that even on salient policy matters, local politics can still exert tremendous influence on voting behavior. This means that the influence of local politics on voting behavior is not circumscribed to highly peculiar or unknown direct democracy measures. However, we suspect that the influence of local politics will be limited to ballot initiatives where a clear co-partisan divide between local and national elites is present. This sort of divergence is less likely to emerge on more crystallized issues, such as, abortion, and more recently, same-sex marriage rights. Co-partisan elite cues at the national and local level could, however, diverge on less crystallized, but salient issues, such as, marijuana legalization and produce similar outcomes as Tucson's Prop. 205 vote.

Before we conclude, it is important to emphasize that political attitudes should not be conflated with voting behavior. While the two often operate similarly, it is entirely possible that some Democrats actually endorsed sanctuary policies in the abstract, but were worried that a yes vote on Prop. 205 might have actually made the situation worse for undocumented residents. After all, this is something that a notable number of Democratic party leaders in Tucson asserted. They argued that Prop. 205 might bring the force of the state and federal government upon the city and ultimately make life worse for the undocumented population and the city as a whole. Given that the state government, controlled by Republicans, has broad powers to enforce SB-1070 across the state, this type of argument could have actually carried significant weight for many voters. Thus, Democratic voters faced multiple considerations when deciding how to vote and their rejection of the proposition does not necessarily stand-in for a general tendency or predisposition to oppose progressive immigration policies. What it likely suggests is that Democrats in states that are mostly controlled by Republicans may be more careful or conservative in their approach to sanctuary city policy. In the face of a hostile national and state government, they may not see much upside to officially declaring their city a sanctuary for undocumented immigrants. Of course, we need more studies across different states to determine if this is actually the case.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

ORCID iD

Kassra A. R. Oskooii  <https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9183-6943>

Supplemental Material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

1. However, in 2012, the Tucson City Council voted 6 to 1 to declare Tucson an “immigrant-welcoming city” and to oppose SB-1070, an Arizona state law that allowed police officers to question and detain people for the purpose of obtaining their identification papers.
2. https://tucson.com/opinion/local/tucson-mayor-rothschild-vote-no-on-tucson-sanctuary-city-prop/article_e0a032e8-c671-5c77-ae3c-e0c954787007.htmlhttps://tucson.com/opinion/local/tucson-mayor-rothschild-vote-no-on-tucson-sanctuary-city-prop/article_e0a032e8-c671-5c77-ae3c-e0c954787007.html
3. As we will detail later, while Arizona Democratic elites supported the idea of sanctuary for undocumented immigrants in principle, they fell into two opposing camps: (1) Support sanctuary policy regardless of the potential costs and (2) Do not support sanctuary policy due to potential external costs.
4. See supporting material: 2018-I001_Application-Title_and_Text_Pages.pdf Along with contests for mayor and city council, Prop. 205 was one of two propositions on the ballot—the other being Prop. 409, which was an amendment to the city’s charter that would raise the city council’s salaries. Prop. 409 also went down in defeat.
5. <http://www.familiesfreeandtogether.org/endorsing-partners/><http://www.families-freeandtogether.org/endorsing-partners/>
6. https://www.azfamily.com/news/politics/arizona_politics/u-s-senate-candidate-mark-kelly-blasts-tucson-sanctuary-city-initiative/article_897fb48e-ae3d-11e9-8230-638e8ca3b4c0.htmlhttps://www.azfamily.com/news/politics/arizona_politics/u-s-senate-candidate-mark-kelly-blasts-tucson-sanctuary-city-initiative/article_897fb48e-ae3d-11e9-8230-638e8ca3b4c0.html
7. https://tucson.com/news/local/tucson-mayoral-candidates-agree-sanctuary-city-initiative-would-be-bad/article_97722918-1a94-5cc5-9c4b-3430060e9586.htmlhttps://tucson.com/news/local/tucson-mayoral-candidates-agree-sanctuary-city-initiative-would-be-bad/article_97722918-1a94-5cc5-9c4b-3430060e9586.html
8. City of Tucson. The Choice is yours: Official Voter Information. Tucson: Published, November 5, 2019.
9. https://tucson.com/opinion/local/chicanos-por-la-causa-prop-not-good-for-community/article_7e5ed67c-219c-5b31-9979-db88ca39eddb.htmlhttps://tucson.com/opinion/article_7e5ed67c-219c-5b31-9979-db88ca39eddb.html

- local/chicanos-por-la-causa-prop-not-good-for-community/article_7e5ed67c-219c-5b31-9979-db88ca39eddb.html
10. Local Democratic elite statements about Prop. 205's legality and potential loss of federal and state funds were fairly credible. Like most other states, Arizona's government grants local authority to cities, although this authority varies depending on whether the city is a home rule city—meaning the city has a charter. Given that Tucson is a home rule city, Republican Arizona Attorney General, Mark Brnovich, would have been required under section 41-194.01 of Arizona state law to determine whether Prop. 205 violates state law. Given Brnovich's partisan affiliation, it seems quite plausible that he would have considered the ordinance in violation of state law. Ultimately, the ordinance likely would have found itself before the Arizona Supreme Court. Thus, arguments surrounding issues of legality and funding appear to carry some weight and were not merely far-fetched statements.
 11. <http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll342.xml><http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2017/roll342.xml>
 12. <https://www.cbsnews.com/news/2016-candidates-call-change-sanctuary-cities-after-san-francisco-murder/><https://www.cbsnews.com/news/2016-candidates-call-change-sanctuary-cities-after-san-francisco-murder/>
 13. https://tucson.com/news/local/gov-ducey-tucson-voters-should-reject-sanctuary-city-ballot-proposal/article_715dbf05-8837-5efe-b72b-803fd5e8759e.htmlhttps://tucson.com/news/local/gov-ducey-tucson-voters-should-reject-sanctuary-city-ballot-proposal/article_715dbf05-8837-5efe-b72b-803fd5e8759e.html
 14. <https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2019/10/17/arizona-legislature-sanctuary-city-vote-crackdown-tucson/4002434002/><https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2019/10/17/arizona-legislature-sanctuary-city-vote-crackdown-tucson/4002434002/>
 15. <http://pimagop.org/vote-republican-say-no-to-205><http://pimagop.org/vote-republican-say-no-to-205>
 16. https://tucson.com/news/local/gop-files-lawsuit-against-sanctuary-city-initiative-in-tucson/article_8e2bc5b3-5242-55f6-a8df-904a7b120682.htmlhttps://tucson.com/news/local/gop-files-lawsuit-against-sanctuary-city-initiative-in-tucson/article_8e2bc5b3-5242-55f6-a8df-904a7b120682.html
 17. A similar search for Prop. 409 generated just two results, which suggests that Prop. 205 contained greater media coverage and hence, more political interest.
 18. <https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2019/08/07/sanctuary-cities-tucson-arizona-vote-november-law-city-council/1949549001/><https://www.azcentral.com/story/news/politics/immigration/2019/08/07/sanctuary-cities-tucson-arizona-vote-november-law-city-council/1949549001/>
 19. https://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/clerks/2019Election/COT_2019_OfficialCanvass_General_11122019.pdfhttps://www.tucsonaz.gov/files/clerks/2019Election/COT_2019_OfficialCanvass_General_11122019.pdf
 20. Thirteen precincts have fewer than $n=10$ registered voters. Due to various data limitations, for some analyses, we dropped these precincts. This does not change any substantive findings.

21. We employed both EI regression and a multinomial dirichlet model for EI. Both showed very similar results. As such, we only report the former.
22. We also estimated partisanship based on the 2016 presidential vote choice. Results are presented in Table B1 in Supplemental Appendix B. Results are nearly identical.
23. Table B2 in Supplemental Appendix B presents results based on estimates using the multinomial dirichlet RxC model (Lau, Moore, and Kellermann, 2019). The results produce substantively similar findings and do not change our main conclusions.
24. In addition to the main analyses, we conducted a homogeneous precincts analysis by subsetting the precinct data to only precincts that voted at least 75% for Sinema/Garcia in 2018 ($n=31$ precincts). We then calculated the weighted mean (by total votes) of Prop. 205 in such precincts. This helps illustrate the voting outcomes for heavily Democratic precincts. This method produced a Democratic estimate of 45.15 in favor of Prop. 205, which is fairly similar to the estimates obtained from the EI model.
25. We also investigated the possibility that ethnicity cleaves Prop. 205 as much or more so than partisanship. While we find that Hispanics are more likely to support Prop. 205 (45% support, 55% oppose) than are non-Hispanics (23% support, 77% oppose), a majority of Hispanics still voted against Prop. 205. Furthermore, we find that Hispanic Democrats are no more or less likely than non-Hispanic Democrats to support Prop. 205. These findings are consistent with the mixed cues top-down model of elite political communication even for Latino voters. We detail our analysis in Supplemental Appendix C.
26. Democrats comprise 45% of registered voters, whereas Republicans just 22%. Source: <https://www.recorder.pima.gov/VoterStats/voterttldist><https://www.recorder.pima.gov/VoterStats/voterttldist>
27. Another potential explanation for the defection of Democratic voters has to do with co-partisan elite cues that may have raised the salience of crime. Given that we lack public opinion data of Tucson voters, we cannot completely rule this possibility out. However, we have analyzed the local (state) media environment with a particular focus on concerns over crime as an alternative explanation for why Democrats may have split their vote. Out of the $n=26$ news articles (i.e., Tucson and Phoenix online newspapers) that were available about Prop. 205, the word “crime/criminal” is mentioned in fifteen of the stories. However, of all the crime references, there is only one reference that implicitly connects the presence of undocumented immigrants with the rise of crime. In all of the remaining twenty-five news articles, the word crime is used to describe visa overstays or to highlight how sanctuary is necessary to get people to call the police when they have seen a crime. Most notably, the one article that connects Prop. 205 to the potential release of criminals back onto the street features a Republican legislator rather than a Democratic legislator. As such, the media messaging that likely contributed to why Democrats split their vote has to do more with state and federal funding, and the legality of the initiative—where some local Democratic elites came to endorse this perspective while others rejected it.
28. <https://cdpueblo.com/endorsements><https://cdpueblo.com/endorsements>

29. Party identification was asked well before self-identified Democrats were exposed to our experimental conditions.
30. Table D1 presents a balance test by treatment group across demographic variables. The full text of each experimental condition is presented in Supplemental Appendix D.
31. Our substantive results do not change if we estimate effects with linear regression.
32. <https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls/arizona/president><https://edition.cnn.com/election/2016/results/exit-polls/arizona/president>
33. The Census and ACS do not include foreign-born (nativity) or gini coefficient at the block group level so we are unable to test for their independent effects. However, we offer two reasons why this is not such a problem for our analysis. First, our measure of party overwhelms all other variables in terms of predicting the vote. Second, we downloaded tract level data for Pima County and correlated percent Hispanic with foreign-born (0.76) and percent Hispanic with foreign-born non-citizen (0.72). This indicates that non-citizens – who in Pima County are largely Latino – are tending to live in areas where Latinos as a whole live. Thus, our percent Hispanic variable does capture somewhat how areas with vulnerable populations are voting.
34. We conducted a variance inflation factor (VIF) test. Because percent white/Anglo and percent Hispanic are so strongly correlated, the VIF is exceedingly high so we do not include percent white/Anglo in our model. When we include white/Anglo and drop Hispanic, our substantive findings remain. The only other possible multicollinear issue is between percent Hispanic (VIF 9.91) and education (VIF = 10.19). We keep education in the model but note here that when we drop education our core substantive findings remain.
35. Due to strong multicollinearity between percent non-Hispanic white and percent Hispanic, we do not include a measure for percent white. If we swap out percent Hispanic with percent white our substantive results – i.e., party driving the vote – do not change.
36. Table B5 presents estimates from a spatial error model, the other common spatial regression technique. Here our results are substantively similar but the AIC remains unchanged from an OLS model. Therefore, we opt to present the lag model as the main model.

References

- Abramowitz, Alan. 2010. *The Disappearing Center: Engaged Citizens, Polarization, and American Democracy*. New Haven, CT: Yale Univ.
- Abramowitz, Alan. I., and Steven Webster. 2016. "The Rise of Negative Partisanship and the Nationalization of Us Elections in the 21st Century." *Electoral Studies* 41: 12–22.
- Abramowitz, Alan. I., and Steven. W. Webster. 2018. "Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans." *Political Psychology* 39: 119–35.
- Aronow, Peter M., Jonathon Baron, and Lauren Pinson. 2019. "A Note on Dropping Experimental Subjects Who Fail a Manipulation Check." *Political Analysis* 27(4): 572–89.

- Barreto, Matt, Loren Collingwood, Sergio Garcia-Rios, and Kassra A. Oskooii. 2019. "Estimating Candidate Support in Voting Rights Act Cases: Comparing Iterative Ei and Ei-rx C Methods." *Sociological Methods & Research*. 1-34, 0049124119852394.
- Benoit, Kenneth, Kohei Watanabe, Haiyan Wang, Paul Nulty, Adam Obeng, Stefan Müller, and Akitaka Matsuo. 2018. "quanteda: An R Package for the Quantitative Analysis of Textual Data." *Journal of Open Source Software* 3(30): 774.
- Bolsen, Toby, James N. Druckman, and Fay Lomax Cook. 2014. "The Influence of Partisan Motivated Reasoning on Public Opinion." *Political Behavior* 36(2): 235–62.
- Bowler, Shaun, and Todd Donovan. 2000. *Demanding Choices: Opinion, Voting, and Direct Democracy*. Ann Arbor, MI: Univ. of Michigan Press.
- Bullock, John G. 2011. "Elite Influence on Public Opinion in An Informed Electorate." *American Political Science Review* 105 (3): 496–515.
- Casellas, Jason P., and Sophia Jordan Wallace. 2020. "Sanctuary Cities: Public Attitudes Toward Enforcement Collaboration Between Local Police and Federal Immigration Authorities." *Urban Affairs Review* 56(1): 32-64. doi:1078087418776115.
- Collingwood, Loren, Ashley Jochim, and Kassra A. R. Oskooii. 2018. "The Politics of Choice Reconsidered: Partisanship, Ideology, and Minority Politics in Washington's Charter School Initiative." *State Politics & Policy Quarterly* 18(1): 61–92.
- Collingwood, Loren, and Brian Gonzalez O'Brien. 2019. *Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge*. USA: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Collingwood, Loren, Brian Gonzalez O'Brien, and Joe R. Tafoya. 2020. "Partisan Learning Or Racial Learning: Opinion Change on Sanctuary City Policy Preferences in CA and TX." *Journal of Race, Ethnicity and Politics* 5.1: 92.129.
- Collingwood, Loren, Kassra Oskooii, S. Garcia-Rios, and M. Barreto. 2016. "eicompare: Comparing Ecological Inference Estimates Across Ei and Ei: R x C." *The R Journal* 8(2): 92–101.
- Converse, Philip E. 1964. "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics". In *Ideology and Discontent*, edited by David Apter, 1–74. New York: Free press.
- Delaney, Kevin, and Rick Eckstein. 2008. "Local Media Coverage of Sports Stadium Initiatives." *Journal of Sport and Social Issues* 32(1): 72–93.
- Delgado, Melvin. 2018. *Sanctuary Cities, Communities, and Organizations: A Nation At a Crossroads*. New York, NY: Oxford Univ. Press.
- Gerber, Alan, and Donald P. Green. 2012. *Field Experiments: Design, Analysis, and Interpretation*. WW Norton.
- Gilens, Martin, and Naomi Murakawa. 2002. "Elite Cues and Political Decision-making." *Research in micropolitics* 6: 15–49.
- Gonzalez O'Brien, Benjamin, Loren Collingwood, and S. O. El-Khatib. 2019a. "The Politics of Refuge: Sanctuary Cities, Crime, and Undocumented Immigration." *Urban Affairs Review* 55(1): 3–40.
- Gonzalez O'Brien, Benjamin, Elizabeth Hurst, Justin Reedy, and Loren Collingwood. 2019b. "Framing Refuge: Media, Framing, and Sanctuary Cities." *Mass Communication and Society*: 1–23.

- Goren, Paul, Christopher M. Federico, and Miki Caul Kittilson. 2009. "Source Cues, Partisan Identities, and Political Value Expression." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(4): 805–20.
- Hopkins, Daniel J. 2018. *The Increasingly United States: How and why American Political Behavior Nationalized*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Hout, Michael, and Christopher Maggio. 2021. "Immigration, Race, and Political Polarization." *Daedalus* 150(2): 40–55.
- Johnston, Christopher D., Benjamin J. Newman, and Yamil Velez. 2015. "Ethnic Change, Personality, and Polarization Over Immigration in the American Public." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 79(3): 662–86.
- Karp, Jeffrey A. 1998. "The Influence of Elite Endorsements in Initiative Campaigns." *Citizens as legislators* 3: 149–65.
- King, Gary. 2013. *A Solution to the Ecological Inference Problem: Reconstructing Individual Behavior From Aggregate Data*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press.
- Klar, Samara., Yanna Krupnikov, and John Barry Ryan. 2018. "Affective Polarization Or Partisan Disdain? Untangling a Dislike for the Opposing Party From a Dislike of Partisanship." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 82(2): 379–90.
- Lang, Correy, and Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz. 2015. "Partisan Sorting in the United States, 1972–2012: New Evidence From a Dynamic Analysis." *Political Geography* 48: 119–29.
- Lasch, Christopher N., R. Linus Chan, Ingrid V. Eagly, Dina Francesca Haynes, Annie Lai, Elizabeth M. McCormick, and Juliet. P. Stumpf. 2018. "Understanding Sanctuary Cities." *BCL Rev.* 59: 1703.
- Lau, Olivia, and , Micheal Kellermann (2019) eiPack: Ecological Inference and Higher-Dimension Data Management. R package version 0.1-9.
- Leech, Nancy, and and Anthony J. Onwuegbuzie. 2008. "Qualitative Data Analysis: A Compendium of Techniques and a Framework for Selection for School Psychology Research and Beyond." *School Psychology Quarterly* 23(4): 587.
- Lenz, Gabriel S. 2013. *Follow the Leader?: How Voters Respond to Politicians' Policies and Performance*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Levendusky, Matthew. S. 2010. "Clearer Cues, More Consistent Voters: A Benefit of Elite Polarization." *Political Behavior* 32(1): 111–31.
- Lupia, Arthur. 1994. "Shortcuts Versus Encyclopedias: Information and Voting Behavior in California Insurance Reform Elections." *American Political Science Review* 88(1): 63–76.
- Magleby, David. 1984. *Direct Legislation: Voting on Ballot Propositions in the United States*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Univ. Press.
- Mason, Lilliana. 2015. "I Disrespectfully Agree": The Differential Effects of Partisan Sorting on Social and Issue Polarization." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1): 128–45.
- Mason, Lilliana. 2018. *Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became Our Identity*. Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press.
- Nicholson, Stephen P. 2012. "Polarizing Cues." *American journal of political science* 56(1): 52–66.

- Oskooii, Kassra, Sarah K. Dreier, and Loren Collingwood. 2018. "Partisan Attitudes Toward Sanctuary Cities: The Asymmetrical Effects of Political Knowledge." *Politics & Policy* 46(6): 951–84.
- Rogers, Todd, and Joel Middleton. 2015. "Are Ballot Initiative Outcomes Influenced by the Campaigns of Independent Groups? A Precinct-randomized Field Experiment Showing that they are." *Political Behavior* 37(3): 567–93.
- Zaller, John R. 1992. *The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion*. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge Univ. Press.

Author Biographies

Loren Collingwood is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. He is the author of "Sanctuary Cities: The Politics of Refuge" (2019) and "Campaigning in a Racially Diversifying America: When and How Cross-Racial Electoral Mobilization Works" (2019) both with Oxford University Press.

Gabriel Martinez is a PhD student in the Department of Political Science at the University of New Mexico. His research interests include Latino Politics and Immigration Politics.

Kassra A. R. Oskooii is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and International Relations at the University of Delaware. His research focuses on the interplay between the contextual and psychological determinants of political opinions and behaviors of high- and low-status group members.

Appendix A: Variable Coding

- Tucson
 - Percent Yes-205 2019, 0-100
 - Total vote Yes/No 205, numeric
 - Percent Democrat 2018 (average of Sinema and Garcia, two top of ticket Dems), 0-100
 - Percent Romero Democrat mayoral candidate 2019, 0-100
 - Percent Cease (Green Party), 2019, 0-100
 - Percent Ackerley (Independent), 2019, 0-100
 - Percent Yes-209, 2019, 0-100
 - Percent Clinton 2016, 0-100
 - Percent Non-Hispanic White
 - Percent Non-Hispanic Black
 - Percent Non-Hispanic Asian
 - Percent Hispanic
 - Percent Race: Other
 - Herfindahl-Hirschman index of segregation
 - Percent Hispanic Change 2000-2010 (2010 - 2000)/2000

- Age: Percent Under 18
- Age: Percent 18 - 44
- Age: Percent 45 - 64
- Age: 65 Plus
- Percent BA (4-year college education) or higher
- Percent Unemployed
- Median Household income
- Greenfield
 - Percent Yes on 2, 0-100
 - Total Vote Yes/No on 2, numeric
 - Percent Clinton, 2016, 0-100
 - Percent Baker (Democrat governor), 2018, 0-100
- Humboldt
 - Percent Yes on Measure K, 0-100
 - Total Vote Yes/No on Measure K, numeric
 - Percent Clinton, 2016, 0-100

Appendix B: Alternative Models

Ecological Inference

Spatial Regression

To rule out variables that might confound the relationship between partisanship and sanctuary policy vote choice, we gathered block group data from the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey (ACS, 2013-2017 5-year). It is important to try to rule out alternative explanations because research indicates that Latinos, for example, are more supportive of sanctuary policy than are Anglos. Furthermore, in a state like Arizona, partisanship may be cleaved by race/ethnicity.³²

From the ACS 2017 5-year, we gathered: total population, Hispanic/Not Hispanic racial data (non-Hispanic white, Latino/Hispanic, black, Asian, race: other), age, education level obtained, unemployment rate, and median household income (2017). To generate our racial estimates, for instance, percent Hispanic, we divide the total number of Hispanics in a given Census block by the total population in that Census block. From the 2010 Census, we gathered percent Hispanic, enabling the creation of a percent Hispanic change variable.³³

To measure precinct racial diversity, we calculate the Herfindahl–Hirschman index based on percent white, percent Hispanic, percent black, and percent other (Rhoades 1993). Higher values indicate greater precinct diversity, and lower values little diversity.

However, moving into the spatial space, because precincts and block groups overlap but are incongruent, we employ a spatial join technique called areal-weighted interpolation (Pebesma 2018). First, we took the Pima County precinct shapefile (the target) and overlaid it against the Pima County block group shape file (the source). For each block group variable of interest (e.g., race, ethnicity), we then produce a precinct level count and ultimately percent. For each precinct, these estimates are calculated via a weighted function:

$$W_i = \frac{A_i}{A_j} \quad (1)$$

Here, W_i denotes the areal weight for each intersected feature; A_i the area of intersected feature i , and A_j the total area of feature j (blocks). From this we calculate the following function:

$$E_i = V_j \times W_i \quad (2)$$

Here, E_i is the estimated value for the variable of interest for intersected feature i , W_i is the aforementioned spatial weight, and V_j is the population count for the block source j . Then, for each target feature k (precinct) we sum all values intersections (E_i):

$$G_k = \sum E_{ik} \quad (3)$$

Areal-weighted interpolation, however, makes a significant assumption – that the population is evenly spread out within a particular set of polygons. In practice this is not true, so to check the plausibility of our resulting precinct-level estimates, we conducted a variety of robustness checks. First, we correlated the total population (estimated the above process) and total registration (from the board of elections) resulting in a correlation of 0.593. This indicates the two variables are related as one might expect. If, for instance, the correlation was below 0.10, we might be suspicious that the spatial join was mistakenly pushing populations counts disproportionately into low population precincts. Second, we correlated percent Hispanic with percent Yes-205, resulting in a correlation of 0.37 (percent Anglo and Yes-205 is -0.39). This corresponds to extant public opinion findings indicating that Latinos are more supportive of sanctuary cities than are Anglos. Finally, we subset the spatially merged data to the 135 Tucson precincts.

To evaluate whether we are capturing indeed a partisan effect and that our findings are not conflated with race, ethnicity, education, and some other factor, we estimate a multivariate linear regression. However, to guard against regression assumptions that individual units (precincts) are

independently and identically distributed, we tested whether statistical assumptions related to our OLS voting model are violated.

We conducted a Moran's-I test on our residuals, finding a Moran's I statistic of 0.081, $p < 0.05$. This indicates spatial autocorrelation in our data. In addition, we conducted a LaGrange Multiplier test to ascertain whether a spatial lag or spatial error model is most appropriate. A LM spatial lag test produces a test statistic of 8.09 that is statistically significant ($p = 0.004$), whereas an LM spatial error test does not produce a statistically significant test statistic (2.42, $p = 0.12$). Therefore we estimate a spatial lag model. To do so, we construct a Queens weights matrix for each precinct's spatial connectivity to every other precinct. The model takes on the following form:

$$y = \rho Wy + X\beta + \epsilon \quad (4)$$

where ρ is an estimated spatial correlation parameter, y is the outcome variable (percent Yes Prop. 205), W is a spatial weights matrix where an individual precinct's weight is a function of row standardized sum of all links to the precinct, and X a vector of predictors (Bivand et al. 2013). We then present predicted probability estimates based on this model to test our hypotheses.

The next step in our analysis is to take into account possible confounders that might bias our estimates of the relationship between partisanship and sanctuary city policy preferences. Table B3 presents correlations between our outcome variable of interest, percent Yes Prop. 205, and possible vote choice predictors. Many variables are related to the vote, including race/ethnicity, age, unemployment, income, and of course our measure of partisanship.

To begin to account for other possible confounders, we turn to multivariate regression analysis. Table B4 presents our spatial lag regression results.³⁴ Just three variables are statistically significant as judged by values in the p value column: our key Democratic latent vote variable, age 45 - 65, and median household income. Turning to the first variable, for each point increase in Democratic vote from 2018, the model predicts an increase of about 0.524% vote increase for Prop. 205.³⁵ In addition, precincts with higher shares of voters between the age of 45 - 65 are statistically less supportive of the initiative than are precincts with fewer shares of these voters. Likewise, precincts with greater shares of residents with higher incomes are less supportive of Prop. 205.

Finally, in fitting with our Moran's I and Lagrange Multiplier tests, our spatial autoregressive parameter, ρ , is 0.31 and statistically significant at the 0.01 level suggesting the spatial lag model improves model fit. This is true, as the spatial lag model AIC is about six points lower than that estimated with a baseline linear model.³⁶

To fully evaluate our hypotheses, we conducted a post-estimation Monte Carlo simulation where we hold all covariates at their mean values then iterate from minimum (24.5) to maximum (86.7) on Democratic vote share 2018. The minimum value is conceptualized as a strong Republican precinct whereas the maximum is conceptualized as a strong Democratic precinct. Under this design and analysis, if our hypotheses are to be confirmed, we should simulate very little support for Prop. 205 among Republican precincts and mixed Prop. 205 support among Democratic precincts. Figure B1 presents the simulations based off of Table B1. The results comport with our hypotheses. Republican precincts give just 3.7% of their vote in support of Prop. 205, whereas Democratic precincts nearly evenly split the vote on Prop. 205 (48% yes). These results are very consistent with our EI analysis, and supportive of our hypotheses.

Table B1. Estimated Prop. 205 support by Democrat and Republican as estimated by 2016 Presidential vote:

	Democrat (Clinton)	Republican (Not Clinton)
Percent Yes	50.29	0.75
se	0.12	0.19
Percent No	49.60	98.98
se	0.05	0.47
Total	99.89	99.74

Source: Tucson Board of elections, 2018, 2019 returns; Pima County Elections Department; 2016 precinct results

Table B2. Estimated Prop. 205 support by Democrat and Republican as estimated by combining Percent Sinema and Percent Garcia:

	Democrat (Sinema/Garcia)	Republican (Not Sinema/Garcia)
Percent Yes	47.96	2.93
se	0.04	0.06
Percent No	52.04	97.07
se	0.04	0.06
Total	100.00	100.00

Source: Tucson Board of elections, 2018, 2019 returns. Multinomial Dirichlet RxC results.

Table B3. Correlation between Prop. 205 and covariates

	Correlation
Percent Yes-205	1.00
Percent White/Anglo	-0.34
Percent Hispanic	0.30
Percent Black	-0.04
Percent Asian	0.15
Percent Race: Other	-0.19
Herfindahl–Hirschman index	0.05
Percent Hispanic Change 2000 - 2010	-0.11
Age: Under 18	-0.02
Age: 18 - 44	0.51
Age: 45 - 64	-0.45
Age: 65 Plus	-0.28
Percent BA or higher	-0.01
Percent unemployed	0.32
Median hh income	-0.51
Percent Democrat 2018	0.77

Table B4. Simultaneous Autoregressive Lag Model predicting percent yes on Prop. 205, Tucson, AZ.

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	p value
(Intercept)	22.399	16.197	1.383	0.167
Percent Hispanic	-0.081	0.102	-0.798	0.425
Percent Black	-0.276	0.352	-0.784	0.433
Percent Asian	0.578	0.458	1.262	0.207
Percent Other	0.465	0.562	0.827	0.408
Inverse Hirfindahl Index: Race	-0.930	2.904	-0.320	0.749
Percent Hispanic Change 2000-2017	0.007	0.013	0.551	0.582
Percent Age Under 18	0.000	0.001	-0.127	0.899
Percent Age 18-44	-0.241	0.183	-1.318	0.187
Percent Age 45-64	-0.611	0.254	-2.406	0.016
Percent Age 65 plus	-0.100	0.208	-0.483	0.629
Percent BA or higher	0.057	0.132	0.430	0.667
Percent Unemployed	-0.023	0.227	-0.103	0.918
Median hh Income	0.000	0.000	-2.017	0.044
Percent Democrat (Senate/Governor 2018)	0.524	0.129	4.073	0.000
ρ	0.314			0.005
AIC	985.54			
AIC for lm	991.2800			

Table B5. Spatial Error Model predicting percent yes on Prop. 205, Tucson, AZ.

	Estimate	Std. Error	z value	p value
(Intercept)	12.485	16.882	0.740	0.460
Percent Hispanic	-0.091	0.109	-0.841	0.400
Percent Black	-0.379	0.373	-1.017	0.309
Percent Asian	0.613	0.474	1.294	0.196
Percent Other	0.445	0.573	0.777	0.437
Inverse Hirfindahl Index: Race	-0.187	3.215	-0.058	0.954
Percent Hispanic Change 2000-2017	0.013	0.014	0.947	0.344
Percent Age Under 18	0.000	0.001	0.216	0.829
Percent Age 18-44	-0.157	0.187	-0.837	0.403
Percent Age 45-64	-0.530	0.259	-2.050	0.040
Percent Age 65 plus	-0.048	0.223	-0.215	0.830
Percent BA or higher	0.038	0.137	0.273	0.785
Percent Unemployed	0.039	0.235	0.167	0.867
Median hh Income	0.000	0.000	-1.809	0.071
Percent Democrat (Senate/Governor 2018)	0.712	0.119	5.998	0.000
λ	0.248			0.094
AIC	990.46			
AIC for lm	991.2800			




Figure B1. Monte Carlo post-estimation simulation estimating percent Yes Prop. 205 vote in Republican versus Democratic precincts.

Appendix C: Ethnicity and Partisanship

To assess the possibility that ethnicity is cleaving the vote as much or more so than partisanship, we conducted two additional analyses. We first swapped out percent Democrat with percent Hispanic on the right side of the EI model. The results are displayed below in Table C1. While Latinos are more supportive of Prop. 205 (45% support) than are non-Latinos (primarily whites, 23%), a majority of Latinos still oppose the measure (55% oppose v. 77% of non-Latinos).

To examine whether an interaction between ethnicity (Latino) and partisanship might further explain the vote, we then conducted a straightforward linear regression weighted by precinct vote total. That is, we regressed percent yes on percent Hispanic, percent Democrat, and their interaction. A statistically significant product term would indicate that Latino Democrats supported Prop. 205 more so than non-Latino Democrats. Table C2 reports the results. The results indicate that partisanship is the dominant explanation for percent Yes vote choice, and that Latino Democrats are no more or less likely to have backed the initiative than non-Latino Democrats.

Table C1. Estimation Prop. 205 support by Hispanic/Latino and non-Hispanic.

Candidate	Race Group	Vote Estimate	StDev.	CI Lower	CI Upper
Yes	Hispanic	44.82	1.61	41.47	47.52
Yes	Non-Hispanic	23.35	0.86	21.40	24.64
No	Hispanic	55.24	1.80	51.18	58.45
No	Non-Hispanic	76.57	0.83	74.74	78.01

Table C2. Percent yes as a function of percent Hispanic, percent Democrat, and their interaction.

	<i>Dependent variable:</i> Pct. Yes
Percent Hispanic	0.062 (0.161)
Percent Sinema 2018 (Democrat)	0.873*** (0.058)
Hispanic × Democrat	−0.001 (0.002)
Constant	−24.782*** (4.042)
Observations	122
R ²	0.885
Adjusted R ²	0.882
Residual Std. Error	108.198 (df = 118)
F Statistic	303.179*** (df = 3; 118)

Note: * $p < 0.1$; ** $p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$

Appendix D: Experimental Treatments

Control: Sanctuary cities limit local police from cooperating with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and from inquiring into residents' immigration status. This policy makes it more difficult for the federal government to deport undocumented immigrants.

Democrat Unified: Sanctuary cities limit local police from cooperating with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and from inquiring into residents' immigration status. This policy makes it more difficult for the federal government to deport undocumented immigrants. *According to a report from the non-partisan National League of Cities, Democratic mayors and city council members across the country are **unified** in their support of sanctuary policies and **agree that** Democrats should actively support sanctuary cities.*

Democrats Divided: Sanctuary cities limit local police from cooperating with U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and from inquiring into residents' immigration status. This policy makes it more difficult for the federal government to deport undocumented immigrants. *According to*

a report from the non-partisan National League of Cities, Democratic mayors and city council members across the country are **divided** in their support of sanctuary policies and **disagree on whether** Democrats should actively support sanctuary cities.

Variable codes:

- Dependent Variable: How likely would you be to vote in favor/opposition of a ballot initiative to make your city, town, or county a sanctuary? (0-100)
- Manipulation Check: In your opinion, how much do Democratic mayors and city council members support or oppose sanctuary city policies? Almost all support; Most support; Some support, some oppose; Most oppose; Almost all oppose. Unified treatment respondents, 1 = Almost all support; Most support; 0 = otherwise. Divided treatment respondents, 1 = Some support, some oppose; 0 = otherwise.
- Ideology. Very conservative (1), Conservative (2), Somewhat Conservative (3), Middle of the Road (4), Somewhat Liberal (5), Liberal (6), Very liberal (7).
- Education. Up to 12th grade but no diploma (1), High school graduate (2), Some college but no degree (3), 2-year college degree (4), 4-year college degree (5), Post-graduate degree (6).
- Religious importance. Not at all important (1), Not too important (2), Somewhat important (3), Very important (4)
- Hispanic or Latino. 1 = yes, else = 0.
- Foreign Born. 1=yes, 0 = no
- Female. 1 = yes, else = 0.

Table D1. ANOVA F-Test balance test across treatment assignments reveals treatment groups do not vary by demographics

	F-Value	P-Value
Female	1.38	0.26
Ideology, cons to libs	0.03	0.97
Education, low to high	0.75	0.47
Religious Importance	0.04	0.96
Hispanic	0.16	0.85
Foreign-Born	0.06	0.94